




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
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THE
NEW ART
OF LYING,
COVERED BY
IESVITES vnder the Vaile of
EQUIVOCATION;

DISCOVERED AND DISPROVED
BY
Henry Mason.



LONDON:

Printed by George Purslowe for John Clarke, and
are to be sold at his Shop vnder Saint Peters
Church in Cornehill. 1624.

THE
NEW ART
OF LYING
COVERED BY
TESTIMONY under the Veil of
Falsification.

DISCOVERED AND DISPROVED
BY
Wm. C. Cresswell.



LONDON:
Printed by J. G. & J. S. B. at the
New York Office, No. 10, N. York St.
1854.



TO THE MOST REVE-
rend Father in GOD, the Lord
Arch-bishop of *Canterburie* his Grace,
Primate of all ENGLAND, and
Metropolitane.

Most Reuerend Father,

He first newes that I heard of the Equiuocating Arte, was that which I learned out of your Graces writings. And well might this be to mee the first newes. For, if I mistake not, you were the first Writer, that published those trickes in print to the World: though (as beginnings vse to be) that discovery of this Art was but brieve in comparison, either because that occasion did not admit of any long or full discourse, or because, but little of this mystery could then at the first be discovered; the professors of that Trade, as your selfe also signifie, labouring to hide their secrets from the knowledge of other men. And indeed it may be obserued, that in managing of the Papacy, they haue certaine mysteries of State, which the

a Prefat.
præfixâ
Sex Præ-
lection.
cap.1. &
cap.1. de
Mendac.
num.12.
13.14.

more they vse, the more they cōceale. One of which, is their power to murder Kings, and blow up Parliaments, & kill all that stand in their way, like the Assassini, who held it a point of great merit to murder all that were their aduersaries in Religion: but yet they are not willing that the world should know that this is any part of their Creede. Another such policy may be that of their Indices Expurgatorij, by which they haue circūcised the lips of such Writers, as spoke any word against the Roman Church: but this they kept as a great mystery among some few of themselues, till misfortune brought it to light, full sore against their wils. And for a third such-like policy, I may reckon also this Art of Equiuocation, which the Masters thereof did keepe secret as long, and as much as they could. And therefore it was no maruell, if your first discouery of this mystery were but brieft in compariscō. But afterward^a another Reuerend & learned Prelate, lighting vpon a more compleate Treatise then formerly had appeared, penned by a Popish Priest in defence of this Arte, and approued by the Arch-Priest, and the Prouinciall of the Iesuits: he pursued the point more fully according as that Treatise gaue him iust occasion. The crye of which pursuit did vnkennell the olde equiuocating^b Foxe, and hunted

a. D. Mor-
ton B. of
Lichfield
and Co-
uentry,
Confutar.
of Equiuo-
cation.
b Persons,
who by
occasion
of the Bi-
shopps
booke
wrote a
large
Treatise in
defence of
Equiuoca-
tion.

hunted him into the open field, there to display himselfe, and to shew what trickes he could use, for saving his new Art from the infamy of lying. And here I finding him well chafed, did by the sent follow after him vnto his Den, to espie if I might, what he and his Cubs were deuising in the darke. And I found them very busie in hammering Reseruati-
ons and mentall frauds, vpon euery occasion and in all kindes of dealing, thereby to catch vs at vn-
awares, who being plain and simple men our selues, could not suspect such frauds and impostures in o-
thers. And in case these things should come a-
broad, as in part themselves had discovered them a-
gainst their wils: yet so confident and resolute did I finde them, to maintaine all for good and honest
dealing, as that Father * Persons maketh a won-
der of it, and thinketh that God should deale worse
with men then hee had done with beasts, if hee
should not grant them equiuocating trickes, and
reserued wiles, as he hath granted to the Hare
and the Foxe, their leapes and turnings, and
windings, and going backe againe in the same
trace they come, to deceiue the Dogges that
pursue them. And yet all this confidence I take to
be but a copie of their countenance. For euen in
their printed Apologies of this Arte, they seeke to
cast

a Mitigac.
cap. 9. nu.
81. p. 403.

cast mists before the Readers eyes, that hee may not be able to see the depth of their meaning. These things when I had found, as I thought, (though I know I am much short of finding all) I was willing, according to my abilitie, to impart them vnto well-meaning Christians, that they seeing the deepe frauds of these men, may learne to shun their company and acquaintance.

In which indeuour of mine, what seruice I may haue done for the publique good, I cannot tell: but sure I am, if there be any good in it, I should in reason returne it thither, where I first found it. The consideration whereof, hath made mee to presume so far vpon your Graces clemency, as to lay downe at your feete this poore Treatise, the grounds whereof I first learned from your owne pen: desiring (if therein I be not ouer-bold) that it may, vnder your name and protection, be sent forth into the world. Which being all, that at this time I haue to say, I humbly take my leaue, desiring the God of peace and truth, to preserue you from euery euill word and worke, that you may maintaine his truth in this world, and enioy his peace both in this world, and the World to come.

Your Graces deuoted in all seruice,

HENRIE MASON



TO MY LOVING AND
Dearely beloued Parishioners, the

Inhabitants of S. Andrews vnder-shaft in
London, GRACE and TRUTH in
IESVS CHRIST.



IN the ordinary exercise of my
ministry among you, when I
came to speak of the ninth Cō-
mandement, the first thing that
I met with to bee considered,
was the matter of *Truth* and *Lying*. And con-
sidering hereof, I found two sorts of Lyes
frequent among men: the one, an open and
professed Lye; and the other, a cunning and
artificiall Lye. The former was defended by
the *Priscillianists*, an old kinde of Heretikes: &
the latter is now defended by the *Romanists*,
a latter sort of false Prophets. Both of them are
odious to God, who is honoured by *Truth*;
and pernicious to the societie of men, which
is vpheld by *Truth*: but the latter is the more
(b) dangerous,

dangerous, because vnder a colour of *Truth* it beguileth simple soules, who are otherwise enemies to Lying. The consideration heereof, made me to enquire a little further into this Arte; which the fauourers therof haue sought to conceile, by calling it by a new name. For beeing ashamed of the name of Lying, they haue christened it by the name of Equiuocating: a name as vnknowne in this meaning, as the Arte it selfe was vnheard of before these latter dayes. The mystery and iuggling tricks of which deuice, I did then and vpon that occasion, in part discouer vnto you: but briefly and plainely, the time, and place, and occasion not admitting of any long or Schoole-like discourse. But since considering, that together with the increase of false Prophets in this Kingdome, this Arte of falsehood hath abounded also: I thought it a part of my duty, (God hauing pleased to place mee as a Watch-man ouer your Soules) to giue you a fresh warning of this danger, and that in a more ample and large discourse, then formerly I had done, and in such a maner and sort, that you might haue something lying by you, that might aduertise you of this dangerous deceit; when I could

not haue opportunity to speake vnto you out of the Pulpit. And this I was moued to vnat this time the rather; because I haue of late obserued, that these artificiall Lyers (among their other deuices and forgeries, which vpon confidence of this Arte, they take liberty to vse without remorse) doe instill into the minds of their credulous followers, an opinion; and doe labour to spread abroad among others a suspition, that among our Learned men, many in heart are of their Church, howsoeuer for the worlds sake they dissemble their opinion: and that there are a good number among vs of the Clergie, who are better perswaded of their Religion, then of our own. Doctor *Sheldon*, a man well acquainted with their dealings, as hauing liued in their bosome, and taken the Orders of Priesthood in their Church, doth write, that * *whilest hee fed on Romes huskes, hee* * *Sheldon of the miracles of Antichrist, ca. 4. pag. 52.*
often heard of many grievous imputations laied
upon some of the greatest Clerkes in the Church
of England, as though in heart they were theirs,
which he then beleeeued to be true, as others did;
but since hath found to be much otherwise. And
my selfe haue met with some, (which perswadeth me, that they abuse others in this kind,

beside our *greatest Clerkes*) who haue more then intimated to my selfe, that I knew that which might iustifie their cause, if I would speake it. Which might well put mee into a muse, what had euer slipped frō me, why they should be perswaded that I had such an opinion of their Church : sauing that I considered, that this might well be one of the Iesuites equiuocating deuices, to instill that opinion concerning vs, into their Disciples minds, that so they might gaine more credit to their cause. Vpon which occasion, entring a more serious cōsideration of the point, I perceiued, that besides this *Arte*, they vse other deuices also, for this purpose, which I thought good, for your better caution and safety, briefly to relate in this place.

First then, if they meete with any of our *Clergie*, which are of weake braine, and vnsettled resolution, (as it is possible, wee may haue some such as well as they) they set vpon such weaklings, with plausible tales in commendation of their Church; whose open abominations practised at home among themselves, are not so well known to vs, who haue neuer trauelled into Popish Countreys. And if by
this

this meanes they chance to peruert a *weake* and *vnsettled* man, then the cry goeth, that such a *Learned* man, is become a Catholike, because euidence of truth forced him to forsake his old Profession.

Secondly, if they meete with men, who being either opinatiue of their own worth, think their good parts not sufficiently rewarded; or being indeed of good parts, haue but slender meanes: they tempt such, as the Deuill did our Sauour, with offers of gifts and preferments. And if by these allurements they can bribe any man to become their *Profelyte*, for *filthy lucre sake*, then they blaze abroad the conuersion of such a great and learned Scholar, who could not withstand the light of truth shining in the *Roman Church*.

Thirdly, if by these, and such like policies, they preuaile not: (for these deuices fit them best, because then they bring men ouer to their side, with their own mouthes to publish their owne shame; but if thus they preuaile not) yet one shift they haue behind, which is, to deuise lyes, of such and such mens conuersion to their Church, who euer hated it from their very soules. In which kind of forgerie, they

(b) 3. haue

haue so farre proceeded, that they haue spared neither liuing nor dead. For, as if they had cast off all feare of shame, which was sure in the end to be their reward, they haue in writing belyed in this maner, the chiefeft Doctors in our Church, who haue suruiued to refute, and to detest their forgeries in Print. But when men are dead, then they become more bold: and of the most constant and zealous Professors of our Religion, they giue it out to the world, that such and such men of chiefe esteeme in the *Protestant* Church, did recant vpon their death beds, it being then no time to dissemble any longer. And when themselues haue first deuised these tales on their fingers ends; then they produce them in their serious bookes of Controuersie, as graue argumētts to confirme the *Roman* faith by. The discouery of which falsehood, I wish it may worke the like effect in your hearts, that it hath done in mine: which is, that whereas I vtterly disliked Poperie before, I do now detest it more then euer. And for this purpose I was the rather moued to penne this small Treatise, that you, of whose soules I knowe my selfe to haue vndertaken the charge, seeing these forgeries, may

may learne to beware of *Equiuocating Spirits* :
who, though otherwise they professe strictnes
of conscience, & according to the rules of the
Romane Faith, are very deuout and religious ;
yet can cozen you with an hundred lying de-
uices, and neuer feele the least grudge of con-
science for it. For so Father *Persons* telleth vs,
that ** Equiuocations are allowed principally to men*
of scrupulous conscience, for auoiding of lying. By
which he giueth vs a faire warning, (and I de-
fire you take notice of it) that if there be any
scrupulous and tender consciences amongst
them (as some no doubt there are) though
they would not tell a lye, if they knew it, for
all the world, yet euen such men may with-
out any scruple or feare, deceiue vs with *equi-
uocating reseruations*, and mentall deuices. And
hauing thus giuen you this faire warning, now
me thinketh I may speake vnto you, to the
same purpose as our Lord did to his Disciples ;
If they shall say vnto you, *Loe heere is Christ,*
or loe there, beleue it not ; for there are many
false Prophets arisen, and doe deceiue many. Be-
hold I haue told you before. And if after all this
warning, any of you shall suffer himselfe to be
deluded by lying Equiuocators, *his blood will*
bee

** Apologie
of Eccles.
Subordinat.
cap. 12. in
the very
end.*

*Matt. 24. 7,
23, 24.*

Exek. 33. 4.

Gal. 5. 10.

bee vpon his owne head, but I haue deliuered mine owne soule. But I feare not this in you, of whose constancie and zeale I haue had good experience: so that I may rather take vp that saying of the Apostle, *I haue confidence in you through the Lord, that ye will be no otherwise minded; but that, if any man shall trouble you, (or seeke to withdrawe you from your faith) he shall beare his iudgement, whosoever he be.* And in assurance hereof, I leaue you to Gods grace, in the words of the same Apostle; *Brethren, the Grace of our Lord Iesus Christ be with your Spirit.* Amen.

Gal. 6. 18.

Yours, the vnworthy Minister
of Iesus Christ, and your ser-
uant for Iesus sake,

HENRIE MASON.



To the R E A D E R.



When the Impression of this Treatise was almost finished, I obtained the sight of two severall papers of Latine Verses, composed long since, in the yeere 1606. by two then Students in the Vniuersities, now Doctors in Diuinitie, and my worthy friends. Which Verses being (according to the Academicall custome) made upon Questions then disputed in both the Vniuersities, in Publicis Comitijis, and happily concurring with the subiect of this Treatise; as I was glad that my selfe had gotten, so I was willing to impart them to the Reader, presuming that my two friends, and much-respected brethren, will not be offended, that I send them their Verses backe againe in Print.

A

Aequivo-



*Questio philoso-
phica in comitijs
Cantabr.*

*Æquivocationis tenebræ pugnant
cum rationis lumine.*

*Ecloga. Cui nomen Pseudolus,
siue Æquivocator.*

Personæ.

Simia. Pseudolus.

*Vide passim Ho-
vatijs Satyræ
quintam, &
Plauti Pseudo-
lum, cui iste sup-
par.*

*a Sic Black-
wellus Archi-
presbyter in sua
ad Catholicos
Epistola, dat. 7.*

Novemb. 1605.

*b Vinculo cæcæ
obedientie ob-
stringi o mnes
Iesuitas & no-
vitijs Seminariorum pullos abundè notum est : Quo tenentur, quidquid Superior imperaverit,*

Hoc quoq; docte Pater, præter narrata, petèti;
Pseudole, responde, quibus artibus invia rerū
Effugiam, nostræ propria pericula Sectæ.
Nonne vides quàm non satis est maria omnia circum
Romulæ quæsisse diu responsa Cathedræ,
Vinctos, adrafos, Iesu cognomen adeptos,
Iam reveli in patriam, Româ duce, & auspice Româ!
Hinc crucis, hinc vrget malus horror carceris; aut nos
Explorat densus, capita heu damnata, Satelles.
Pseud. ^a Nos nil interea miseri, nil tendere contra,
Nos tantum lachrymas, & nulli audita Deorum
Vota damus: vel, si nostra hoc Ecclesia poscat,
Idq; ^b Patri (qui nos in Sancta incepta remittit)

Præ.

Pseudolus.

Præcepisse lubet, bello, sicavè, venenovè
Extinxisse nefas, & gentem abolere nefandam
Conamur; vel, si zelus flagrantior adsit,
Forſan ſulphureo diſperdimus obvia flatu. (veſter
Sim. Cuncta piè ac rectè. *Pſeud.* Quid rides? *Sim.* Simia
Ille ego. Nos inter quaſi c nos non norimus. *Pſeud.* Euge c *Lupus lupum
novit, &c.*
Simia quandoquidem tam ſanctè, tamq; ſeuere
Iſta rogas, noſtram miſſis ambagibus Artem,
Artem, quam magnus docuit *Pater* d *Arius*, Artem, d *Arj hæveſtat-
chæ ſophiſticam
& Acquivocato-
rium coram Impe-
ratore Conſtanti-
tino inſurandum
recole apud So-
cratem Hiſt Ec-
cleſ. lib. 1. c. 25.
e Plautus in
Pſeudolo Act. 2.
Scen. 4.
Pſeud. Onerabo
meis præcep-
tis Simiam
Quid agat, ne
quid titubet, do-
cèt ut hanc ſerat
fallaciam.
f Apocal. 9. 11.
g Quid olim
Femplarij, quid
ni tandem le-
ſiſtis accidat?*
Cortinam quæ Phœbe tuam, quæ te quoq; Proteu,
Vinciat, & vincat (paucis adverte) c docebo.
Putide Tireſia. *Quicquid loquere aut erit, aut non:*
O quàm divinare tibi donavit Apollo.
Lentū eſt, Quicquid ego edixo ſimul ipſum erit, & non.
Acquivocare mihi Stygius dedit f *Ἀπολλύων*
Sim. Eſt, & Non ſemper ſibi contradicere dixi,
Et didici à puero. Si iam hæc mutaverit ætas,
Auſa ratam violare fidem, & convellere prima
Fundamenta, quibus verorum innititur ordo,
Submetuo ne nos (quorum venerabile nomen
Amſanctum populis, & formidabile Sceptris
Nunc ſedet ad primas) g olim, volventibus annis,
Mutati in peius ſaſtidia publica ſimus.
Sed tu perge loqui quorſum hæc adeo ardua tendant.
Pſeud. Rectâ ad te, fili. Si te, ſub iudice (qualis
Hæreticæ nimium eſt vigil indagatio turbæ)
Contigerit reſponſa peti, vel dicere cauſam,
Accipe quâ ratione queas nec prodere verum,
Nec male mentiri, nec te obiectare periclo,
Nec reticere tamen. Captes aſtutus oportet
Lucifugam ſermonem, & verſicoloria diſta.
Sim. Vt ne viſeludam pueri de more Sophiſtæ?
Præterea, ſi quid perplexi ſubloquar, omnes,
Evolve, ingeminant. *Pſeud.* Vah nil ſapis: vt ere verbis *Ariſtot. ſel
Egmulweis h.
cap. 1.*
Ex ſe perſpicuis, ſed mente interprete tortis,

h *Act. 2. Sc. 2.*
Pseud. Tu in-
ventus verò me-
am qui forçillis
fidem?

i *Act. 2. Sc. 3.*
Pseud. Dy im-
mortales auri-
chalco contra non
charum fuit
Meum menda-
cium.

k *Act. 4. Sc. 8.*
Nimis illic mor-
talis doctus, nimis
versutus, nimis
malus
Superavit dolum
Troianum atque
Vlysem Pseu-
dulus.

l *Act. 2. Sc. 2.*
Pseud. Hic mihi
incus est, procu-
dam ego hodie
hinc multes
dolos.

Formula reserva-
tionum mentaliū
Iesuitis vsitata.
Non novi i. e.
apodictice.
Non vidi, i. e.
visione beati-
ficā.
Vel non ut di-
cam tibi.

Mente tua, non mente illa, quæ consona voci.

Sim. Me verò memini primo didicisse Lycæo

Sensa animi rerum, sensorum Symbolæ voces.

Scilicet vtibilem linguæ articulantis honorem

Naturam tribuisse patet mortalibus, vt sit

In quo conueniant, & possint mutua fungi.

Quinetiam ratio.-- *Pseud.* h Num tu rationibus audes

Iniussu certare meo? meminisse decebat,

Me Patre cum primum nostrarū elementa Scholarum

Imbiberes, in verba manus te nostra dedisse.

Imperio iam disce meo: ac, dum prosequor, audi.

Forsitan hoc de te quærat, *Tunc Sacerdos?*

Non ego Respōde. *Sim.* Quid? mentiar? Haud ita Romæ.

Pseud. Ipse fui Romæ; mentiri nescio. Num tu

Esse Sacerdotem te credis *Apollinis, Orci,*

ſſidos, aut Cereris? Tu sic intellige. ¹ Fraus hæc

Argento contra non chara est, aut orichalco.

Sic itidem. *Tu? Romam adijisti?* Non ego Romam

Vnquam adii (capite incedens, aut compede victus,

Aut furcam ore gerens, humerovè molatile saxum)

Simia, ne risu te ruperis. Hæc ego trado

Sobrius, ac prudens. *Sim.* ^k O te, Pater alme, cerebri

Fœlicem! quàm Dîa doces! Haud talia distant

Pythagoras, Anytivè reus, vel dogma Platonis.

Pseud. Te præstas nobis ^l incudem Simia: tecum,

Dum loquor, ipse novas videor producere technas.

Si, cui consilii focium te adiunxeris, idem

Cum fuerit Patriæ suffossor, perq; -duellis,

Is coram sistatur, & hunc norisne rogeris?

Haud te nosse hominem, prius aut vidisse, repone.

Non nosse (ex animum cantu, Boreave susurro,

Non ex *Æthiopum* historijs, Troiave ruinis,

Non ex notitiâ, quæ Demonstratio dicta est.)

Non vidisse (oculis palpebra tegmine clausis,

Non oculis Argûs, non alta noctis in umbris,

*Non disiunctarum trans saxea septa domorum,
Non hoc, quem Coelum dabit olim Patria, visu:
Denique non, ut rem tibi, Iudex improbe, narrem.)*

Sic non lingua tibi mendax, sed dictio fallax.

*Interea^m duplices condens in pectore sensus,
Viceris, & rabidos prædâ spoliaveris hostes.*

*Sim. O Pater: ô nulli quidquam mentite, quid autem,
Quid si iuratos recta ad responsa laceſſant,*

Si tangendæ aræ, si cælum in vota vocandum,

Fallemusne fidem? Pseud. Fidei est sine corpore nomen

Hæreticis concessa fides. Periuria non sunt,

Quæ varium sumunt ex vocum ambage colorem,

Aut iniurata sunt dissona nuncia mentis.

Sim. Hæc super Hæretici iurabunt protinus omnes,

Papicolis non esse Deum: n ludibria Cælo

Conceptis fieri, consultisq; impia verbis:

°Non posse (vt reliquæ cessant hoc nomine lites)

His pietate malis obſisti. Pseud. Simia, quicquid

Hic nobis inimica cohors obganniat (vt se

Ruperit inuidiâ) tu sic, licet vndiq; creſcat

Suspicio, corvum ludes. P. elapsus hiantem

Tortilis in morem anguillæ, & nova flumina inibis.

Deprendi miserum est, vel Apolline iudice vincam.

Me memini quondam bis tervè his artibus vsum:

°Periurum aiebant. Quid tum? Non hoc mihi bilem

Moverat. Irascor, quod non irasceris hosti

Arciùs. Sim. Ipse quidem (sic me rationis egentem

Dementisse modo fateor) vix ista putaram

Digna fidè. Iam me Magnæ reuerentia Romæ,

Iam tua me virtus, censuraq; nescia falli

Imperiis egere suis, vt singula credam,

Et cupiam vt capiam tam sanctæ imitamina fraudis:

Iam liqueo in laqueos, tetusq; interfluo rimis:

Iam me vtinam celebres Romani nominis hostes

*manifesto tenetur? Ch. Anguilla est, elabitur. ° Act. 4. Sc. 6. Bal. Malum & sceleratum, periurum
aiebant esse me. Si. Pol. haud mentitus es. Bal. Ego haud iratus fui.*

m Act. 2. Sc. 1.

*Pseud. Ego in
meo pectore ita
paravi copias du-
plici triplici do-
los*

*Perfidias, vt ubi-
cunq; cum hosti-
bus congregiar*

*malorum meorū
Fretus virtute
dicam, mea in-
dustria & maliti-
tia fraudulentia*

*Facile vt vincā,
facile vt speliem
meos perduellis
meis perfidijs.*

° Act. 1. Sc. 3.

*Quid ais quantā
terra tegit homi-
num periuissime
Iurauisti te,*

*&c. Bal. fateor.
Cal. nempe con-
ceptis verbis. Bal.*

*etiā consultis quo-
que. Cal. Periu-
rauisti scelerate.*

*° Ibidem.
Pseud. Non po-
test pietate obſisti
huic, vt res sunt*

*cetera,
Deos quid ē, quos
maximè æquum
est metuere, eos*

*minimi facit.
° Act. 5. Sc. 4.*

*Pseud. Quid cū
Pseud. Non po-
test pietate obſisti
huic, vt res sunt*

*cetera,
Deos quid ē, quos
maximè æquum
est metuere, eos*

*minimi facit.
° Act. 5. Sc. 4.
Pseud. Quid cū*

Exagitent. Sic est. An mecum Pseudolus vnquam
Verba habuit, quærent. Nunquam, respondeo, quicquā
Verborum (*virides urentum flatibus ornos,*
Aut animas Erebo, Scopulis, glacie ve cientum.
Non per canalem sonuit, Taurumve Perilli.
Non Arabum lingua Chaldaeorumve loquutus,
Non lingua τεπέδων, τεταχείρων, βαταχρεγγων,
χόχοσιδης φάγων, φλογοπέδων, έρεβήσικων,
Μυομηχανεύων. *Pseud.* Quo tendis nimbila supra?
Sim. Κορυδαλοκοιτομάχων. *Pseud.* Satis ô satis. Vnde sed ista?
Sim. Nomina sunt longè populorum vtroq; sub Indo,
Quos è barbarie nuper sub fœdera Christi,
Pontificisq; iugum nostri misère Sodales.

Act. 4. Sc. 1.
Pseud. O homi-
nem lepidum! te
quoque etiam do-
lis

*Atque etiā men-
dacijs. Iupiter te
mihi seruet.*

Pseud. O lepidū, charumq; caput, quā Pseudolicissas!
Simia non magis est imitatrix, Simia, quā tu.
Te mihi, te seruet Romæ, ac sibi Iupiter. *Sim.* Atqui
Pluris adhuc ego sum. Si quando (scilicet haud sunt
Semper in occulto nostræ mysteria Sectæ)
Suspicio est cæcos verbis me affingere sensus,
Iurabo me non hoc fingere: dumq; ita iurem,
Interea me non quicquam finxisse, negantem
Fingere, iurabo. Tum tertia, quarta secundis
Iuramenta superiiciam catus. Omnia falsa,
Et falsura omnes. Hæc *Aequinocatio* nomen
Me tribuente, potest *Reflexa* aut * *Orbica* dici. (te

* *Aequinocatio*
circularis.

Act. 4. Sc. 1.
Et ego ob tuam,
Simia, perfidiam
te amo, et metuo,
& magnifacio.

Pseud. Dapsile ob inventū hoc, nequeo mi Simia, quin
Osculer, argutumq; caput demulceam. Abundè
Iam scio te nostris aurem adiecisse lubentem
Consiliis; & quæ superaddis, facta daturum.
Sim. Quī verò nosti num non, dum, Pseudole, tecum
Hæc loquor, æquivocè me iam tibi credere fingam,
Aequivocè tibi pollicear me strenuè in hostes
Vocibus æquivocis vsurum? *Pseud.* O improba virtus!

κακὸς κόερος
κακὸν, αἶον.

Sim. Dum pullum doceas oculos transfigere, corve

Ipse tuis caveas. Pseud. "Metuo malè, ne malus iste,
Et nimium præcox Patris anticipator, ab hoste
Protinus in nostros obuertat cornua. *Sim.* Nam quid
Impedit, in Caium qui sit periurus eundum
In Titiū quoq; --- *Pseud.* Sed nostris sermonibus ecçum
Nescio quis captator adest. Discede. *Sim.* Valeto.


Quid ni igitur

Pseudolus æquivocare docens, & *Simia* discens,
Verborum laqueos ambo luant laqueo?

THO. GOAD
Magister Artium.

Act. 4. Sc. 3.
Pseud. Peiorem
ego hominem,
magisq; versutè
malum,
Nunquã edipol
quenquam vidi
quàm hic est Si-
mia,
Nimisq; ego illum
hominem metuo,
Et formido male,
Ne malus item
erga me sit, ut er-
ga illum fuit;
Ne in re secunda
mibi obuertat
somnia.

An



Questio philo-
phica proposita in
Comitibz Oxon.

*An Societati humanæ infesti-
ores sinte vafr Amphibologi, } Affirmo.
quam aperte periuri.*

* Guido Faux.
* Garnet Ies.

FAux crebri patriæ fax, fax mundi, *vnū at habebis
Patrem flagitii, flagitio parem.

Herculeas ambo sceleri posuere columnas,
Nil ultra, hic calamo pessimus, hic manu.

Nomine qui varius, qui vestibus, ore, colore es

* Parenthesis in-
cludit mentalem
Iesuitæ reservati-
onem.

Vectus trans mare tu? Non (* *mare mortuum*.)

Curia Papalistibi visa est? Non (*sine scortis*)

Sacris Papa caput? Non (*caput aneum*)

Num tu mendicans abraſo crine Sacerdos?

Non (*ritu antipodum*; Non (*apud inferos*)

Nonne a te binis grauidata est Fulvia natis?

Non, verum fateor (*bimula cum foret.*)

Heus laqueo nodos claudas hos ocyus vno,

Et nodo laqueos, in cruce carnifex.

Ignare æquiucæ fraudis conſtringito fauces,

Garnetto vniuocè guttura frangito.

Pendeat inſœlix, membris truncetur, apertè

Periuro æquiucocus crimine dirior.

Pectore diffiſſo videas, quæ mente *reſeruat*;

Evulſi latebras cordis et explices.

Ancipiti gladio Ieſuitica texta ſecentur:

Solvi nam nequeunt ancipites doli.

DAN. FEATLY,
Magiſter Artiũ.



THE
NEW ARTE OF
Lying, couered by Iesuites
under the Vaile of
Equiuocation.



He ^a Apostle describing the state ^a 2.Thes.2.7^e
of Antichrist, doth signifie, that
a mysterie of iniquitie should ap-
peare in the managing of it:
and this doth implie, that in the
kingdome of Antichrist *iniquity*
should reigne vnder a couert of
holinesse. And the same Apostle
doth foretell, ^b that in *the latter* ^b 1.Tim.4.
^{1,2.}
times (which are the times of Antichrists reigne) men
should *speake lies in hypocrisie*. And this, though it may
bee extended farther, yet cannot bee more literally vn-
derstood, then of such as teach a practise of *lying*, vn-
der a pretence of preserving *trueth*. Now of these
Prophecies of the Apostle I may speake in a like man-
ner, and almost in the same words, as our ^c Lord spake ^c Luke 4.21.
of the Prophecie of *Isai*; *This day are these Scriptures*
fulfilled in our eyes; for now wee see those who exer-
cise *a mystery of iniquity*, and *speake lies*, pretending
thereby to maintaine and preserve the *trueth*: as (to
B omit

d *Lequendo cum Arte dissimulati-
onis vitatur pec-
cata, quæ comu-
niter committun-
tur, &c. Rodri-
quez sumâ, v.
mendac. nu. 4.*

e *Aequiuocatio, quam licitam tu-
emur, omnino ad
mendacia periur-
iaq; vitanda
confert. Heissius
Refut. Aphoril.
cap. 4. Aphor. 4
nu. 130.*

f *Sive recreatio-
nis gratiâ, sive
quocunque alio
fine, iuret se non
fecisse aliquid
quod reuera se-
cit, intelligendo
intra se aliquid
aliud &c. reuera
non mentitur.*

*Sanchez oper.
moral. to. 1. l. 3.
c. 6. nu. 15. pag.
25.*

g *Per hanc do-
ctrinam singula-
rem, possumus
excitare innume-
ra peccata, quæ
passim aliquot*

*negligentiores admitimus negando vel affirmando passim sine aliqua subintellectione, cum qua con-
iuncta essent vera. Nauar. Comment. in C. Humanę aur. q. 3. nu. 13. h Proceeding a-
gainst Traitors. lib. I. 1.*

omit all further instance) may evidently be seene in a new-found Arte of *Equiuocation*. For the Masters and maintainers thereof doe tell vs, ^d That by speaking according to this Arte of dissembling, sinnes are auoided, which, without it, are commonly committed. And that ^e *Equiuocation* altogether serueth, or is of good use for auoiding of lyes and periuries. And ^f that for what end or reason soeuer a man sweare, that hee did not doe a thing, which indeed hee did doe, yet hauing his reseruatiō with- in himselfe, he in very deede telleth no lie. And ^g that by this singular doctrine wee may auoid innumerable sinnes, which through heedlesnesse diuers of vs doe euery foote commit, by denying or affirming things vsually, without a reseruatiō vnderstood, with which if they were ioyned, they would bee true. And to this purpose it is, that Father ^h Garnet, a Master of this Arte, when a booke was to be licenced by him, the title whereof was, *A Treatise of Equiuocation*, hee scored out that title, and put this in the place of it, *A Treatise against lying and fraudulent dissimulation*. By all which it may appeare, that these men, while they teach the Arte of *Equiuocation*, do professe notwithstanding, that all which they doe, is with a religious obseruance and preferuation of the trueth. But now in the second place I offer to prooue in this short Treatise, that whatsoeuer shewes they make to the contrary, yet this deuice of *Equiuocation* is in truth, an Arte of falshood and deceit, and such as the Scriptures doe condemne vnder the name of *lying*. Which point if it bee once cleared, then there can be no doubt, but that the Church of *Rome*, and her Doctors, are they which exercise a mystery of iniquity, and speake lies in hypocrisie.

Now.

Now for the clearing hereof, and that the world may see more fully what to thinke of this *mystery*, there are five things, which I haue thought necessary to be considered of.


1 *The name, or what is meant by the word Equiuocation in this Question.*

2 *The Originall of it, or who be the Authors and vsholders of it.*

3 *The obiect and matter, or in what cases they allow it to be lawfull.*

4 *The vse, or rather abuse of it, or for what turnes it may serue the Patrons of it.*

5 *The Grounds, or what the proofes or reasons are either for or against it.*



CHAP. I.

Of the name, and what is meant by the word Equiuocation in this Question.



Hat wee may the better vnderstand what is meant by this word, wee must note that there are two famous acceptations and vses of the word *Equiuocation* among men. The first is a *proper* and *ancient* vse of it, frequent among all sorts of writers, but handled and spoken of, especially in *Logicke*. The second is an *improper* and *abusive* acceptation of it, which was of late yeeres deuised by some writers and Doctors of the *Romane Church*. Father *Parsons* calleth the former, *verball*, and the later, *mentall Equiuocation*. And of these hee saith, ^a that the *verball* is ^a *Mitigar. cap. 8*
proper Equiuocation; the *mentall* is so called, rather by ^{nu. 10. pa. 314}

a *Ibid. nu. 15.* certaine similitude, then propriety of speech, and that
 a the verball is onely true and proper Equiuocation, for that
 b *Ibid. nu. 10.* mentall in rigor is none. And againe, that ^b Equiuocation
 hath of later yeeres onely been accustomed to bee vsed in this
 sense, that is, for mentall Equiuocation. And Heissius ano-
 c *Refut. Aphor. cap. 4. Aphoris. 3. nu. 129.* ther Iesuite, & Patron of this Art, saith, that their *mixt*
 speech (which they call mentall Equiuocation) is not pro-
 perly Equiuocation. By which speeches of these Iesu-
 ites (especially seeing the one of them is a man so well
 seene in this *Arte*, and so much exercised in this argu-
 ment of Equiuocation) I presume I haue sufficient war-
 rant to say as I did, without the controll of any of our
 punie Iesuites, that the one vse and acception is *proper*
 and *ancient*, the other *vnproper*, and of a later growth,
 that is, since the *mystery of iniquity* did open it selfe
 more fully to the world, and men did more apparantly
speake lies in hypocrisie. But yet for the distinguishing of
 these two kindes, I will rather call the first *Logicall E-*
quinocation, as being that which Logicke doth onely
 acknowledge: and the later I will call *Iesuiticall Equi-*
uocation, as hauing, if not its first deuising, yet at least, its
 polishing from men of that Order. The Question in
 this place is onely concerning the later, which I call
Iesuiticall Equiuocation. Notwithstanding for the better
 clearing of the point in controuersie, somewhat is first
 to bee said concerning the former, which I call *Lo-*
gicall.

First then for the *Logicall Equiuocation*; it is an *am-*
biguons or doubifull saying, when one word or speech hath
more senses then one, and it hapeneth three wayes.

1. When a word by it selfe hath diuers significations
 and meanings; as this word [*to know*] hath. For some-
 times it signifieth to apprehend and vnderstand the
 certainty of some truth: as when S. Iohn saith; *God*
is greater then our hearts, and knoweth all things. 2. [*To*
know] is as much as to approue and allow of: as when

Daniel

David saith; The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous. Psal. 1. 6. And when *Christ saith to the foolish Virgins; Verily I say unto you, I know you not.* Math. 25. 12. The meaning is; I do not acknowledge you for any of mine. In this, and such like words as this, there is an *Equivocation*; because the word hath diuers acceptions and vses.

2. When words, which haue but one signification of themselves, yet are so ioyned together in some sentence, as that they may, by reason of the composition, make and yeeld diuers meanings; or when by reason of their contexture, they may haue moe meanings than one: as when *S. Luke saith; When they heard this, they were baptized in the Name of the Lord Iesus:* these words are diuersly construed by the Learned. For some thinke them to bee the words of *S. Paul*; and to haue reference to the speech of *John Baptist*, immediately going before; and then the meaning must bee this; that when those brethren, there spoken of, heard *John* so teaching concerning Christ, they were baptized of *John*, in the Name of the Lord Iesus. But others thinke them to be the words of *S. Luke*, and to haue reference to the former speech of *S. Paul*; and then the meaning must be; that when those brethren had heard *Paul* discoursing in this manner of *John* and his Baptisme, then they were baptized of *Paul*, in the Name of Christ. In this Clause then, there are two senses giuen by the Learned; and that sheweth that there is an ambiguity; but that ambiguitie riseth not from the diuersitie of significations in any of the words, but from the different consideration of the contexture or composition of the sentence.

3. When the circumstances of time, place, persons, &c. are such, as that in reason, and in the iudgement of sober men, being well and duely considered, they may limit or restraîne the speech to some speciall matter or subject; or other wise alter the meaning of it from that

Acts 20. 27.

which it should haue, if it were in some other place, and vpon some other occasion. As for example: when *S. Paul* saith; *I haue not shunned to declare vnto you all the Counsell of God.* These words considered by themselues, doe comprize all the Secrets of God, and all the mysteries of His Wisedome: but if we consider the circumstances of the persons, time, place, and occasion; as that the speaker was *Paul*, an Apostle, whose office and imployment was to teach the mysteries of Religion; that the hearers were the Church of *Ephesus*, who expected information in matters of saluation; and that the occasion of their meeting at this time, and in this place, was onely for teaching and learning the Word of God, and the Gospell of Iesus Christ: these circumstances, in reason, may teach vs, that in this place, those words [*all the Counsell of God*] are not to bee extended to all the secrets and depth of Gods Wisedome; a great part whereof, is neither reuealed, nor necessarie to bee knowne of any man; and some part whereof, though it be reuealed, yet was not pertinent to this occasion; but rather, that those words are to bee limited and restrained, according to the present occasion, to signifie and note, all necessary things for them to know for their soules health and saluation. Or, to giue a more familiar example, and such as a Iesuite hath giuen instance in; wee may suppose, that two men going together in a iourney; the one of them (his money sayling him) desireth to borrow ten pound of his fellow; who maketh answer, that he hath not so much: heere his meaning must be supposed to be, that he hath not so much in his purse, or so much in a readinesse about him, though he had foure times the like value in his Chest at home. But if the same thing should be desired of him, when he were at home in his owne house, then the meaning would be, that he had not such a summe at home. And the same answer, which was true, beeing giuen to his fellow-

fellow-Trauellet by the way; would be a lye, if it were vttered to him in his house. Thus there may arise an ambiguity in a speech, by reason of the circumstances of person, place, time, and occasion; where otherwise there is no ambiguity either in the signification of any word, or in the composition of the sentence, considered in and by themselves.

And in what kind soeuer, of these now specified, there happeneth an ambiguity; that I call a *Logicall Equiuocation*; concerning which our present question is not. For as the Doctors of the Romane Church, so the learned of our side doe acknowledge, that there may bee a lawfull vse of equiuocall speeches in euery of these kinds, if they be not extended too farre, or mis-applied to a wrong cause. For, to speake more particularly, it is granted,

1. That we may lawfully vse words, which may indifferently be taken in diuers acceptions and meanings, as they are then vsed. And this is plaine, partly because the Scriptures are full of such speeches; and partly, because our common conuersation and life cannot bee without them.

2. It is not vnlawfull, when some case of further good doth require it, to vse these ambiguous speeches in the lesse knowne and common signification, and in another meaning then it is likely the hearers wil vnderstand them for the present. For so, when our Lord said, *Lazarus our friend sleepeth*: He meant that he was dead, *Ioh. 11. 14.* which was the lesse common and knowne signification; and therefore the Disciples, according to the more vsuall meaning, vnderstood him of naturall sleepe. And he did this for good purpose, and for the profit of the hearers; that they might heereby learne, either that death in generall is to Gods children but as a *sleepe*, by which they are refreshed, and made the more liuely: or that this death of *Lazarus*, was rather to bee called

a sleepe, then a death, because hee was so speedily raised from it againe.

a 1. Sam. 16.
1, 2.

3 It is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech in any of these kindes, that thereby we may hide some thing from the hearers, which they should not know. This assertion hath not so direct prooffe from *Scripture*, as the others haue; & yet it is not without all prooffe from the *Scriptures* neither. For there wee finde, that a man may lawfully vtter one trueth, thereby to hide another trueth from the hearer. As for example, ^a God appointed *Samuel* to goe to *Bethleem* and anoint one of *Iesses* sonnes to bee King; and when *Samuel* obiected, *How can I goe? If Saul heare it, hee will kill mee. The Lord said, Take an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord.* And so *Samuel* did, as it followeth in the same Chapter; and by this he cōcealed his purpose of anointing a new King; which was the speciall intent of his going to that place. And if it be lawfull and warranted by Gods own appointment to vtter one trueth, for the concealing of another: then in reason I thinke it cannot iustly be condemned for vnlawfull, if a man, vpon iust occasion, doe vse an ambiguous speech in a true sense, thereby to hide from the hearer, something which hee should not knowe. For if in so doing any thing bee faulty, it must be, as I take it, the one of the two; either because an ambiguous speech is vsed in another meaning then it is likely the hearer will take it; and that to be lawfull, is prooued in the former assertion: or because this true sense in the ambiguous speech, is vttered to conceale another thing from the hearer; and that to be lawfull, is cleare by this example of *Samuel*. And therefore I thinke the conclusion may hence be inferred, that it is not vnlawfull, if there be iust cause for concealing of a trueth, to vse an ambiguous speech, that thereby we may conceale some other thing, which is not fit to

to be vttered. And hereto agree our learned diuines also. For one, speaking of *Equiuocatio*, as it consisteth in the ambiguitie of words vttered, addeth, ^a *That this kind of Equiuocation, especially in ordinary speach, no man doubteth but that it may lawfully be vsed.* And, ^b *this Equiuocation may haue his due place for concealing of Counsels, and hiding of secrets.* And againe, speaking to his aduersary, ^c *Knowe (saith he) that those concealements, whether of Confessions or Counsels, whereof you speake, where they doe consist of ambiguities in the words, wee dislike not: onely if they be couered with a lie, that wee doe wholly condemne.* And another learned writer in our Church, speaking of one, that magnified the vse of Equiuocation, adioineth, ^d *If by the name of Equiuocation he vnderstand a plaine and sober concealing and couering of secret counsels, which in this miserable life is oft times necessary, I am of his opinion too.* This is the opinion and iudgement of our learned men, concerning the vse of *Logicall Equiuocation*; and herein we agree with them of the Church of Rome: or if there bee any difference among the learned of both sides in these cases already mentioned, as perhaps about some circumstances in the vse of those ambiguous speeches there may be, it is nothing to the present Question in hand, which is not concerning any of the kindes of these *Logicall Equiuocations*, which consist in the ambiguous acception and meaning of the words vttered. And therefore when the *Equiuocators* of our time doe labor to confirme their *Arte*, by the authorized vse of such speeches, as are ambiguous by reason of the diuers meanings which the words may receiue, they misse the marke, beate the ayre, and spend their labour to no purpose.

And this being briefly noted, concerning the true and *Logicall Equiuocation*, I come now to the *improper* and *Jesuiticall*. And that what it is, I will set downe in their owne words, who professe to bee Patrons of it.

^a *Quā interdū, maximè in liberis sermonibus, hoc quidem sensu vti licere nemo dubitat.* Abbot Andrus Eudemono-loan cap. 2 fol. 18.

^b *Sit per illam cetandus consilijs, regendisq; arcanis suis locus.* Ibidem.

^c *Tu scias taciturnitates illas, quas narras, Confessionum & consiliorum, ubi amphibologijs, & ambiguitatibus consistunt, nobis non improbari: damnavi prorsus à nobis, ut mendacio tegantur.*

^d *Si appellatione Aequivocationis, simplicem quandam & modestā relucientiam significet, aut dissimulationem consiliorum in hac misera vita sepe necessariam; planè cum ipso sentio.*

Casaubon. epi. ad Fronton. Duc. pag. 110.

a Mitigar. cap.
9. nu. 53. pa. 382

b Mitigar. ca.
12. nu. 3 p. 484.

c Possum absq;
mendacio ea ver-
ba usurpari, eti-
am si ex sua sig-
nificatione non
sint ambigua, nec
cum sensum ve-
rum admittant
ex se, nec ex cir-
cumstantijs oc-
currentibus, sed
tantum verum
sensum reddant
ex aliquo addito
mente proferentis
retento, quodcuq;
illud sit. Sanch.
oper. moral. l. 3
c. 6. nu. 15.

Father Persons ^a then, a man very laborious in the poli-
shing of this *Arte*, defineth it thus; *Equiuocation* or *Am-
phibologie* in this our *Controuersie*, is nothing else, but when
a speech is partly vttered in words, and partly reserued in
mind, by which reseruatiō the sense of the proposition may
be diuers. And again, ^b mentall *Equiuocation* (saith he)
is, when any speech hath or may haue a double sense, not by
any double signification or composition of the words them-
selues, but onely by some reseruatiō of minde in the speaker,
whereby his meaning is made different from the sense which
the words that are vttered, doe beare or yeeld without that
reseruatiō. And Sanchez giuing a Rule concerning the
words vsed in this their *Equiuocation*, saith, ^c A man
may without telling of a lye, vse those words, although they
be not ambiguous by their signification, and doe not make a
true sense, either by themselves, or by reason of the circum-
stances then occurring, but doe onely make a true sense by
some addition, kept in the speakers minde, whatsoeuer that
addition bee. Thus they. By which descriptions it ap-
peareth, that *Iesuiticall Equiuocation*, is a mixt proposi-
tion, (as Persons also diuers times calleth it) part where-
of is vttered in words, and so taken it hath one sense;
and another part of it is reserued and vnderstood in the
speakers minde, which being added to the words spo-
ken, maketh another sense; as for example, A Seminarie,
or a Iesuite-Priest being asked by a Magistrate, *Are*
you a Priest? He answereth, *I am no Priest*, vnderstand-
ing and reseruing in his minde this clause, *So as I am*
bound to tell you, or any other which himselfe pleaseth
to like purpose: here (say they) is but one mixt pro-
position, part whereof is vttered in words, namely, *I am*
no Priest; and that taken alone as it is vttered, breed-
eth a false sense, and in this sense they would haue the
Magistrate to conceiue it: & another part of that propo-
sition is reserued and kept secret and close in the Priests
mind, & that is this, *So as I am bound to tell you!* And this
secret,

secret & mentall reservation, being added to the words, maketh this one entire Proposition; *I am no Priest, so as I am bound to tell you*: and that being taken all together, maketh a true sence, and so the Priest vnderstandeth it. And therefore, if he doe but keepe, or reserve, or vnderstand that or any such clause in his minde, though the words which he speaketh bee neuer so false, yet this man telleth no lye, nor speaketh no vntruth. Such is the vertue of this new-found Arte; and thus they describe it.

But that it may yet appeare more fully and more distinctly, it will not be amisse to set downe the myserie of this Art in certaine distinct Propositions, all gathered from their owne writings, and approued dealings.

1. That this *mixt Proposition* of theirs, or this *Equiuocation*, as they call it; whether we consider that part of it which is vttered in words; or the whole Proposition, as it hath the reservation added to it, which is kept in the speakers mind; hath in neither respect or consideration, as *F. P.* saith, any doubtful sense of speech or words, by their doubtfull or double signification; but only that it vttereth not all the whole sense of the speaker; & therefore cannot be properly called equiuocall, according to Aristotles meaning & Definition. And againe, These mixt Propositions (^b saith he) be not properly equiuocall in the sense that Aristotle did define, &c. for that they doe not of themselves nor their own natures, signifie equally diuers things; but being understood wholly, haue a simple and single signification in the mind and understanding of the speaker: yet, for that the hearer conceiuing but one part thereof, apprehendeth a different sense from the speaker; they may, ab effectu, be called ambiguous; for that they leaue a different sense in the hearer & speaker, albeit of themselves they be plaine, cleere, and true, &c. Out of which words, considered & ioyned with that which was formerly cited out of *Sanchez* and *Parsons*, we may note three things. 1. That there

(a) Mitigat.
cap. 8. nu. 10.
pag. 313.

(b) Mitig. cap.
11. nu. 14. pag.
447.

is no ambiguity or doubtfull sense, either in the words vttered, if they be taken alone; nor in the whole Proposition, as they compound it of the words vttered, & the reseruatiō vnderstood, taken together. 2. That therefore they call it *Equiuocation*, or an *Equiuocall Proposition* or speech; because they signifie or expresse one meaning to the hearer, which is false; and retaine or vnderstand another sense within themselves, which is true. 3. That the taking of this word *Equiuocation* in this meaning, is not proper, and such as *Aristotle* did vnderstand and conceiue by it. Hee might haue said, that it is not proper; nor such as either *Aristotle*, or any man either learned or vnlearned, hauing but common sense in his head, and common honesty in his heart, did euer acknowledge before this last Age. And the truth is, they therefore call it an *Equiuocatio*, though the word was neuer known to haue any such meaning or signification; because they are ashamed to call it by its right name, which is, *A Lye*. But as the couetous man, though he practiseth the thing, yet abhorres the name; and therefore will be called a good husband, or a thrifty man: And as a thiefe is ashamed of his right name, and when he meeteth with a Traueller to whom he would signifie his errand; he saith, that he is a Good-fellow which wanteth money: So the *Romanists* teach an Arte of lying; and because they are ashamed of the infamous name of *Lyers*, they call themselves *Equiuocators*: and that which other men call *Lying*, they call *Equiuocating*.

2. That if a man will vse this benefit of *Equiuocating*, he must be warie and carefull, that he reserue some secret clause in his mind, which being added to the words vttered, doe make a true speech; or else all is marred, and he, for want of that clause, become a plaine Lye.

To this purpose, Father *Persons* saith, that the *Equiuocator* speaketh a trueth in his owne meaning, and in
the

the sight of God; which alwaies he must doe, when hee v-
seth this Evasion; for that otherwise he should lye, and com-
mit sinne, if he had not some true sense reserved in his mind,
&c.

To declare this yet further: Say that two Priests
were questioned by a Magistrate, whether they were
Priests or no; and the one should say, *I am no Priest*:
and should withall reserve in his mind this clause, *So
as I am bound to tell you*: and the other should answer
in the very same words, *I am no Priest*: but should for-
get or neglect to frame or imagine in his mind that re-
servation, or some such like: the former, who imagi-
ned that reservation in his mind, should be an *Equivo-
cator*, and speake the truth; but the latter, who had o-
mitted it, should be a *Lyer*, and vtter a falshood and
vntruth, though hee speake none but the very same
words; and they haue none but one signification and
meaning.

*Risum teneatis,
amici?*

This they say, to shew vs, how an *Equiuocator* doth
differ very much from a *Lyer*. The truth is; this *Equi-
uocator* and this *Lyer* doe differ as much as two false
knaues, the one of which is called a Thiefe, and the o-
ther, a *Good-fellow that taketh a Purse*.

3. That whatsoeuer a man doe say or sweare, be it
otherwise neuer so false and absurd; yet if a man doe i-
magine a clause in his mind, which being added to the
words spoken, would make a true meaning; then the
former speech or saying, how false soeuer otherwise, be-
commeth true, and without all compasse of lying: be-
cause (saith Father ² Persons) it is freed from the nature
of a *Lye*, by the due & iust reservation in the speakers mind.

a Mitigat. cap.
10. nu. 14. pag.
418.

By the due and iust reservation, saith hee. But suppose
the reservation be not iust and due, but that a man vse
this arte, when he ought not to equivoicate? Why, yet
euē then, he is by this reservation freed from telling of
a *Lye*, though not freed from all sinne. For though it

should

a Mitigat. cap.
10. num. 23.
pag. 424.

b Tom. 3. disp.
5. q. 13. punct. 2.
pag. 1136.

c Si quis vel so-
lus vel coram ali-
is, sine interroga-
tus, sine propria
sponte, sine recre-
ationis gratia, si-
ue quocumq; alio
fine, iuret se non
fecisse aliquid
quod reuera fecit,
intelligendo intra
se aliquid aliud,
quod non fecit,
vel aliam diem
ab ea in qua fecit,
vel quod aliud
additum verum,
reuera non men-
titur, &c. San-
chez op. mo-
ra! l. 3. cap. 6.
num. 15. p. 25.
d Mitigat. cap.
11. nu. 29. pag.
459.

should not be properly the sinne of Lying, nor against the ne-
gative Precept of Truth: yet should it be another sinne, a-
gainst the publike good of ciuill society, and consequently a-
gainst the affirmatiue Precept of Truth, &c. Thus spea-
keth Father a Persons. And to the like purpose Valen-
tia^b. But Sanchez more plainly and roundly: If a
man (saith he) either alone or before company, either being
asked or of his owne accord, either for recreation sake, or for
any other end, doe sweare that he did not doe something,
which indeed he did do; vnderstanding within himselfe some
other thing then that he did doe; or some other day then that
in which he did doe it, or any other addition that is true;
this man, in very deed, doth neither lye nor forswear.

Thus they speake, and so must all they that will
maintaine this Arte. For whereas Father Persons, spea-
king of the Wife of Ananias, saith; ^d that shee beeing
lawfully demanded by S. Peter in a lawfull cause, touching
her owne vow and promise, no clause of reseruatiō could
sane her speech from lying: he doth herein not only con-
tradict himselfe, as Lyers vsually doe, but doth also
thereby ouerthrow the very grounds of this fond Arte.
For if a reseruatiō in the mind doe free the Equiuocator
from lying; because that beeing added to his words,
both together do make a true Proposition; why should
not a reseruatiō in this womans mind, saue her speech
from lying, if it were such, as being added to her words,
both together might yeeld a true meaning; which, ac-
cording to the rules of this Arte, it had beene easie for
this woman to frame?

4 That in any case, in which Equiuocation may bee
vsed, a man may frame any reseruatiō, whatsoeuer
himselfe pleaseth; so it be such, as being added to the
words, doth make the whole compound to bee true.
^e Persons sometimes seemeth to require, that the reserua-
tiō be conformable to the matter, time, and place; & not fai-
ned at randome, as some fondly do imagine. But he doth but
mocke

e Mitig. c. 10.
nu. 22. p. 424.

mocke his Reader; making shew of following the former Schoole-Doctors, whose words these are; when he hath no such meaning as they had in them. For, when he speaketh plainly, and so as you may vnderstand his distinct meaning, then his ^a words are; *I doe truly and really meane, that I am no Priest, in the sense that I speake it, which may be any that pleaseth me, or that I list to frame to my selfe: so as I may meane, that I am no Priest, such as I should be, such as I desire to be, such as is worthy of so great an office, and sacred a function; such as he ought to be, that occupieth the place of God in governing of soules; I am no Priest subiect to the demander, or obliged to answer his demands; or the like.* Thus, and such like, whatsoeuer he pleaseth, he professeth may be his *reservations*, when he denyeth himselfe to be a Priest: and what *conformity* these haue, at least the most of them, with the *Circumstances*, I leaue to bee declared by the Patrons and Masters of this Arte. Sure I am, if such large scope may be granted, and yet the *reservation* bee conformable to the matter, &c. and not *fained at random*, then it will be an easie matter to keepe within compass, and to obserue the wise rule of this graue Father. But, let *Persons* goe with his doubling, and let vs heare what others say. Sanchez alloweth any words, if they yeeld a true sense, ^b *By any addition, reserved in the minde of the speaker, whatsoeuer that addition bee.* And Iacob de Grassijs, proposing a Case of one, who being taken by the eues, doth for feare promise them somewhat with an oath; ^c *If (saith he) he doe imagine some other thing in his minde, for example, I promise to giue this, or do that, if the Judge shal compell me to it, or if the skie shall fall, or the like, then he shalbe cleare from sinne.* And Sanchez, ^d that a man may lawfully answer, that he killed not Peter, meaning another man of the same name, or that he killed him not, *antequam nascereur, before hee was borne.* And Strange the Iesuite, to shew what strange and vnlimited liberty they

Mitig. cap. 8.
nu. 55. p. 344.

^b Ex aliquo addito, mente proferentis retento quodcumque illud sit. Sanch. op. moral. l. 3. c. 6.

nu. 15. pa. 25.

^c Si iſſe aliud mente cogitauerit, verbi gratia, promitto dare aut facere, si à Iudice coactus fuero, vel si Caelum ruat, aut quid simile, tunc à peccato erit immunis.

Decis. Aur. par.

1. l. 2. ca. 17. nu.

12.

d Oper. mor. l.

3. c. 6. nu. 26.

pag. 18.

Proceeding a-
gainst Trai-
tors. lib. I. c. 1.

they doe take in the framing of this fancie, affirme e that he was in the company, reseruing and intending secretly as added, this word, *Not*; when hee was questioned before the Lord Chiefe Iustice of England, and the Kings Attourney. These reseruatiōs, and others not much better, doe they allow and practise in the Arte of Equiuocating, whereof there is frequent mention in their Bookes and Treatises of this argument. By all which it appeareth, that they approoue of any reseruatiōn, which a man can fancie, if the case be such as they allow of, and the clause such, as may signifie a trueth.

5. That this Equiuocation of theirs, is lawfull, not onely in ordinary speech, but in oathes also. This is plainly auouched by Father Persons, and vpon this reason, ^a Because it is a most certaine principle, as well in reason, as in Diuinitie, that what a man may truly say, hee

a Mitig. ca. 11. nu. 17. pag. 449.

b Mitig. c. 11. may truly also sweare. And againe, ^b As all Diuines hold (saith hee) that which may lawfully be said, may also lawfully be sworne. And to this doe agree others of this Crue, who commonly handle this question of Equiuocation in their Treatises of Oathes, and allow it as a thing very lawfull, and of good vse.

c Mitig. c. 7. nu. 14. pag. 284

6. That this Arte was deuised, and so by them is vsed, that by it they may deceiue the vnderstanding of the hearer, and make him beleue an vntrueth, when it may serue for their turne. To this purpose those words of Father Persons sound, ^c Equiuocation must sometime be practised, when no other euasion can be found for defence of innocencie, iustice, secrecy, and other like urgent occasions. And speaking of some cases of inconuenience, which hee would haue to bee auoided by Equiuocation,

d Cap. 7. nu. 22. pa. 289.

he demandeth, ^d Hath God and Nature, and Law of Iustice left no lawfull euasion in such cases? And againe,

e Cap. 7. nu. 2. pag. 274.

^e Wee delight not (saith hee) in this Arte or maner of euasion by Equiuocation. By this it appeareth, that Equiuocation (to vse the Iesuites owne words) is an Art of euasion,

enafion, which cannot bee vnderstood without a meaning and purpose to deceiue the hearers vnderstanding, and to make him beleue an vntrueth. The same Doctor of this Arte goeth on, and teacheth vs, that this their *Equiuocation* is, ^a when any speech hath, or may haue a double sense, not by any double signification or composition of the words themselves; but onely by some reseruatiō of minde in the speaker, whereby his meaning is made different from that sense which the words that are uttered, do beare, or yeeld without that reseruatiō. And by this is implied, that the purpose of this is, to imprint one sense in the speaker, which they acknowledge to bee false, and to keepe within themselves another, which they imagine to bee true. *Becanus* also, another Iesuite, hauing first proposed the question, *An liceat vti Aequiuocatione*: Whether it may be lawfull to use *Equiuocation*: he explaineth the point thus; ^b Whether it bee lawfull to deceiue and beguile others by *Equiuocations*. In the prosecution of which question, though he wrangle, & would gladly shift off from themselves the imputation of this *equiuocating* fraud; yea, and flatly denieth it: yet by explaining the questiō in such sort, he acknowledgeth, that their meaning who defend it, is to beguile and deceiue men. And in like sort *Tolet* saith. ^c It is sometimes lawfull to use *Equiuocation*, and to deceiue the hearer. And therefore when Father *Persons* ^d saith, that his intention is not to deceiue in this mentall proposition, but to defend himselfe, &c. and that the Priest (who denieth himselfe to bee a Priest) that his principall intent is not intentio fallendi, an intention of deceiuing; but rather, *euadendi desiderium*, a desire to escape and defend himselfe: he doth either too boldly presume vpon his Readers simplicitie, or too grossely bewray his owne. For first, when hee saith, that his principall intent is not to deceiue, but rather to escape, hee implieth, that an intention he hath to deceiue, though that be not his principall

^a Mitig. c. 12.
 nu. 3. pag. 484.

^b Sensus est, an liceat alios fallere, decipere aut cludere per Aequiuocationes. Manual. Controu. l. 5. c. 21. pag. 530.

^c Aliquando licet vti aequiuocatione, & fallere audientem.

Tolet. Instru. Sacerd. l. 4. c.

21. nu. 9.

^d Mitig. cap. 8 nu. 58. pag. 346 & 347.

See also, *Sober* Reckon. c. 4. nu. 89. pag. 285

intention; and that is enough to prooue (which hee denieth) that his *Equiuocation* doth herein agree with the nature of a lye, that as a lye is said to bee, *cum intentione fallendi*, so his *Equiuocation* cannot be denied to haue the same purpose and intention in it. And secondly, where he saith plainly that his *intention* is not to *deceiue*, but to *defend*, hee speaketh as wisely, and to as good purpose, as if a thiefe by the high way side should say, that hee intended not to take away the true mans purse, but to supplie himselfe with money for his owne spending. For as the thiefe intendeth to robbe, that thereby he may supply himselfe; so the Iesuite intendeth to deceiue, that thereby he may defend himselfe.

Mitig. c. 7. nu. 2.
pag. 274.

7 That to forbear the vse of this *Equiuocation* (vnlesse where by duety a man is bound to vse it) is better and more Meritorious then to vse it. To this purpose speaketh the great Master of this Arte; *Wee delight not* (saith hee) *in this Arte or manner of euasion by Equiuocation, though it be no lye at all; but rather do allow and like far better of simple, plaine, and resolute speech in all Catholikes, concerning aswel matters of ordinary conuersation, as of their conscience, &c.* And presently he addeth; *Yet for that perfection is one thing, and obligation is another, wee may not binde men to more then Gods precept bindeth.* By which speech hee plainly teacheth, that though it bee not vnlawfull to vse *Equiuocation*, because it is not forbidden by any precept; yet it is a worke of perfection, (such as they vse to call worke of supererogation) not to vse a mans lawfull libertie in this case. And yet further, *It is eident, that albeit good men desirous of perfection, and prepared to suffer iniuries, may liue without going to Law, without swearing, without dinorcing their wiues, without Equiuocation, &c.* yet for all that, men are not bound to this exactnesse, &c. And yet againe; *My wish is* (saith hee) *that Catholike people, but especially Priests, whose example must instruct the rest, should yeeld also of their*

Cap. 7. nu. 5.
pag. 276.

Cap. 13. nu. 3.
pag. 548.

their right, for increase of their merit and Crowne in heaven, and use also plainnesse and synceritie in speech, and free discovering, not onely of their religion, but also of their state, where it is hurtfull to none but themselves. And in a word, plainnesse and syncerity of speech, he compareth with virginity, (which in their esteeme, is a glorious worke of perfection or supererogation:) and the practice of Equiuocating to Wedlocke, which is lawful, but not of such merit.

See Persons also
in his Sober
Reck. ca. 7. nu.
22, & 23. pag.
484, 485.

Now hence I inferre two Conclusions.

I That the practice of Protestants in vsing plainnesse and syncerity in speech, according to their doctrine, is by the confession of the Iesuite, better and more holily, then the practice of Papists in vsing *Evasions* and *Equiuocations*, according to the doctrine of the *Equiuocators*.

2 That according to the doctrine of Popish *Equiuocators*, Iesus our Sauour was not so perfect, nor vsed not so much *exactnesse* in his speech, nor merited not so much, as the Iesuites doe, many of them at least. For Father Persons saith, that *albeit good men desirous of perfection, may liue without Equiuocating, yet &c.* hee meaneth that though it may bee seene in such men, yet others are not bound to that *exactnesse*: and he implieth, that men *desirous of perfection*, doe vse to doe so. And such, I trow, the holy Order of *Iesuites* is, who for desire of this *perfection*, haue by solemne vow abandoned the world, and all the glory, and profit belonging to it. Besides, Father Persons graue aduice is, that *not onely Priests, but other Catholikes too*, should yeeld of their right, by forbearing to equiuocate, for the increase of their merit and Crowne in heaven: and, I trowe, the followers of IESVS will not bee slacke to performe, what one of their owne Fathers doth aduise to bee so behoofefull, not onely for seculars of the Clergie, but for lay-

a Sober Reck.
Append. nu. 16
pag. 682.
b Sober Reck.
in append. nu.
34. pag. 687.

Catholikes also. But now I E S V S our Lord, see how farre off the Iesuite maketh him to bee from this degree of perfection. For hee was so frequent in equiuocating, that Father Persons^a findeth him to haue vsed the same in one onely Chapter of S. Iohns Gospel, aboue seuen or eight times at the least. Nay, and that^b more then one Equiuocation was vsed by our Sauour in one sentence: and that eight or nine Equiuocall speaches at the least, are contained within a peece of one onely Chapter of our Sauours talke with the Jewes, Scribes and Pharisees. And indeede hee hath recited and alleadged nine seuerall examples out of our Sauours words, recorded in the latter part of the eighth Chapter of S. Iohn. And sure, hee that did equiuocate so often in so little compasse, cannot be imagined to haue forborne his right in this practice, for the increase of his merit and Crowne in heauen. Or if they will say, that notwithstanding this frequent vse of Equiuocation in so short space, that yet hee did forbear his right still, and so increased his merit thereby; then they will giue vs occasion to thinke, that Iesuites and Priests; and other Roman Catholikes may attaine this height of perfection, vnto which Father Persons aduiseeth them, and coozen and deceiue vs silly fellowes with their Equiuocations seuen, or eight, or nine times in one houre.

I leaue it then to bee considered by the wise Reader, whether Father Persons doe cog with vs all this while, and make no small vse of this deceitfull Arte, while hee labourerh to defend it: or, whether in good earnest hee thinketh that our Lord and Sauour did not follow so exact a rule of perfection, as hee aduiseeth all his Catholikes vnto.

These bee the most speciall properties belonging to Iesuiticall Equiuocation, as neere as I could gather and obserue them out of their bookes, which bee the abettors of this Arte, among whom the principall, Father Persons,

Persons, must needes bee acknowledged to bee. For hee hath laboured herein more then they all. Out of all which obseruations layd together, I leaue it to the consideration of any vnderstanding man, to iudge, whether these two things doe not follow.

1 That the Roman Doctors haue such rare wits, as that they can by their deuised sleights, transforme the nature both of words and things, euen as well as Alchymists can turne lead into gold. For as in matter of State, they^a haue found out a mystery; that a Clergie-^a *Clerici Rebellio* man of their Church may moue *Rebellion* against his *Prince*, and yet be no *Traitor*: so in Conferences with *men*, they haue found a like mysterie; that any man of the Romane Church, may speake, and say, and sweare whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth, though it bee neuer so false, and yet be no Lye. The one they fetch from their doctrine of *Exemption*; and the other from their doctrine of *Equiuocation*: both dangerous praactices to all humane society. The one whereof should teach Kings to be aware of their Swords, and the other should teach all men to beware of their words.

in Regem non est crimen laese maiestatis, quia non est subditus Regi: Sa. Aphor. v. [Clericus] printed at Antwerp, 1599. and allowed and commended by Silu. Pardo, the Inquisitor.

2 That by their doctrine, a man is at liberty to lye, without anie grudge in his conscience; and that the Abettors of this Arte, by a secret iuggling deuice, doe set open a schoole for deceit and perurie; in which they teach an Arte of Lying; by the helpe whereof, he that can lye & forswear by the Rule; shall bee free either from lying or perurie: as^b a reuerend and learned Diuine hath noted. But hereof there will be fitter occasion giuen to say more hereafter. In the meane while, thus much shall serue to be said of the first Point.

Eius beneficio, qui ad normam mentiatut aut peieret, baud ille perurio aut mendacioris censendus sit.

^b Abbor. Anti-log. adu. Eudem. Ioann. c. 2. in princ. fol. 11. fac. 1.

CHAP. II.

*Of the Originall of Equiuocation; and who they bee
that uphold it, and giue life vnto it.*

^a Hospinian.
Histor. Iesuit.
l. 4. c. 2. p. 228.



^b Quos Autores
habuerit, non
facile dixerim.
Casaub. epist.
ad Frontō Du-
cēum. pag. 108.

Concerning the Originall of this Arte,
^a some learned men referre it to the
Priscillianists, or *Arim* the Arch-heretike,
who are read to haue vsed fraudulent
and deceitful speech. And such
Heretikes had not beene vnmeete Fa-
thers for such a deformed child. But this
Brat was not then borne, nor for many
Ages after those dayes. For mine owne
part, vnlesse I shall hereafter meete
vvith some thing more cleere then yet I
haue seene, I must say with a iudicious
and learned Writer, ^b *I cannot readily
say who were the first founders of this
Arte.* Nor is it maruell, that a thing of
this nature, though found out but yester-
day, should appeare to the world without
the name or notice of his Author. For,
as the head or spring of *Nilus* hath beene
long enquired after, and for ought I know,
is yet scarce heard of; and the reason may
bee, because it is supposed that that Riuer
doth rise somewhere in *montibus Luna*, in
some place of those great Mountaines,
whose greatnes doth hide the place of the
Well-head or Spring: So deuices of State,
which neuer prosper after they are discou-
ered, are commonly smothered for a time,
and doe vsually appeare without name;
themselues being vnwilling to owne them,
and others being vnable to descrie them.
And such is this Arte of *Equiuocation*,
hatched by some rare wit, who yet had
rather lose the glory of the inuention,
then

then to lay open the mysterie of it : and smothered by the *Romane State* as long as was possible, till misfortune brought it to light against their wils. And yet now, that the Riuer appeareth with a full streame, notwithstanding, the Spring will hardly bee found. And if any *Romanist* shall hence inferre, that this Doctrine is therefore an *Apostolicall Tradition*, and came from Christ himselfe ; because I cannot tell who was the first Author, and at what time since it was first hatched, as they vse to dispute in other cases against vs : I will send him to find me the head of *Nilus*, and when he hath found that, I will goe about to enquire for the Originall of this Arte. And yet in the meane while, though I cannot precisely say who was the first Father of this blacke *Arte*, yet some things may bee said, not impertinent to this purpose. And those (as I conceiue them for the present) I will lay downe in certaine Propositions or Assertions. And they be these.

I It is certaine that it is a late deuice, and found out the other day. Persons claime *Vniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent*, for the prooffe of this Arte. ^a His words are, that euery man may heare him speak in his own dialect; Let vs consider (saith he) how this absurd and impious opinion (if such it be) could come to bee receiued so generally, both in approbation & practice, doctrine & action, throughout the Christian world, that is to say ; The Doctrin in all Schooles, Pulpits, Chaies, Vniuersities, where teaching hath beene used, extant also in the Bookes and Workes of all learned men of what sort soeuer, before Iesuites were borne or heard of : but especially those haue most treated thereof, who haue written most tenderly of matters belonging vnto conscience, whom we call *Casuits*. Lawiers in like maner, both Canon and Ciuill ; Diuines, both Scholasticall and positive, haue approued the same. And as for practice, it hath in due cases beene receiued in all Courts, in all Countries, in all Tribunals, and Seates of iudgement, both ecclesiastical

^a Mitigat. c. 7.
nu. 12. & 13.
p. 281. & 282.

asticall and temporall; and neuer refused, condemned, or controled by any, so it were used with the due circumstances, &c. And a little after; Was there no man to stand for truth and reason in any Countrey, in any Province or State? in any place or time for this 400. yeeres, &c? Where it must be noted, that when he mentioneth 400 yeeres, his meaning is not to limit the approbation of this *Arte* to the compasse of those yeeres; but because he supposeth, but falsely, that his Aduersarie had granted so much; and so here he disputeth *ex Concessis* vpon the Confession of his Aduersarie; but he intendeth and meaneth the consent of former times also; as himselfe signifieth in the same Chap. ^a whereof he there promisseth to speak afterward; & so he doth. ^b For he bringeth the testimonies & practice of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and Iesus Christ himselfe, and that frequently declared. Where it may bee noted, that this Father is as bold to alledge *Vniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent* for the prooffe of this *Arte*, as the rest are for the prooffe of their *Church*. And sure the prooffe is as good and sound in the one, as the other. Onely, Father *Persons* affirmeth more boldly, and confirmeth what hee saith, more weakely. But the reason is alike good in both cases. But heere I haue onely to deale with *Persons*, about his *Equiuocation*. And against these great cryes, I oppose the confident and iust challenge of a Reuerend man; Name me one man (saith he) out of all antiquity, Heathenish, Iewish, Christian: name but one man, who euer approued these your Reseruations, vlesse perhaps some who were noted with infamy for their paines. I may adde; Nay, name me one, who defended this *Equiuocation*, which Iesuites call a mixt or mentall Proposition, or by a secret reseruatiō, in all the time from *Adam* to the *Trent Councell*. I will not say none such can bee named; for who can say or presume, that hee knoweth the sayings and opinions of all former Ages? but this I will

^a Nu. 16. p. 285.

^b cap. 9. nu. 17, &c. and repeateth it againe in his Sober Reckon. cap. 7. nu. 26, &c.

Da mihi unum ex omni hominū antiquitate, Ethnica, Iudaica, Christiana; davel unum, cui Reseruatiōes istae tue probatae sunt, nisi siqui forte in infamiam notati, &c.

Abbot Anti. cap. 2. fol. 25.

will say, that wheras the Abettors of *Equiuocation* haue bin challenged by two learned Doctors in our Church, to shewe any who in former times haue allowed this diuelish *Arte*; hitherto I haue seene no one man produced, who doth giue any plaine or direct allowance heereof. For as for the many authorities, which *Persons* doth alledge, they be Conclusions of his own, spun out of other mens sayings, by such consequences as himselfe fancieth or pleaseth to frame. For where holy or learned men haue vsed speeches, that may admit diuers interpretations, either by reason of the words vsed, or some circumstance occurring, according to which only former Ages were wont to expound them; he presently runneth away with an out-cry of *mentall reseruatiō*, or *mixt Proposition*: as euery man that considereth the Allegations, may easily perceiue. In a word, *Persons* claimeth very boldly, and to speake truth, impudently, *Uniuersality*, *Antiquity*, and *Consent*, for this nouell, new-deuised, and vpstart fancie of their owne. Where I wish the Reader to consider, how farre he may credit such men, when they lay the like claime to all *Antiquity* and *Consent* of Nations, either for the prouing of their Church, or for maintaining of any other subordinate point of Controuersie. For mine owne part, till they shew me one who approued a *mentall Equiuocation* or *reseruatiō*, I will thinke and say there is none. And this is my first assertion; whereof see further prooffe in the next assertion.

2 My second is, that the latter sort of Schoole-men and *Casuits* gaue occasion, and laied grounds for this ensuing *Arte*; which at that time themselues, it seemeth, did not so much as thinke or dreame of. For, whereas some Cases were then debated, how farre a *Priest* might deny the things which hee had heard in Confession; and in what sort any man that was questioned by an vnlawfull Iudge, or proceeded against in

an vnlawfull maner, &c. might deny the things which he knew to be true: they, considering the *circumstances of the persons, place, and businesse*, did allow some hard *Equivocations*, which the words would hardly beare in any true sense, yet such as they thought might be allowed and gathered out of those circumstances, and might well be vnderstood in those words, as there and then they were vttered. As for exāple, If a Priest were questioned, whether he knew or had heard any thing of such or such a matter; he might say, *No*: if he did not know or heare it any other way, but onely by *Confession*. And the reason of this answer is, because, *Words*—(saith *Dominicus a Soto*) doe so signifie, as they are vnderstood or taken by the people. Now Christian people, when they heare a Priest sweare, that he knoweth nothing of such or such a matter; they vnderstand him not to speake or meane any thing that he heard in *Confession*. And therefore those words (of the Priest) doe onely signifie or import, that hee knoweth nothing out of *Confession*. And the like defence of this answer is giuen by *Sepulveda, de Rat. dicendi test. cap. 3*. Againe, it is a further Case, If the Priest be asked concerning the same thing, whether he know or haue heard it in *Confession*; whether may he then say, *No*, *I heard it not*? And the common opinion of the Doctors was, that in this case, he may sweare he did not heare it. But *Soto*, vpon better aduice, disliketh this answer, because in this Sentence, *Nihil audiui in Confessione*, I heard nothing of it in *Confession*; the Restriction allowed in the former case, cannot fitly bee vnderstood, to say, *I heard nothing in Confession*, to wit, out of *Confession*. And therefore he concludeth, that that answer in this case cannot be excused from being a lye; because the words cannot haue that construction. Another case is proposed; Suppose a Tyran should aske of a Priest, whether *Peter* (for example) did kill *Iohn*. (which the Priest knew in *Confession* only) may the Priest say and sweare, that *Peter* did.

Voces eo modo significant, quo recipiuntur a populo: populus autem Christianus, dum audit Sacerdotem iurantem se nihil scire, nihil intelligit de his quae nouit in Confessione: Quare verba illa solum significant nihil se scire extra Confessionem.

Soto Relect. de Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 2. S. His vero.

Relect. de secreto memb. 3. q. 3. Concl. 4. S. Haftenus opinionem.

pa. 3. 12.

did not kill John? *Adrian*, who afterward was Pope, and was called *Adrian* the sixth, he resolved the question, that he might answer negatively, that he killed him not: but *Soto* againe replyeth, that this which *Adrian* said, had no shew of reason; because the words admit no interpretation, that may excuse them from a Lye. For, saith he; ^aIt were a most fond interpretation to say, He killed him not that I may tell you, or (as our Equiuocators vse now a dayes to speake) He killed him not, so as I may tell you. And he giueth a further reason hereof, ^bbecause deeds haue no immediate relation to this word, [that I may tell it] as the word [I know] and other such words of sense haue. And in his Booke de Iustit. & Iure, disputing the like question, whether a man beeing questioned concerning his owne Act, may by Ambiguity elude the question; hee resolueth, It can no way be defended, that he may lawfully say, that he did not doe it: and hereof he giueth this reason; ^dBecause this speech [I did not doe it] cannot receiue this sense; I did not doe it, to tell it, or that I may tell it, &c. His meaning in more plaine words, is this; that the Priest might truly say in the case proposed, I know not that Peter did kill John; because hee might reasonably vnderstand it thus, or with this restriction, I know it not out of Confession. And of such a knowledg, the Iudge is supposed to aske, and men do vsually vnderstand the Priest to speake. But the Priest might not say without telling a lye, Peter did not kill John; because, this restriction cannot without absurdity, bee applied to those words. And consequently, these words could not bee so vnderstood by the hearers. A fourth case may bee added, and with that I will end. Suppose a guilty person be against order of Law examined by a Iudge, whether he haue committed such a crime, which indeede he hath done, but is not in this case bound to answer him: suppose (I say) he be inforced to answer, may he truly say, I did not doe it? And *Adrian's* resolution

a Ineptissima interpretatio esset, non occidit, ut dicam.

b Quia facta non habent ordinem immediatum ad hoc quod est, dicere; sicut scire & alia verba sensationum. Soto ibid. pag. 314.

c Quod liceat ei dicere se non fecisse, nullatenus est sustentabile. Soto de Iustit. & Iure, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. prope finem.

d Quoniam, Non fesi, nullo modo amplecti potest sensum, Non feci, ut dicam. [sacere] enim non habet eandem connexionem cum eo, quod est, ut dicam, quam habet [scire.]

^a Potest secundū omnes Doctores respondere quod nihil de facto ille nouit, vel certē, quod non fecit. Adrian. in 4. de Sac. Conf. resp. ad 2. prin. pag. 143. col. 4. ^b Desicientia, ex qua ei liceat reuelare.

^c Nescio qui sint illi omnes Doctores: fateor me nullum legisse. De Secreto, mem. 3. q. 3. Concl. 4. p. 316. v. etiam de Iustit et Iure, l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. ^d Sensus ille violentissimus est.

^e Nemo veterum & nobilium Theologorum, quod e quidem sciam, affirmavit. Sepulch. de rat. dicend. testimon. cap. 17.

^f Quorundam iuniorum Theologorum decretis consentaneam.

^g Illam veterum ac summorum Theologorum consensu damnatam opinionem. ^h Nostra & pa-

of the doubt, was; that in such a case, ^a he may truly answer, according to the opinion of all Schoole-Doctors, that he knoweth nothing of that fact, or at least, that hee did not doe it. And his reason is, because in this answer, he is supposed to speake ^b of such a knowledge of the fact, as he may lawfully discover. But Soto replyeth againe, ^c I know not who all those Doctors are, that Adrian speaketh of: I confesse, I haue read none of that opinion. And he addeth; ^d That meaning, in which Adrian interpreteth these words, is a most forced and violent sense.

Thus Soto declareth his owne opinion, and the opinion of other Schoole-Doctors and Casuists of that time, in these and other cases of like nature. And the like doth Io. Genesius Sepulveda, another learned man of the same nation, and about the same time. For hauing heard some defend some such like Equiuocations and ambiguities; he vndertaketh to proue, and that by the testimony of ancient Diuines, that in witness-bearing (for thereof hee doth in particular intreat) a Witnesse may not, arte verborum, by cunning words, deceiue the Iudge; but that he is bound to speak plainly, and according to the meaning of the Iudge, who asketh the question. And of the contrary opinion, hee saith, ^e None ancient and renowned Diuine that I knowe, did affirme it to bee lawfull. And in the Preface to that Booke, hee saith, that while hee was in Rome; hee met with one, who maintained this opinion, which he calleth ^f agreeable to the Determinations of some yong or late Diuines: and when he came backe againe into Spaine, that prater spem, contrary to his expectation, he found some of their learnedest Diuines, maintaining, and instilling into their Students hearts and eares, ^g that opinion which was condemned by the ancient and chiefe Diuines. And, Chap. 15. hee sheweth who they bee, whom he calleth ancient Diuines; and that is in his owne words, ^h those which liued before our and our Fathers;

thers dayes, such for example sake, as Thomas Aquinas is. *trū memoriā superioris, qualis est*
 Out of which testimonies and sayings of these two learned men (the one of which was *Confessor* to Charles the fifth, and the other his *Historiographer*; and the one flourished about the yeere 1560. as *Possenn* saith, and the other died in the yeere 1572. saith the same *Possenn*, out of these their sayings) I gather and obserue these things.

I That in the dayes of these two learned men, which was about some 60 yeeres agoe, there was little or no speach of any *Equiuocation* by *mentall reservation*, or of any such *mixt propositions*, as the Romanists now fancie. This I gather, first, because *Soto*, in oppugning these ambiguous Answeres and speaches allowed by some *Schoole-Doctors* of that time, doth no where (to my knowledge) charge them with any such opinion, or euer labour to refute it. Which (considering the argument that hee had in hand, and the diligence that he vsed in handling of it, and cleering of all doubts that belonged vnto it) no man may with reason imagine that hee would haue forborne to doe, if those times had giuen occasion of disputing such a question. Secondly, the same learned man, in oppugning that liberty, which others did grant, doth still ouerthrowe or confute their opinion, because the interpretation and the meaning which they doe allow those answeres to be taken in by the speaker, are such as doe not agree to the vse and signification of the words spoken, nor cannot bee applied to them, without incongruity and absurditie. By which reason of his, hee implieth, that these *Diuines* meant no other ambiguity, or interpretation, or meaning, in those answeres; then such as they thought, the words in that case in which they were vttered might beare. Or els his reason had beene insufficient and foolish; which yet he supposeth to be such, as that his aduersaries could not dislike as impertinent, if the

*Quam vñ status
sermo citra men-
dacium ferre
possit. Soto de
Iustit. & Iure
l. 5. q. 6. art. 2.*

thing which he vrged were true. Thirdly, the same Author doth still so set down his opinion, that in the cases proposed, and others of the like nature; he alloweth any ambiguity or Amphibologie, *which the use of the speech can beare without a lye*, as in expresse words hee explaineth himselfe, but refuseth and condemneth all such, as is not noted and implied in the words. Fourthly, *Sepulveda*, he also disputeth against those, who think themselves not bound in the cases propounded to answer according to the common meaning, and acceptance of the words: and confuteth them, who hold it lawfull simply to denie the crime truely layed to their charge, although they *purposely speake some other thing in their minde*, which the Iudge, taking their words in the common meaning, *understandeth not*: Cap. 17. & throughout the whole Booke. But yet I haue not obserued in all that Booke any speech, in which hee mentioneth a *mixt proposition*, a *mentall Equiuocation*, or an ambiguity made by a *reservation*. Against which opinion, (if there had then appeared any such to the world) hee might haue disputed with more probabilitie and shewe of substantiall reason. But he no where (as farre as I can obserue) either refelleth or mentioneth any such opinion among these late and punie Diuines. For whereas in the place last cited, he hath these words, *though purposely he speaketh some other thing in his minde*, that maketh nothing, as I thinke, for the *mentall reservation*, which our *Equiuocators* haue deuised. For he meaneth nothing else, as I take it, but that the speaker doth frame in his minde, another sense and meaning of his words, then they in the common vnderstanding of men doe make, or then the *Iudge* according to the common vnderstanding doth take them in. And therefore those very Schoole-Diuines, whom hee and *Soto* doe refute for going too farre, and allowing too much liberty; yet goe not so farre as our now Iesuites doe, who

*Etiam si ex in-
dustria aliud
præter ea mente
loquatur.*

who build all vpon a fancied *reseruation* of their owne framing, no way included in the words spoken. Fifthly, say that those *Diuines*, whom these learned men doe refute, did maintaine such a *mixt proposition*, & mentall *reseruation* as our *Romanists* doe strue for: yet *Soto* saith, that he had read no Schoole-Doctor, who allowed such a fancie as *Adrain* imagined, which yet by a *reseruation* of a Iesuite, might easily bee solued. And *Sepulueda*, when hee came out of *Italy* into *Spaine*, thought it strange, that hee found *Diuines*, who contrary to the meaning of all the *Ancients*, did allow that opinion, which he there refuteth. And therefore if we shall say, that the *Diuines* against whom these men wrote, did hold this *Equiuocall reseruation*, yet it was then a nouell opinion, lately sprung vp, such as *Soto* had read in no Schoole-Doctor of former time, and such as *Sepulueda* did maruell to finde set on foote in his owne Countrey, where he liued. But, as I said; these learned men did not know of any such opinion risen vp at that time. And therefore in those dayes either this *Arte* was not yet found, or if it were, it was rather whispered in corners, or taught obscurely, then published in Schooles.

Secondly, I gather out of these learned mens writings alleadged before, that *Schoole-Doctors* about that time, allowed and gaue liberty for such ambiguities, as in opinion of these men, and in trueth the words could not beare: and therefore their interpretations were forced & violent, and such as could not free their speeches from being *lyes*. This without further deduction, is euident by the words before cited.

Thirdly, I obserue, that these hard and harsh *Equiuocations*, by some *Diuines* then allowed, and the violent constructions that they made of the words, were then newly taken vp, and were vnknowne to the elder and more iudicious *Schoole-men*.

And out of all this, I leaue it to the iudgement of the

the learned Reader, whether I may not vpon good reason inferre; that therefore in all probabilitie, the later sort of *Schoole-Doctors*, by the hard *Equiuocations*, which they allowed, did giue occasion & layd grounds for this *Iesuiticall Art of Equiuocation*, though at that time themselues did not thinke of it. For, may it not hence be reasonably conceiued, that the progresse and proceeding to the framing of this *Art*, was on this manner? that first of all, and in elder times, there was nothing, but *simplicitie* in their Oathes and answers, or if any *ambiguitie* was allowed to be vsed, it was but in some such sense, as the *circūstances* of the persons, time, place, and occasion, did put vpon them, and that according to the intention of publique Lawes, and the reasonable construction that the Hearers might make of them: and that afterward they allowed violent constructions, and such as the words, together with the *circumstances*, could not beare, in any reasonable mans vnderstanding, but such as the speaker, in his minde did fancie to be agreeable to that businesse and occasion. And lastly; that this ouer-bold liberty in them, in framing such a sense, as the words in reason & cōgruities could not beare, made way to fine wits following after, to adde something to the former inuention, and to frame a sense of words spoken, which they acknowledge not to be signified by them, but made vp by a *Reseruation* in their owne breast, such as themselues would please to fancie, what euer it were, either pertinent to the businesse, or as farre different from it, as the *falling of the skie* is different from the *paying of money*. But this will appeare yet more plainly; if it be considered, that *Nauarre*, ^a who liued at the same time with *Soto*, & *Sepulueda*, but wrote after them, and when they were dead, doth from the opinion of those *Diuines*, and in speciall from the opinion of *Soto* also, and from his sayings; labour to inferre and proue the lawfulnessse

(^a) Nauar.
Com. in c.
Humanę
aures, q. 1.
nu. 4. & nu.
8. & 9.

lawfulness of the Jesuiticall Equiuocation; because (as hee saith) there is the like reason of them both. How truly he inferreth his Conclusion, from the sayings of *Soto* and the rest, I dispute not; I onely note in his course of disputation, that hee taketh their assertions for a ground to proue his owne by. And that sheweth that those former Writers gaue occasion, &c And thus I haue declared my second Assertion concerning the originall of this new Art.

3. The third is, that whosoeuer wit deuised it, yet it seemeth to mee most probable, that it receiued the first life and credit from the See of Rome, and the Romane state. My reason is from these grounds.

1. Doctor *Nauarre*, who (as *Persons* saith, *Mitig. cap. 7. nu. 41. pag. 301.*) is held to be one of the most liberall and largest in admitting Equiuocations both in words and oathes, was thought a fit man to be the Popes Reader of Cases in Rome. And if I mistake not, hee was the first that broached this new arte. For hee read at Rome not long after the time of *Soto* and *Sepulveda*, who (as before was noted) had not yet heard any thing of this arte. And there he read & framed that a Commentary, in which he teacheth this mysterie, for the instruction of the Iesuits Colledge. and dedicated the same vnto *Gregorie 13.* the present Pope: which may breede suspition, that the Pope was well pleased with this new deuice of *Nauarre*, of whom he made choise to be his publique Reader of Cases; and who, while he was imployed in this seruice, did perfect that arte, and from whose Readings, the very Iesuits themselues may seeme to haue borrowed the grounds of that Doctrinne, which afterward they polished with great dexteritie and care.

a Præfat. ante
initium Com-
mentar. in c.
Human. aures.

Secondly, In *Queene Elizabeths* time, there was a Treatise found out, which before was in the secret keeping of Iesuits or Priests: in which, beside the Resolu-

F

tions

tions of *Nauarre*, were contrayned sundry instructions and directions, giuen by *Sixtus Quintus*, for the pra-ctising of this myserie of *Equiuocation*. Which, if the Reader be desirous to know more fully, hee may reade a Relation thereof set downe by ^a a most reuerend and learned *Prelate*.

Thirdly, I finde that *Emm. Sà* in his *Aphorismes* v. *Mendac.* had giuen his opinion concerning this *Equiuocall reservation*, in this manner: that in a case, ^b where a man is not bound to reueale the truth according to the intention of the Demander, some say, that a man may answere by understanding or reseruing something in his minde, as that is not so, to wit so, as that hee is bound to tell him: or that hee hath not such a thing, meaning, that hee hath it not to giue it vnto him. But others admit not of this kinde of answere, and perhaps, vpon better ground and reason. Thus hee gaue his iudgement of this poynt; and so the Booke passed in the Low Countries, and with approbation and commendation of *Silv. Pardo*, the Inquisitor and Censor there, and was printed at *Antwerpe* 1599. But when it came to be perused, and renewed at *Rome*, the Censor there, *Io. Maria*, Master of the sacred Palace, he purged the Booke, and put out the last words, which were, ^c And perhaps vpon better reason. In which words *Sà* had signified, that hee inclined to their opinion, who disliked this *Equiuocating* by reservation. And hence it appeareth, how acceptable and welcome this Doctrine of *Equiuocation* is in the Popes Palace. For whereas *F. d* Persons saith, that in the last Edition of *Sàes* Booke at *Rome* 1607: this whole last sentence was left out, as though hee had changed his opinion. And ^e that it seemeth that *Emm. Sà* did afterwards change his opinion; it is but a trick of iugling, such as this Father often vseth to delude his Reader with. For *Sà* died, as ^f *Ribadeneira* reporteth, in the yeare 1596. eleuen yeares before this edition

of

a G. Abbot in the Preface to his Sixe questions. cap. 1. pag. 7. 8. &c.

b *Quidam dicunt,--posse respondere aliquid subintelligendo, ut non esse, scz. ita ut ei dicere teneatur; vel se non habere, scilicet ut ei det. At alij id non admittunt, & fortè potiori ratione.*

c Et fortè potiori ratione.

d Sober Recon. cap. 4. nu. 76. pa. 276.
e Ibid. nu. 80. pag. 279.
f Ribaden. Catalogo Scriptorum Soc. Iesu. in Eman. Sa.

of *Rome*, and three yeares before the impressiō of *Antwerpe*, being then about threescore and ten yeares olde. And if *Sà*, after so many yeares deliberation, had changed his opinion, how came it about that that change was not seene in the *Antwerpe* Copy, which was printed 3. yeares after he was dead? Besides, the Edition of *Rome*, re-printed also at *Colone*, An. 1612. doth professe, that that Book was purged by *Joan. Maria*, the *Master of the Palace*, and not that it was corrected or amended by *Sà*, the first Author of it. Further, *Persons* giueth no one piece of a reason, by which the Reader may imagine, that *Sà* did euer change that point. And therefore, this is but one of *Persons* vsuall trickes of fittening, with which his Brethren of the secular Clergy doe so often charge him.

Now these considerations layed together, make mee thinke it very probable, that this *Arte* receiued its life from the *State and See of Rome*. But if any man can shew mee, whence it might rather haue its first ground, I will willingly yeeld to him; and be thankfull to him, that can and will discouer the Spring, or Well-head, whence first flushed forth this muddy *Nylus*, so fertile of *Crocodiles*, I meane of this sophistrique *Crocodilites*, whereby vnware men are ouer-reached and caught.

4. My fourth Assertion is; It is obserued by learned men, that whosoever was the Author, yet the Iesuites, especially those of our *English Nation*, haue beene the chiefe Abettors, Defenders and Polishers of this *Arte*. For prooofe of this, I will set downe the words of some learned men. The a learned Gentle-

a Relation.
nu. 33. fol. 36.

man, who wrote the *Relation of Religion*, speaking of false newes, frequent at *Rome*, for aduantage of their Sect, addeth, that he found by obseruation, and iudgement of some wise men, that the Iesuites were the Masters of that *Mint*, and that all those coynes were of their stamp;

^a Histor. Ie-
suit. l. 4. cap. 2.
pag. 228.

^b *Vt non imme-
rito Auctores &
Inuectores eius
esse vulgò dicantur.*

^c *Constat mul-
tos vestri ordinis
Theologos eam
artem magna
cura, & explicu-
isse & asseruisse.
Sed qui præcipuè
Æquiuocationem
excoluerint, eos
video fuisse
Anglos. Cas-
saub. Epist.
ad Front.
Ducem,
pag. 108.*

^e Reply to
Father Per-
sons Libell,
fol. 22. & 23.
^f Quodl. 2.
art 6. pag. 39.
^g Quodl. 3.
art. 4. pag. 66.
^h Quodl. 2.
art. 4. pag. 31.

and, that the Iesuits were noted by some of their owne friends, to be too hardie Equiuocators, and their Equiuocations too hard. And Hospinian ^a hauing cited many testimonies of Iesuits for this Arte, concludeth that therby it is euident, that many Iesuits with great care haue explained and defended it, ^b that not without cause they are commonly thought to be the Authors and Inuectors of it. Adde hereto that which the learned Casaubon obserued, who was well acquainted not onely with the writings of all sorts of Iesuits, but with the proceedings and dealings of our English Iesuits also. Hee telleth Fronto Ducemus, a learned Iesuit, ^c *It is a cleare case,* that many Diuines of your Order haue explained and maintained that Arte: but they which haue especially polished it, I finde to be English men. Yea and their owne Brethren, the Secular Priests, lay the ouer-bold vse of Equiuocation in their dish. ^e For so famous (say they) and so notorious are their Equiuocations, and so scandalous, that the very Protestants take notice thereof, &c. and, such iugglings, and shiftinges of late haue beene vsed by them, that not onely Protestants, but also Catholickes, yea Priests can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise. And a little after, Howsoever this kinde of dealing may seeme excusable vnto them, vnder the name of honest Equiuocation; sure ^f I am that few honest men will excuse it from dishonest lying. And Master Watson ^g calleth it the Iesuits rule of swearing and forswearing in a contrary sense and meaning; and ^h a shift, which they call a lawfull Equiuocation. And againe, hee ^h calleth these Equiuocations, their absurd paradoxes of Equiuocation. And the like speeches may be found in diuers other places of the Priests bookes. By all which it may appeare, that learned men on both sides, not onely among the Protestants, but also among Popish Priests, haue noted this deuice especially in the Iesuits: which may be reason enough, (beside that which is to be found

in their owne writings) to make any sober man resolute, that the *Iesuites* haue had their fingers chiefly in this new deuised *Arte*. And reason may perswade the same to be most likely; because the *Iesuites* are an Order consecrated and deuoted from their very first birth to the *Popes* will, to doe what may serue his turne For so the *Iesuites* themselves, who published *Sanchez* Morall worke, doe professe in the Epistle Dedicatorie to Pope *Gregorie* 15. ^a that their first founder ^b did make himselfe and his Order or Societie vassals to the *Popes* command; in a new and unheard of manner. And therefore if the *See* and State of *Rome*, did (as before I shewed) giue life, and credit and authoritie to this *Arte*; then, in reason it must be conceiued that the *Iesuites*, who by their first institution are created the *Popes* vassals, to serue at his pleasure, and to doe his will, would be the most forward in the ranke, to vphold and maintaine with all their wit, this deare Childe of the *Popes* owne breeding. And yet when I conclude that the *Iesuits* are the most forward, and the men that haue polished this *Arte*, my meaning is not, either to include all of that Order within this compasse, or to exclude all others not of that Order from it. For first among the *Iesuites*, *Becanus* doth disclaime it, as ^c being not taught by the *Iesuites*, and unlawfull to be practised by any. Wherein hee saith well, that it is unlawfull; but ill, that it is not taught by the *Iesuites*. For their Doctrine this way is so cleare, and so open to the view of all men, that *Becanus* in denying it, must needs either vse the *Arte* of *Equiuocation*, which himselfe condemneth, or else tell a flat and downe-right lye, which is not much better. And the like may be noted in the writings of some other *Iesuites*, who deny and renounce this deuice. But they had best keepe themselves from *Rome*; for if they come in the *Censors* hands, it is to be feared hee will deale with them, as

^a Prefixed before the second tome.

^b *Se suamque Societatem Pontificijs imperijs more prorsus non mancipauit.*

^c *Manual. Controu. l. 5. cap. 21. & Opusc. Theolog. tom. 1. Opusc. 17. in Respons. ad Aphorism. 13, 14, 15, 16. & tom. 2. Opusc. 1. in Append. de fide Her. seruandâ in exam. 4. propositionis.*

he hath done with their fellow *Sā* already; that i, circūcise their lips, and teach their pens to speake the *Roman Language* more purely. Secondly, among those that be no Iesuites, wee haue experience and examples good store, of them who haue learned this *Arte*, and maintained it as stiffely, as the best Iesuite can. In which number, I may place Doctor *Norrice*, who beeing apprehended in *Oxford*, denyed himselfe to bee a *Priest*, and afterward in prison did defend it by this sleight of *Equiuocation*, and that he maintained to be lawfull, by the example of our blessed Sauour; *Mar. 13. 32. But of that day & houre knoweth no man, neither the Son, &c. and Ioh. 7. 8. Ego non ascendam, &c.* For so he then alledged the place, as Father *Persons* also doth, against both the *Greeke*, and their owne approued *Latine*. In expounding, and applying of which Texts to his purpose, how weakely he behaued himselfe, he may now bee pleased to call to his remembrance: that as he braggeth of his victories ouer other men, so for his humiliation, hee may sometimes call to mind his owne infirmities. And that perhaps may stand his soule in as good stead, as the meritorious forbearing of *Equiuocation*, when he might lawfully vse it: which (as Father *Persons* saith) may increase his Crowne and merit in heauen.

But in earnest, he shall doe well, if in the next edition of his *Antidote*, he place this question of *Equiuocation* among the rest of his *Controuersies*, and tell vs in good sadnes, what, after so many yeeres more, he thinketh of this Point. But in the meane while, the Reader may vnderstand, that Dr. *Norrice* is not the only man that ioyneth with the Iesuites in the practice and maintenance of this *Arte*. For in this small Treatise may be seene diuers testimonies for it, out of other Writers. And the secular Priests, though they charge & vpbraide the Iesuites with a *niniuum*, too often and too bold a practice of it, yet themselues doe allow it, euen when they

they shew greateſt opposition againſt the Ieſuites. So Maſter *Watſon* ^a ſpeaking of *Equiuocation*, as a ſhift ^a *Quodlib. 3.* which the Ieſuites uſe; ſaith, that *though there bee no* ^{art. 4. p. 66, 67.} *question to bee made of it, but that in ſome ſenſe it may bee lawfull, &c.* In which place, the ſum of that, wherein he ſheweth his diſſent & diſlike of the Ieſuites, (for his owne words are too many to be ſet down in this place) is in theſe two things: Firſt, That the Ieſuites doe allow *Equiuocation* in a caſe, wherein he thinketh a man is bound to ſpeake the plaine truth. And ſecondly, that *they doe hold, that they may not onely to their Aduerſaries* (to Proteſtants) *but euen alſo to any Catholike Magiſtrate, yea to the Pope himſelfe, anſwere one way, and meane another.* And to like purpoſe, the Author of the Replie to *Perſons* Apologic, beeing to anſwere for D. *Bagshaw*, whom *Perſons* had reprooued, as denying the doctrine of *Equiuocation*; ſaith, that the Doct^r, ^bno doubt, know- ^b *Cap. 17. in* *eth in what caſes doubtfull anſweres and Equiuocations are* ^{the very end} *to be made to curious questions: neither is it to bee thought* ^{pag. 331.} (ſaith he) *that he diſſallowed thereof, but onely of the liberty, which is in the Ieſuites and their Adherents, in all their dealings with other men.* By which it may appeare, that the difference betweene the Secular Prieſts and the Ieſuites in this point, is not about the equitie & lawfullnes of this Arte, but about the liberty and large ſcope that the Ieſuites take, to praſtiſe it among their owne Brethren, and before their owne Magiſtrates and Superiours, and in all their dealings. And ſurely, for our owne experience, I cannot learne any thing to the contrarie, but that our Tribunals and places of Iudicature, our Biſhops, Juſtices, and other Officers, who haue to deale in their Examinations, yea and that our common ſort of Chriſtians, who conuerſe with them, doe find in their experience, that Secular Prieſts, and laie Papiſts of all ſorts, doe iumpe with the Ieſuites in the praſtiſe of this Arte. Notwithſtanding, if any among them, which

which call themselues Catholikes, doe renounce and disclaime it, as well in deedes as in words; I am so far from fastening any imputation of disgrace vpon them for this iniquitie of their brethren, as that I wish and pray they may goe on, to forsake and abandon all other the abominations and errors of the Roman Church. But (to draw toward an end in this Point) all things considered, my Conclusion commeth to this head; That this *mystery of iniquity* spreadeth farre and neere in the Papall Kingdome, hauing receiued authority and countenance from the very *Roman See*, and finding entertainment and acceptance among all inferiour sorts: but yet the Iesuites are they that haue chiefly polished it, and most boldly practised it; and among the Iesuites, our *English-men* (be it spoken to the credite of our Nation) doe beare the bell away. And from hence the Reader may see why our Diuines doe vsually ascribe this Doctrine to the Iesuites: and consequently what wee haue to answer to *Becanus* his question. For *a desire to know* (saith he) *why you call this Arte of deceiuing, Iesuiticall Equiuocation*: and our answer is ready; We call it *Iesuiticall*, because men of that order, haue beene the chiefe Abettors and polishers of that Arte.

*Quero cur
hanc fallendi ar-
tem appelles Ae-
quiuocationem
Iesuiticam. tom.
2. Opusc. 1. in
Append. in ex-
aminatione
4. propos.*

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the matter or object of Equiuocation, or in what cases it is allowed by the Patrons of it.



Or the matter or object, about which this Arte may be exercised, F. Persons a seemeth to except two cases, in which they hold it vnlawfull to equiuocate. First, *in matters of faith*: and secondly, *in buying and selling, in common conuersation and humane traffique,*

to the hurt or preiudice of any. But this is but another trick of his iuggling, by which hee would bleare the eyes of his Reader; and make the world belecue that they vse no fraud, either in matters of Religion, or in businesses with their neighbours, so that any body should be hurt or beguiled by them. For first, where he saith, that they may not vse Equiuocation in matters of faith, perhaps in this saying he doth equiuocate with vs; and meaneth, that we may not so vse Equiuocation, as to deny any point of faith. But that in handling & dealing about matters of faith, it may bee lawfull with them to vse this Arte; there are good proofes from their own Writings, beside all the experience of their practice. For F. Persons saith, that *in matters of Religion, it becometh to the faith of the hearer, - to seeke out the speakers reseruatiō for his better assurance.* Which is but a slender comfort to a poore Christian, who had as good seeke a Needle in a bottle of hay, as a reseruatiō locked vp in an Equiuocators mind: but hence it followeth, that he alloweth Equiuocation in matters of Religion. A-

a Mitigat. cap. 7. nu. 7. pa. 277. & cap. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. & cap. 14. nu. 31. p. 460. & cap. 13. nu. 2. p. 547.

^b Mitig. ca. 11. nu. 23. p. 454.

- ^a Mitig. cap. 13. nu. 3. p. 548. Againe, the same Father *Persons* telleth vs, that ^a *no man can deny, but many facts and cases may fall out concerning matters of Religion, not tending to Confession (especially in time of persecution) wherein a man may, or perhaps also must by obligation vse equiuocall speeches.* Here he granteth, that by their principles, it is an vn-doubted conclusion, that in cases concerning Religion, a man may equiuocate, so the case be not such, as tendeth to *Confession*; 1. as I vnderstand it, if by equiuocating he doe not seeme to deny the Roman faith, which at such times, they hold it necessarie for their Children, without any tergieruation to confesse. But elsewhere hee vnfoldeth himselfe a little more plainely, when he saith of Equiuocation, ^b *that it may not be used in matters of Religion, where Confession of our Faith is required.* For this implyeth, that where Confession of faith is not required, there it may be lawfull enough to equiuocate. But euident and cleare it is, that the
- ^b Sober Rec- kon; in Ap- pend. nu. 25. pag. 687. ^c Iesuite maketh our blessed Sauour to equiuocate in sundry matters of Religion, and thence would perswade vs, that by his example, they may doe the like. As for example, hee did equiuocate, when he said of the day of Iudgement, ^d *Of that day and houre knoweth no man, not the Sonne; &c.* And when hee said of himselfe, ^e *I iudge no man*: the Iesuite faith, that this speech without a mentall reseruatiō is false, and cannot stand, for that it should be contrary to many other places of Scripture: and should imply a deniall of Christs office to be our Iudge. He proceedeth to other examples, and telleth vs, that Christ did equiuocate about the Sacrament of Baptisme, when he said, ^f *Hee that shall beleene, and be baptized, shall be saved*: and about eating of the flesh of Christ, ^g *If any man shall eate of this bread, hee shall liue for euer*: and about Prayer, when hee said, ^h *If ye shall aske any thing of my Father in my name, he will giue it you.* Now the points here spoken of, and others of like nature,

ture, in which the Iesuite findeth Equiuocation to haue beene vsed in Scriptures, are, I trow, *matters of faith and Religion*. And hence it followeth, that Equiuocators must either confesse that they abuse the world in alledging these and such like Texts, to proue and vphold Iesuiticall Equiuocation, which is not there meant; or that they hold their Equiuocations to be lawfull, and sufficiently warranted, euen in principall *matters of Religion*, such as are Christs office of iudging, the doctrine of the Sacraments, and prayer in Christs name. In the first place then, when *Persons* excepteth *matters of faith* from the practice of Equiuocation, hee mocketh his Reader with generall speeches, when hee meaneth no such thing; but onely that men may not *equiuocate*, by denying in words their beliefe of the *Roman faith*, or some such like. Secondly, where *Persons* saith that they allow not *equiuocation* in common conuersation, in buying, &c. it may be obserued that Nauarre,^a the famous Reader in Rome, doth highly commend this Equiuocation as a ^b singular point of Doctrine, by which wee may auoid innumerable sinnes which wee commit by denying and affirming without this mentall reseruatiō, with which if the words spoken were ioyned, they would become true. This he explaineth and confirmeth thus: ^c We are asked & demanded euery foot, whither we goe, what we haue eaten, how much money we haue, or haue borrowed, or haue giuen, what letters and newes we haue receiued, what wee haue written and related; what such or such a man said to vs, what wee know of such or such a one: and many hundred like. To all which (saith hee) wee might answer without sinne, ^d by vnderstanding somewhat in our mindes, which may make that true, which we affirme; and that false, which wee deny: As for example, when a man asketh of vs, money, or a Booke, or newes, &c. if wee answer him, ^e I haue them not, or I know them not; vnderstanding, ^e so as I am bound,

^a Comm. in
^c Human. au-
res q. 3. nu. 13.

^b Per hanc do-
ctrinam singula-
rem possumus
euitare innumera
peccata, &c.

^c Passim enim
interrogamur,
Quò vadimus,
quid comedimus,
&c.

^d Subintelli-
gendo aliqua,
quibus sicut vera
quæ annuimus,
vel falsa quæ
negamus.

^e Ita vt teneat
vel conueniat illi
præstare, tradere,
dicere, &c.

a Summa v.
mendac. nu. 4.
pag. 385.

b *Que doctrina
debet notari.*

c De præcept.
2. §. 1. nu. 8.
p. 49.

d *Causam habeat
non illam dandi.*

e *In communi
loquutione inter-
rogato de re,
quam secretò
seruare expedit,
licitum est dicere,
se nescire, intel-
ligendo, ita vt
expediat dicere.*

Sanchez O.
permoral. l. 3.
c. 6. num. 25.

f Mitigat. c. 9.
nu. 81. & 83.
pag. 403, 404.

g In c. Human.
aures. q. 2.
nu. 12.

h *Verum & in-
iustum damnium.*

bound, or, as it is conuenient to doe it, or giue it, or to speake and make it knowne. The like is affirmed by ^a Emm. Rodriguez, who alledging this determination of Nauarre, and transcribing also some of his words, addeth in the end, to shew how hee esteemed this denice, ^b which Doctrine ought to be marked and obserued. And Fernandes ^c in his Examen saith, that if a man being requested to lend a thing to his neighbour, ^d haue a cause or reason, why hee will not grant or giue it, &c. hee may sweare by Equiuocation, that he hath not such a thing. And Sanchez, ^e In common talke (saith hee) if a man be asked of a thing which it behooueth him to keepe secret, it is lawfull for him to say, that hee knoweth not, vnderstanding ^f as that it is expedient to tell it. And Father Persons ^f also thinketh it most iust and necessary, if a man come to borrow mony, whom we may not deny without inconuenience, that we may then answer equiuocally that wee haue it not; vnderstanding, with any mind to lend it: or that wee haue it not in our purse, &c. Which instances and examples, if they be not matters of common life and conuersation, I know not where to finde any. But it may be said, that Persons, when he excepteth matters of common conuersation in buying, &c. hee addeth, to the hurt or preiudice of any; as if hee meant by that restriction, to leaue ^a libertie of equiuocating, euen in buying and selling, and humane trafficke; so it be without the hurt of any man: but then vtterly to forbid it. And I graunt, hee addeth those words: but I cannot tell, whether he meant the vulgar Reader to conceiue that meaning in them. Howsoeuer, there is a mysterie in those words, which ^g Nauarre, (who vseth to deale aboue-boord, and to speake more plainely) hath vnfolded, when he calleth it, ^h a reall and vniust hurt or preiudice; by which hee vnderstandeth such an hurt, as wee may not doe to another, without sinne and iniustice. And then, the meaning of this.

this goodly Exception of *Persons*, will be this; that in buying, and selling, and humane traffique, and common conuersation, wee may not equiuocate, if thereby wee doe hurt any man *vnjustly and unlawfully*: but else, if any of their Catholiques should thinke that the hurt which redoundeth to one of vs, is *lawfull and iust*, that then they may freely delude vs with their *amphibologies* and *reseruations*, in what matter soeuer, and for what end they please, though it were for *massacring* of an assembly, or for *murdering* of a Prince, or for *blowing up of a Parliament*, or for the *invasion* of the Kingdome by hostile and forraine forces. And so by this exception we are well freed from the feare of these deluding and *equiuocating* spirits. Let vs then dismiss *Persons*, with his shifting Exceptions, and enquire more particularly and directly what the cases be, wherein they doe in sober sadnesse allow their Schollers to vse the benefit of this *Art*. And for this purpose I finde two things said by them. First, that whensoever a man may lawfully keepe silence, and say nothing, or whensoever hee is not bound to reueale and lay open the truth, then hee may lawfully equiuocate, and vse this sleight of amphibologie: be it a *matter of faith*, or a businesse of *commerce and traffique*, or a poynt of *State*, or what else you will, it mattereth not to this purpose. For prooffe of this, first take the resolution of Father Garnet. He being prisoner in the Tower, and required to declare his opinion concerning this point, set downe his minde in writing, which is yet kept vpon Record: and it was this, ^a Concerning Equiuocation this is mine opinion. In morall matters and common use of life, when among friends it is required of a man to speake truth, then hee may not use Equiuocation, &c. But as oft as there is occasion for necessary defence, or for auoyding of some iniury or damage, or for obtaining some good of weight or moment, Without the perill of any man, then Equiuocation is law-

a De Equiuocatione ita censet. In rebus moralib. & comuni usu vite, quando veritas inter amicos requiritur, uti equiuocatione haut licet: id enim Societati hominum magno malo cederet. Quare hoc remedio in istis nullus locus. Quoties vero de necessaria defensione agitur, deque iniuria aliqua euitanda, aut damno, aut de consequendo aliquo non parui momenti bono, sine ullo cuiusquam periculo, tum licita est Aequiuocatio. Casaub. Ep. ad Fronton. Duc. pag. 1. 1.

^a Proceeding
against Tray-
tors, lit. u. 4.

^b Ea etiam uti
licet, quum iuste
quis interrogatur,
si datur rationalis
causa non res-
pondendi ad me-
tem Interrogan-
tis. Fernand.
Exam. de præc.
2. cap. 5. §. 1. nu.
8. p. 49.

^c Non solum quum
iniuriosa est in-
terrogatio, sed et-
iam absque cul-
pa interroganti,
sepe non tenemur
ad mentem eius
respondere, quan-
doque scilicet
Interrogans non
habet ius impe-
randi responsio-
nem, & Interro-
gato idonea mini-
meque levis illius
denegande causa
suppetit. Nam
cui tacere licet, is
præter quæstia,
aliud quid cum
Deo, Coelitibus,
aut seculum loqui
potest, seu vocali,
seu mentali oratio-
ne -- seu mixta,
.i. partim vocali,
partim mentali.
Heiff. Refut.
Aph. c. 4. Aph. 2.
au. 117. p. 191.

full. In which speech, Master Casanbon doth truly note by the way, that those words, without the perill of any man, are onely added for a colour, and to blind the simple with; as I noted the like before, in a like sentence of Father Persons. But the thing that I now note for this purpose, is, that he saith; In comon use of life, when it is required of a man to speake truth, then it is not lawfull to equivocate. By which words he implyeth, that where a man is not of duety bound to speake or reueile the truth, there he may obscure & hide it by this Arte. The same Father Garnet, while hee stood at the Barre, in fewer words, and plainer manner explaineth his meaning thus; ^a No man may equivocate when he ought to speake the truth, otherwise he may.

To like purpose Fernandes ^b A man may lawfully use it also, when he is iustly or lawfully demanded, if hee haue a reasonable cause not to answer according to the meaning of the Demander. And Heissius the Iesuite, ^c Not onely (saith hee) when the question is uniuersall, but also when it is without fault, We are many times not bound to answer him that asketh the question, according to his intention and meaning: and that is, Whensoever the Demander hath not right to command an answer; and the Demanded hath a sufficient and not idle reason to deny it. For he that may lawfully hold his peace, may, passing by the things that are asked him, speake some other thing with God, the heauenly Spirits, or with himselfe, either by vocall or mentall speech, or by a mixt speech, which is partly vocall and partly mentall. In these two last testimonies, the instance is in a particular case, when a man is examined or questioned: but the ground on which they build their determination, is a generall Rule, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, then he may lawfully equivocate, and speake by a mixt Proposition; as appeareth plainly in the reason of Heissius, now set downe in his owne words. And in a word, Equivocators say, that if

if ^a a man vse Equivocation with mentall reservation, he doth not offend against the negative Precept, which forbiddeth a man to lye; because, whatsoever he speaketh in that maner, is a truth: onely hee may offend against the affirmatiue Precept, if he doe then equivocate, when he is bound to vtter and reueile the truth. And hence I inferre, that whensoever a man may lawfully say nothing, as not being bound to reueile the truth; then in these mens opinion, he may lawfully speake by Equivocation. And this is the first thing that they say for this purpose.

The second thing is, that ^b there is iust cause for vsing of Equivocation, whensoever it is necessary or expedient for preserving of bodily safety, honor, household goods, or for any other act of vertue; so that the hiding of the truth may then be thought to bee expedient and honest. So speaketh Sanchez, meaning this rule of such an Equivocation as is ioyned with an oath. For else, ^c if there be no oath vsed, then honest sport vsed for lawfull recreation, may make the vse of Equivocation lawfull. But if there were an oath added, then it is an evident fault, because of the vaine and indiscreet vsing of Gods Name. So speaketh the same Author not long after. From which words of the Iesuite we may gather two things. 1. That an easie cause may suffice for iustifying of Equivocall speeches, in a simple assertion without an oath. If there bee no other cause but onely for merriment and recreation, yet that is reason inough to make the vse of Equivocation lawfull and honest. 2. That when other Equivocators doe require some kind of necessity or vtility which may draw men to vse it; they are to be vnderstood of Equivocation ioyned with an oath, and not when it is vsed in a bare and simple affirmation or negation: vnlesse wee may conceiue, that sport and merriment goeth with them for a matter of necessity or great moment. And

^a Persons mit. c. 10. nu. 23. pa. 424. Greg. de Valent. tom. 3. Disp. 5. q. 13. punct. 2. §. Ad. 2 Arg. Sanchez moral. 3. c. 6. nu. 16. p. 26.

^b Causa iusta vtendi his amphibologiis est, quoties id necessarium aut vtile est ad salutem corporis, honorem, res familiares tuendas, vel ad quemlibet alium virtutis actum: ita vt veritatis occultatio censatur, tunc expeditur ac studiosa. Sanchez op. moral. 1. 3. c. 6. num. 19.

^c Dum Sotus ait non esse culpam Amphibologiis uti joco, & inridiculis, intelligo quando absque iuramento id fieret. Tunc enim honestus ille ludus, recreationis iuste causa exercitus, honestum redderet amphibologie usum. At si iuramentum adesset, est manifesta culpa, propter vanam et indiscretam Divini Nominis usurpationem, Sanchez moral. 1. 3. c. 6. nu. 22.

indeed,

indeed, this difference giuen by Father Sanchez, betweene *Equiuocation* with an oath, and without it, hath reason in it, if we consider their grounds and principles. For in affirmations and negations, there are two things required. 1. That no lye be told: for this is required by the negative precept of truth, as they vse to speake. And this fault, as they thinke, they auoide by their *arte* of *Reseruation*. And secondly, that men conceale not a truth, when they are bound to disclose it: for this is required by the affirmatiue precept of *truth*. But in an Oath, besides truth in the speech, there is a third thing required, and that is, that it be vndertaken with iudgement, that is to say, aduisedly and with due discretion. Else, by swearing a truth *vnadvisedly*, Gods Name may be prophaned. There is reason then for this difference which Sanchez maketh. And now by all this, the Reader may see, that an easie cause is thought sufficient for the vsing of this *Arte*. If it be for ease of the body, safety of a mans goods, preferuing of his credite, &c. then by their doctrine, a man may *equiuocate* with an Oath: but if it be for *sport* and *merriment* only, yet then it may bee lawfull in affirmations and negations without an Oath: provided that it be such a case, in which a man may lawfully hold his peace, and bee not bound then to disclose the *truth*.

By this it appeareth in generall, in what cases they allow the vse of this *Arte*. But for fuller satisfaction of the Reader, and for more distinct conceiuing of their meaning in this point; it will not bee amisse to point out some speciall and particular Cases, in which they giue expresse leaue for the practising of this sleight. And they be these, and such like.

1. If a Priest, that hath heard another mans Confession, should be demanded, whether such a one had confessed such a sinne vnto him, or not; -- he may answer directly, that hee hath not confessed any such thing vnto him, albeit hee had done

done so: yea, he may sweare also this answer of his, understanding and reserving in his minde, that the Penitent hath not confessed the same unto him, so as he may utter it. These be Father Persons ^a words. And hee saith, they be agreeable to the mind of all Schoole-Doctors.

2 ^b If a Penitent be asked without a iust cause, whether he haue confessed such or such a sinne (which he had confessed to the Priest) he may sweare he confessed it not, understanding, so as that he is bound to tell him. So speaketh Sanchez, and citeth others of the same opinion.

3 ^c If a Iudge do against iustice question a Defendant, and doe not question according to order of Law; the Defendant may vse Equivocation, and sweare according to his owne meaning: that is, by a secret reservation kept in his mind. So saith Tolet. And Sanchez saith the like,

^d When the Iudge that questioneth, is not the lawfull Iudge of him that is questioned, or is not his Iudge in that peculiar case, the Defendant may vse Equivocation. And the like he saith, if the Iudge bee an Excommunicate person. And the like Father Persons doth largely confirme, ^e When the Iudge is not lawfull, or not competent at least in that cause, or proceedeth not lawfully. In these cases, they thinke that a man questioned before a Magistrate, may vpon his oath, by an equivocall reservation, deny that which he knoweth to be true.

4 ^f If one doe ignorantly kill a man, thinking him to be a wild Beast, (a Deere for example) or if he kill a man in his owne defence; he may being questioned of the fact, denie it vpon his oath.

5 ^g When an uniuert tax is set vpon a commoditie, if a man sell it for more, or maketh light waight, and scant measure, so that he make himselfe satisfaction for the Wrong of the Taxe, and yet sell his commodities worth the moeny; he being examined by a Iudge, whether he sold the commodi-

ignorater, putans esse seram, occidat, aut in propriam defensionem - potest de eo facto rogatus in iudicio, id negare. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 29. ^h Quando taxa alicuius rei est iniusta, si pluri vendens, aut defraudans in pondere & mensura, ita ut sibi satisfaciatur pro pretij iniustitia, & reddat correspondentes merces pretio dato; potest hic interrogatus a Iudice, an pluri vendiderit

^a Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 2. pag. 407, 408.

^b Vltimo, Deducitur Penitentem temere rogatum, an hoc vel illud peccatum fassus sit, posse iurare se non confessum, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illi explicare. Sanchez mor.

l. 3. c. 6. nu. 44.

^c Si contra iustitiam petit, et iuridice eum non interrogat, potest vii equivocatione, et iurare secundum propriam mentem. Tolet. de Instruct. Sa. l. 4. c. 21. num. 10.

^d Fisdem ambigoloyis potest vii Reus, quando Iudex interrogans non est legitimus Interrogati Iudex, aut in hoc casu peculiari. Sanchez l. 3. c. 6 nu. 27.

^e Mitig. cap. 10. nu. 11. and in the rest following.

^f Si quis homine

vel defecerit in ty for more, or came short in his waight or measure, hee
 pōdere aut mēsu- may deny it, and say, that he sold it for the price that was
 ra, id negare, as- set him, and that he gaue full waight and measure; meaning
 ferereq; se pretio so, as that selling for more, or coming short in his waight
 taxato vendidit- or measure, he did commit an offence.

se, & integrè
 pondus & mensu- 6 ^a If a man be found slaine, with a Sword lying by him;
 ram tradidisse, in- and a guiltlesse person should be asked, whether that sword
 telligendo hac, Were his, or whether hee passed that way at such an houre,
 ita ut pluris ven- (Which things are true, and are inquired after as signes of
 dens aut defici- that murder, which he committed not) he may denie it.

ens in pondere aut
 mensura deli- 7 ^b If a man haue borrowed money, and paied it againe,
 querit. Sanchez and be examined of the Iudge, concerning the money that he
 moral. l. 3. c. 6. borrowed; he may sweare that he borrowed not that money;
 nu. 29. understanding so as that he is now bound to pay it. And so
^a Si reperto cada- a man may sweare, that he had not such money, which hee
 uere, quis interro- did receiue; if through pouerty he be excused from making
 getur, an gladius payment, or if he should be urged to pay it, before the day
 ibi repertus sit su- that it is due.

us, vel tali hora illac transferit,
 que vera sient, 8 ^c If a Creditor haue money owing him upon Bond,
 & petuntur ab part whereof is payed vnto him, but as much is due vnto
 eo, tanquam illi- him some other way, for which hee hath no Instrument to
 us homicidij indi- shew: if he be required before a Iudge, to sweare whether
 cia quod verè nō part of that debt were payd him; he may sweare that it was
 commisit; potest not paied; understanding, so but that as much is now due to
 negare. Sanch. him, some other way.

l. c. nu. 30. 9. ^a If a man be forced to promise marriage to a Wo-
^b Ratione optima- man, Whom otherwise he is not bound to marrie [the mea-
 = docent eum, qui- ning is, if he be urged and pressed by a Iudge against
 nummos mutuo reason, to make that promise] he may sweare, that hee
 acceptos soluit, Will marry her, though hee meane it not, understanding
 posse à Iudice ro- gatum de mutuo, iurare, se illud non accepisse, intelligendo, ita ut teneatur id soluere. -- Atque idem credo si tunc non
 teneretur soluere, eò quòd terminus, ad quem mutuum datum fuit non est impletus; vel prae pauper-
 tate excusatur debitor à tunc soluendo. Sanch l. c. nu. 31. ^c Non, deducitur Creditorem virtute
 Instrumenti publici exigentem coram Iudice debitum, -- etsi pars illius summae debiti soluta sibi sit,
 &c. Si Debitor reconueniat coram Iudice Creditorem, ut iuret an pars illius debiti soluta sit sibi,
 potest iurare solutam non esse, intelligendo, ut modò non sit tantundem sibi debitum. Sanch. l. c.
 num. 36. ^d Undecimò deducitur, coactum aliquam accipere in sponsam, quam ducere non te-
 netur, posse iurare se accepturum, intelligendo intra se, Si tencor, vel si postea placuerit mihi. San-
 chez ibid, num. 39. Tolet. de Instru. Sacerd. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11.

Within himselfe, if he be bound to doe so, or, if after ward I shall like of it.

10 ^a If a Woman, that hath played the Whore, bee asked by her husband, whether she haue committed adultery, shee may sweare that she hath not done it, understanding with-in her selfe, so as I may or meane to tell you of it.

11 ^b If a man haue contracted himselfe to a Woman, and after ward make another contract With another, by words de præsenti: and being called before the Bishop, and there asked, whether he made such a contract de præsenti with this later woman, he may sweare hee did not, understanding, so as that it is a marriage.

12 ^c If a man bee requested to lend money, when hee is not bound to lend it, though he haue the money by him, yet he may sweare that he hath it not, understanding with-in himselfe, so as that he will lend it him.

13 ^d If a man come from London in a time of infection, to Couentrie, where he cannot be admitted to lodge, vnlesse he will sweare, that he came not lately from London; hee may sweare that he came not from London, reseruing in his mind, so as that if am infected with the plague, if vpon good reason he thinke that he is not infected.

14 ^e If a man in common talke bee asked of any matter which it behooueth him to keepe secret, he may lawfully say, that he knoweth not, understanding, so as it is behoouefull

matrimonium fuerit. Treatise of Equiuocation, allowed by Blackwell and Garnet, cited by D. Abbot Antilog. cap. 2. fol. 13. and Casaub. Epist. ad Front. pag. 115. ^f Decimo quinto deducitur, eum, a quo mutuo pecunia petitur, quam reuera habet, posse iurando affirmare, se eam non habere, intelligendo intra se, ut mutuo det. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 43. & Nauarr. Com. in c. Human. aures, q. 3. num. 13. Persons mitigat. cap. 9. num. 81. pa. 401, 403. ^g Londino quis, se uiente ibi peste, proficiscitur Couentriam, quem magistratus de urbis sue incolamitate solliciti, diuersari ibi non patiuntur, nisi prius iuret se Londini nuper non fuisse, non inde uenisse, iurare poterit non se uenisse Londino, cum hac reseruatione mentis, ita ut infectus peste uenerim. Treatise of Equiuocation, apud D. Abbot Antilog. c. 2. fol. 13. The like is said by Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 35. by Tolet. de Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. num. 12. by Nauarre Enchirid. cap. 12. nu. 19. ^h In communi loquutione interrogato de re quam secreto seruare expedit, licitum est dicere se nescire, intelligenda, ita ut expediat dicere. -- potest etiam -- uti quamuis alia amphibologia, &c. Sanchez moral. l. 3. c. 6. num. 25.

• Si vir ab uxore petat an sit adultera, ista potest dicere, Non sum, (quamuis uerum fuerit eam adulterium commississe) intelligendo, ut tibi reuelam Tolet. Instruct. l. 4. c. 21. nu. 11. Sanch. moral. l. 3. c. 6. nu. 41. Persons, mitig. c. 10. nu. 37. pa. 436.

• Contraxit quis matrimonium per uerba de presenti, qua de re postulat ius coram Episcopo, potest adhibere iuramento respondere, non se contraxisse per uerba de presenti; seruata sibi clausula, ita ut matrimonium fuerit.

to tell it: or With any other reseruatiō that he will imagine

▪ *Obseruandum
quoties licitum
est, ad se tuendum
vbi aliqua equi-
uocatione, id quo-
que erit licitum,
etsi interrogans
urgeat excludens
illam equiuocati-
onem. and, Quā-
tumcūq; redu-
plicet inquis In-
terrogator, ut in-
ret se nulla equi-
uocatione vbi, &
absque omni
profus equiuoca-
tione id intellige-
re: adhuc id in-
rare potest, intelli-
gendo, ita ut pla-
ne debeat loqui et
explicare, vel ali-
quid aliud mente
conspicendo, quo
verum id redda-
tur. Sanchez
moral. l. 3. c. 6.
num. 45. and
the same is
said in the
Treatise of
Equiuocation
apud D. Abbot
Antilog. fol. 13.
fac. 2.*

Lastly, a If he that asketh the question, doe exclude the use of Equiuocation, and require a man vpon his oath not to use any Equiuocation, and that he meaneth what he speaketh without any Equiuocation at all (as it is in the Oath of Allegiance) yet he may sweare it still, understanding, so as he ought to speake plainly; or framing some other reseruatiō in his mind, by which it may be made true.

These and such like be the cases, in which they allow their Equiuocating fraudes. I could adde more, but I feare I haue wearied the Reader by too many already.

Surely, by this that hath beene said, we may learne two things, which it is requisite all plaine-meaning Christians should take notice of.

1 That *Equiuocators*, and such as are instructed in this *Arte*, doe take vnto themselues a large liberty of vsing this fraudulent deuiſe. For out of the premises it may appeare, that whatsoeuer busines or occasiō be offered, be the matter sacred or ciuill, publike or priuate, in open Courts of Iustice, or in common practice of life; yet if they can perswade themselues that they haue any *serious cause* to conceale the truth, whether it be for some good to their soules, or for safety of their bodies, or keeping of their goods, &c. they may freely sweare the contrary to that truth, by an *Equiuocall* or mentall reseruatiō. And if they haue any light cause or reason, if it be but for sport or merriment to recreate themselues, then they may deceiue vs by an *Equiuocation*, in a simple affirmation or negation, hauing no Oath in it.

And this being so, I desire euery Christian, that would not be deceiued, to consider with himselfe, whether he can thinke of any busines that passeth between man and man, in which hee may promise to himselfe plaine dealing, or may presume that he shall not bee deceiued by some *mentall deuiſe* or other, if hee haue to doe with them, who doe professe this Equiuocating *Arte*.


Secondly,

Secondly, we may learne, that there is no limitation, or exception, or explication, be it neuer so wise or wary, nor any thing which mans wit can deuise, that may restraine or keepe backe these *Equiuocators*, from deluding vs by their equiuocall speeches; but that say or doe what a man will or can, they will take libertie to *equiuocate* still: so that no Oathes, how warily and carefully soeuer they be framed, can hold these men, further then themselues will. ^a *Paceni*us discoursing of the Oath of *Allegiance*, laugheth at the *simplicitie* (as hee calleth it) of our King and State, who thought by that Oath to provide for their safetie: as hauing hedged it about with so many circumstances, as that, to their thinking, no man could winde himselfe out of it with a safe conscience. But they consider not (saith hee) that if the Pope shall dissolue this Oath, all the bands of it, either for performance of fidelitie to the King, or for not admitting a dispensation from Rome, are shattered in pieces. Nay, ⁷ will say one other thing (saith hee) that is more admirable. An vnjust Oath, when it is declared to be such, bindeth no man: but that, this Oath is vnjust, hath beene sufficiently declared by the Pastor of the Church. Hee meaneth the Pope. And hereupon hee inferreth in an insulting manner; ^b Thou seest now (saith hee) that the band of that Oath is vanished into smoak, so that the band which so many wise men thought to be as strong as Iron, proueth weaker then straw. Thus this man boasteth, that by the Popes dispensation, or declaration of the vnlawfulness of it, no Oath in the world is any thing worth. A great priuiledge fure for them, that can so easily winde themselues out of bands, euen the strongest that can be thought of, among men: And yet me thinketh, aliud admirabilius, the *Equiuocators* haue found a more admirable deuice then this of *Paceni*us is. For he sen-

^a Vide in tanta astutia quanta sit simplicitas. Quæ omnem securitatem in co iuramento sibi statuisset, talem se modum iuramenti, tot circumstantijs connexuisse existimabat, qui, saluâ conscientia, nulla ratione à quoquâ dissolui posset. Sed videre non potuit, si Pontifici iuramentum dissoluerit, omnes illius nexus, siue de fidelitate Regi præstanda, siue de dispensatione non admittenda, pariter dissolutos fore. Immo aliud dicam admirabilius. Nostri credo, iuramentum iniustum, si tale esse euidenter sciatur, vel aperte declaretur, neminem obligare; Regis iuramentum iniustum esse, ab ipso Ecclesie Pastore sufficienter declaratum est. Barthol. Pacenius, Egelas.

Epistol. Monit. Iacob. Regis lit. B. 2 & 3. ^b Vides igitur iam in fumum abiisse illius obligationem; ut vinculum, quod à tot sapientibus ferreum putabatur; minus sit quam stramineum.

deth a man to Rome, to fetch a *dispensation* thence, or to get the Pöpes *declaration* of the vnlawfulnesse of the Oath, and then they may breake all. But our *Equiuocators* haue that at home, and within their own breasts, that may free them from all. For if themselues doe but thinke that the thing is vnlawfull, or that they haue some reasonable cause, to dissemble, they may take this or any other Oath whatsoeuer; and by an *equiuocall* reseruatiön, breake the band of that Oath, before they take it. And if such be the priuiledges of these men, how great is their danger, that liue and conuerse with them: God preserue all well-meaning men from such deceitfull tongues.



CHAP. IIII.

Of the vse, or rather abuse of Equiuocation, and for what turnes it may serue.



Equiuocation, such as hath beene described before, may be beneficiall to them that vse it, many wayes, and for diuers purposes. For in the generall it may serue them for all turnes, in which by mis-leading the Hearer, they may make any aduantage to themselues: and more particularly it may serue them for these speciall ends and purposes.

First, in State-businesses, and matters of policie, it may serue great men, to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by: and yet to make faire weather towards all men, and beare them in hand that they meane nothing but friendship and loue. In this kinde

Nauarre telleth vs of a great *Monarch*, who hee thought

a In c. Human.
aur. q. 3. nu. 14.
pag. 353.

Monarchicum
primis maximis

thought had vsed, and did then vse *this good art* (as he calleth it) by the benefit whereof, euery man was contented and pleased, that came to him, or had to deale with him about great affaires, ^b For (saith he) *hee is thought so to entertaine and to heare those that come vnto him, and in answering, so to expresse and declare himselfe vnto them with whom hee hath to deale, as well by gesture, as by words and deedes, that the things being understood according to their meaning, doe please and content them, though in themselves they be false, but are true according to the reseruations understood by the Answerer.* The same Nauarre addeth further, ^c that he thinketh another great Monarch meant to teach his sonne ^d *this doctrine and good arte of Equiuocating*; when for some secret defect, hee drew him backe from the studie of learning, saying, *I would not haue my sonne to haue any more Latine, then onely that one Apophthegme, * Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare.* Doe they thus instruct their Catholique Princes, to dissemble and equiuocate? and call they it a good *Arte*, by which they may possesse men with a good opinion of them, when they meane quite otherwise; that so they may worke their ends, and bring about their proiects and plots? Why, then I neede not feare to say, that one turne, for which the Doctrine of Equiuocation doth serue them, is in State-businesse to hide their plots, and to worke their ends by it. Which as it is aduantageous to themselves, so it is dangerous for those that haue to deale with them.

Secondly, It may serue them, for a meanes to hide their mischieuous plots against the State and Religion, and yet to escape the hand of iustice after all. For when they haue plotted and acted Treasons, or are about any vnlawfull businesse, forbidden by the whole-some Lawes of the Kingdome; *Equiuocation* serueth to hide both themselves and their Associats, from the enquiry

^b *Creditar enim illa excipere & audire ad se venientes, & sic ipsdem respondendo, significare tam gestu, quam verbis & factis, ut placeant eis, cum quibus remgerit, intellecta secundum intentionem illorum, licet sint in se falsa, &c.*

^c *Ibid. nu. 15.*

^d *Hanc doctrinam & artem bonam.*

** He that knoweth not to dissemble, knoweth not to raigne.*

quiry of the Magistrate, be hee neuer so vigilant and carefull. For if one of them be examined or asked, whether hee haue reconciled such a man to the Pope, or absolved such a subiect from his bond of Allegiance, or haue conspired against the life of the King, or haue beene acquainted with a plot of blowing vp the Parliament; though all these things be most true, yet hee may without scruple deny them all vpon his Oath. Or in case one be detected otherwise, and examined, who were his Associats, whether such a Priest, or such a Iesuite, or such a Gentleman were priuy to the thing; though these men were all of them as deepe in the villany, as himselfe; yet he may sweare that none of them all did know the least iote of the matter. And by these trickes they can worke all mischiefe to Kings, and Nobles, and People, and Parliaments; and yet wind themselves and their complices out of the hands of iustice; vnlesse God doe disclose them, as many times he doth beyond the prouidence or expectation of man. For rather then Treasons should goe vnespied, God maketh

a the Bird of the ayre to carry the voyce, and that which hath wings to tell the matter, saith Salomon. This vse Southwell the Iesuite made of this Arte. For, fearing to be detected, b hee instructed a Woman-Disciple of his, that if shee should be examined, whether himselfe were or had beene in that house, shee should vpon her oath vtterly deny it; and so shee might safely doc, vsing but the helpe of this Arte, though shee had often seene him there, and knew him to be in the house. And to like purpose c Tresham, one of the Gun-powder Traitors, vpon examination did confesse that Father Garnet was priuy to the Treason, and had talked with him about it; but afterward, hauing been better instructed or confirmed in this rare mystery, when he lay sicke on his death-bed, and not aboue three or foure houres before his death, hee protested, and tooke it vpon his Sal-

*a Eccles. 10.
20.*

*b G. Abbot
prelect. de
mendacio.
pa. 50. nu. 13. &
R. Abbot An-
tilog. cap. 2.
fol. 13. fac. 2.
c Proceeding
against Trai-
tors. Cc. 2.*

nation,

uation, and set it downe vnder his hand, that his former Confession was false, and that hee had not seene *Garner* of sixteene yeeres space before, at the least. And thus hee died. Which protestation of his, vpon his oath, was proued not long after, to be most vntrue. Yea, and *Garner* himselfe confessed, that within that space hee had seene him many times. Whereupon this graue Father, and grand *Equiuocator* being demanded what he then thought of *Treshams* Testamentall protestation, hee answered, *a* *It may be hee meant to equiuocate.* And this reuerend Father himselfe, who was Prouinciall of the Iesuits, when after secret conference betweene him and *Hall*, another Iesuite in the Tower, hee was asked before all the Lords Commissioners, whether *Hall* and hee had any conference together, and was desired not to equiuocate; hee stiffely denied it vpon his Soule, reiterating it with so many detestable execrations, as wounded their hearts to heare him. And afterward, when he knew that the thing was knowne, and that *Hall* his fellow-Iesuite had confessed it; hee cryed the Lords mercie, and said hee had offended, if *Equiuocation* did not helpe him. And though the Priests accuse the Iesuites for it, yet when they are examined before a Magistrate, or Officer, they also say and sweare and protest all maner of falshoods and vntruths, that so they may winde either their fellowes or themselues out of the danger of the Law. And indeede this is the chiefe and principall turne, for which *Equiuocation* is intended to serue them.

a Proceeding
against Trai-
tors. Y. 3.

Thirdly, In matters of Religion this *good Art* may serue them to auoide arguments and euident reasons brought against them, which their owne consciences doe acknowledge to be true. For hereby they can glosse the Fathers sayings against their meaning, and deny all sorts of authorities that are alledged against them. For so themselues professe to their friends in

a Quum in Catholicis veteribus alijs, plurimos feramus errores, & extenuemus, excusamus, cogitato commento per sepe negamus, & commodum ijs sensum affingamus, dum opponuntur in disputationibus aut in conscriptionibus cum Aduersarijs: non videmus cur non eandem equitatem & diligentem recognitionem mereatur Bertramus. Index Belgic. lit. B. in Bertramo. pag. 12. in 8^o. b Mitigat. ca. 7. num. 34. & seqq.

secret, ^a Seeing (say the Belgicke Censurers) in other ancient Catholiques, wee beare with very many errours, and doe lessen and excuse them, and very often by some deuised shift doe deny them, and feine vnto them some commodious meaning, When they be objected against vs in disputations and conflicts With the aduersaries: wee see no reason why Bertram may not deserue the like equitie or fauourable dealing, and diligent reuising. This they professe among their friends (for their meaning was not that euer it should come to our sight :) and being that they hold all lying to be so sinfull, that they may not tell a lye for the sauing of a soule, it were too hard a censure to thinke, that against the light of their owne consciences, they would so wilfully thrust themselues on that danger, and so boldly professe it in the eares of their friends. But by this fine Arte they can quiet the murmuring of their consciences, because by it, they can say any thing, neuer so false, and yet by a *reseruation*, make it as true as the Gospell.

This consideration maketh mee not to maruell, when in men, that professe such religious *strictnesse*, (as Father Persons ^b saith they doe,) I finde such broad and vnreasonable *expositions* and glosses of Fathers and other Writers, as that no man of vnderstanding who readeth the places, but will see, that the *glosse* doth corrupt the *Text*, and the *expositions* doe clearely depraue the Authors meaning. For I know that an *Equiuocator* hath an Arte, by which hee can make all speeches to become true, if once they doe but come forth of his mouth.

Fourthly, It may serue them for deuising and counterfeiting of strange apparitions, and heauenly visions, and diuine miracles. This, how frequent it hath beene heretofore, the wisest and most learned among their owne Writers doe confesse and bewaile. And of late yeeres their owne ^c Brethren doe say, that the miracles

^c The Author and the Publishers of the Iesuites Catechisme.

acles and visions reported of ^d Ignatius, and ^e Iustinian and ^f Xauier, and others of the Iesuiticall straine and order, are not much better. And what should let vs to thinke, but they which presume so much in other things, in ordine ad Deum, and pro bono societatis, in reference to God, and for the good of their Order; would not sticke to fittē and faine and tell of glorious facts, and admirable wonders which were neuer done, and make faire shewes without substance, if these may helpe to aduance the papall dignitie, or the Iesuiticall order, especially seeing they know how to say and write and sweare any thing for so great a good, without the least grudge of conscience?

Fiftly, It may serue them for forging and diuulging of false, especially slanderous reports, against their aduersaries and enemies of their profession. A thing so generally and so boldly practised by the men of this faction, especially by the Fathers of Ignatius his Order, that wise men haue much wondred, when in such politique persons as Iesuites are, they haue seene and obserued such a strangeliberty in coyning of forged tales, as that the vntruthes which they haue broached, might well be called *splendida mendacia*, transparent lyes, such as by their owne light bewray themselves, or such as within a few dayes might and haue appeared to the world to be loude and lewd lyes, that might shame their Master. And wee might well wonder, if we knew not the Iesuites new Arte, that men of any either conscience or honest minde, could let passe out of their mouthes, or from their pens, such shamefull and yet shamelesse fictions. For example (to giue the Reader a taste of their forgeries and lying slanders) Luther was a great mawle, that battered their Babel; and of him they reported, and printed it too, that hee was dead and buried, which was no great wonder: but (that which was worth the straining of their wits) when hee

d L.I.c. 18.
fol. 64.
e L.I.c. 17.
fol. 62.
f Ibid.

g Relation of
Religion, num.
33. Beza Re-
diu. Epist. ad
Gul. Stuck,

lay a dying, hee tooke order, that his bodie should be layed on the Altar, and adored as a God. And when hee was dead, and buried, that there was such a terrible noyse and tumult about his graue, as if heauen and earth had gone together. And the night after his buriall, that there was a much greater and more hideous noyse and shrieking then before. And when, vpon the occasion of this fearefull noyse, which frightened all the Citizens out of their sleepe, his graue was opened the next day, there was neither bodie, nor bones, nor graue-clothes to be seene; but so hellish a stinke came out of his graue, as with the poyson of it, it had almost killed the standers by. And all this while Luther was aliue, and did helpe to demolish their Babel still; and not long after the same time, published a booke in print, & gaue it this title, *Contra Papatū à diabolo institutum*, Against the Papacie founded by the Deuill.

This story if any man be desirous to see, he may read *Melch. Adamus*, in the booke which he wrote of the liues of German Diuines. ^a Where he may also reade the words of the lying Relation, printed by them in Italian, and afterward translated into Latine. After this practice against Luther, they fell vpon Calvin, the wounds of whose pen were deepe in their sides; and of him they scattered this newes in the Courts of the German Princes, and in a generall Assembly in Germany, that Calvin now was weary of his Religion, had revolted, and was turned Papist. And at this very time, was hee printing his booke of Institutions: and in a ^b Preface prefixed before this booke, doth make answer to this slander, and telleth these lying Spirits, ^c *The Deuill and all his rowt of lying spirits are decciued, if they thinke by lading me with base lyes, to discourage or hinder mee in my course.* In like manner, but with more shamelesse impudency, they afterward traduced Beza. Of whom there were not onely false reports scattered through

^a In vita Lutheri pag. 152.

^b Directed to the Reader.

^c Fallitur cum tota sua caterva diabolus, &c.

through Italie, Germany, & other Countries, but let-
ters also were written & diuulged to this purpose; That
Beza ^a a little before his death had recanted his Religion
in a full Assembly of the Senators of Geneva, beseeching them
that if euer they would be saued, they should renounce Cal-
uins errors, and betake themselues to the profession of the
Romish faith; that for more full testification of his unfa-
ined Conuersion, after his death hee desired them to send
for and to be aduised and directed by the Iesuites; that
hereupon the Pope had appointed the Bishop of Geneva to
absolue Beza, and other learned men, such as could be had
neere at hand, to goe to Geneva, and consider of the bi-
sinesse, and deale with the Inhabitants, if any were more
backward, about points and Articles of Religion in que-
stion. After which Relation, the Reporter addeth,
that this newes is most certaine and true; as may appeare
by the numberlesse company of letters written to this pur-
pose, and will (as hee saith) appeare at the next Franck-
ford Mart, by the store of Bookes which would then flye
abroad in the World, for the witnessing of this thing.
Hee yet goeth on further, and for more abundant
prooffe, telleth vs, that Putcanus, the Generall of the Je-
suites, who liued within twelue miles of Geneva, had by
writing related this newes, adding moreouer, that him-
selfe was one of those Fathers, whom the Pope had appoin-
ted to goe and instruct the Citizens of Geneva. Yea,
and moreouer, saith the Relator, the Landgrane of Hes-
sen, being scared with this newes, sent messengers to Ge-
neua, who after their retourne confirmed all this to be true.
This they reported of Beza; without either fear of God
or reuerence of men. For all this while Beza was aliue;
and continued preaching and writing against the super-
stitions and idolatries of the Romane Church, for di-
uers yeeres after. And for the clearer detection of this
shamelesse lye, he wrote a Booke, the title whereof is
Beza redinuus, Beza returned to life againe. Wherein

See the Iesuits
Catechisme,
l. i. cap. 17. §. 62.
a *Vise mortii
vicinum sensu,
coram pleno Se-
natus Geneuensi
palinodiam ce-
cinit. Beza Re-
diuiui. Epist.
Coloniâ missâ,*
pag. 9.

he hath laid open the Iesuites forgeries, to the shame of their Order. I could bring more instances of their abominable forgeries of this kinde, but I am afraide to cloy the Reader with such vnsauoury fictions. Yet two examples there are, (both within mine owne knowledge and experience) which I cannot omit, without some short rehearfall. The one is, of the famous Diuine, Doctor *Rainolds*, President of *Corpus Christi* Colledge in *Oxford*: and the other, of the worthy Prelate Doctor *King*, Bishop of *London*, my euer-honoured Lord. Of the former, some well-willers to the *Romane-Church*, were discovered to haue diuulged reports, in the time of his long sicknesse, (for hee died of a lingring consumption) that hee voyded his owne Ordure vpward by the mouth: (of which lye what construction ill mindes would frame, any man may easily conceiue.) This report was brought to him while he was yet alieue, which made him to send for the partie, who was said to be the *author*, or at least a *reporter* of this forgerie, and shewed him what the matter was, that hee vsed to spit out of his mouth, euen the very same that other such sicke men vse to doe. But these lyers might haue proceeded perhaps to fowler fictions, had they not beene preuented by the timely prouidence of some learned, and his louing and religious friends. For they remembring and considering the shamelesse practices of Papists, in scattering false newes to disgrace the Worthies of our Church, came to him the day before his death, put him in minde of their false dealing, and desired him, that for the preuenting of such slanders after his death, hee would now make an open confession of his faith, and constant beliefe. Which he being not able to doe with his owne mouth, his speech hauing fayled him some dayes before, left the composing of a forme of Confession to them, to which hee would subscribe. And they considering his

weakenesse,

weakenesse, framed it in generall and few words, in this manner :

These are to witnesse vnto all the world, that now in this my weakenesse, wherein I looke for my dissolution, and hope shortly to be with my Christ, I die in a constant beliefe, perswasion, and profession of that holy truth of God, in defence whereof I haue stood both by writing and speaking, against the Church of Rome, and whatsoeuer other Enemies of Gods truth. And for mine owne resolution touching mine owne state of Saluation after this life, I assure my selfe thereof, by the merits of Christ Iesus onely, into whose hands I commend my spirit, as vnto my faithfull Redeemer.

To this he readily subscribed with his owne hand ;

John Rainolds.

And his friends then present, who had beene eye-witnesses and eare-witnesses of the whole passage of this businesse, did by their hands witnesse the truth of the act to the world, in these words :

That hee made this Subscription with his owne hand, with such willingnesse and chearefulnesse, as ministred great comfort vnto vs, who were then present ; wee testifie by this subscription of our names also hereunto. May 20. 1607.

Henrie Airay Vice-Chancellor.

Henrie Wilkinson.

Edward Rylston.

Richard Taylor.

Henrie Hindle.

Daniel Faireclough.

Henrie Mason.

Alexander How.

John Dewhurst.

The Originall hereof signed with Doctor Rainolds owne hand, and subscribed by the afore-named parties, I haue in my custodie : out of which this is a true and faithfull Transcript here published. Now blessed be his counsell, and blessed be hee of the Lord, that gaue this aduise for the stopping of these slanderous mouthes.

For

For had not this preuention beene vsed afore-hand, we may feare that such as belied him in his sicknesse, would not haue spared him after his death. And for want of some such prouidence and preuention it is, that that Reuerend and learned *Prelate*, (whose memory is precious with all good men that knew him) our late Bishop of *London* I meane, mine euer-honoured Lord and Patrone : for want, I say, of some such prouidence afore-hand, this glorious Soule hath beene traduced by worthlesse pennes, and foule-mouthed fiends (the indignitie of the thing maketh mee, against my nature and custome, to giue them that name whereof they are most worthy) as if hee had made defection to the Roman Church; to whose errors notwithstanding he shewed himselfe an Enemy to his dying-day : as those that knew him inwardly, doe know very well, how in the very time of his sicknesse, hee spared not vpon occasion to expresse his zeale that way. But of all foule-mouthes, that haue slandered that blessed Soule; hee that wrote the *Bishop of Londons Legacie*, is the most shamelesse and impudent lier. The Author of the *Protestants plea* is but a milke-sop to this noble Champion : and Father *Persons* himselfe must now be forced to resigne vp to him the *Whetstone*, which his secular Brethren bestowed vpon him for his excellency in the *fittening Trade*. For they and other of their fellows, haue played their prizes well : but this *L yer* *excelleth them all*. He hath made two publications of one indiuiduall Booke, qualifying, or rather destroying in the latter, some transparent lyes, which with an Whores forehead, and without regard of the Worlds censure, hee had auerred in the former. For, in the yeere 1622. when hee first diuulged this Libell, he made the worthy *Bishop* to speake those silly Motiues, which his worthlesse selfe had deuised. And so hee went masked vnder the *Bishops* name : but with such difformitie and

*Egregiè illi
quidem, sed nihil
ad Parmenonis
Suum.*

and disproportion euery way, as made mee remember the Asse in the Fable ; which presuming to weare the Lyons skinne, did by his long eares bewray himselfe to be an Asse notwithstanding. He saith, that the *Bishop* himselfe did penne those Motiues, and deliuered them to this *Publisher*, this publique Lyer, to be committed to the Presse. I would the world were worthy to vnderstand what rare man this is, that had such inward acquaintance with that learned and wise *Bishop*, as to heare from him the secrets of his heart, and to receiue from him the studied Reasons of his Conuersion, which were neuer made knowne to any bodie else. And sure, it were a great honour to see that face, that could come and goe, and conuerse with the *Bishop* about these weightie affaires, and in this serious manner, without being once scene of any other man ; as if by the vertue of some *Gyges* his Ring, he had bin transformed into an inuisible Spirit. But he goeth on, and saith that the man is knowne that reconciled the *Bishop* to the Romane Church. But it is to be feared, he will neuer make knowne the mans name to the world, lest if the *Reconciler* should proue more shamefaste, then this *Publisher* is, hee might returne the lye vpon the Author that deuised it, and spit his shame in his owne face. And yet say, hee both can and will name the man, what great mastery is in this ? or what great credit might such a circumstance, comming from an Equiuocator, gaine to his cause ? For did not *Puteanus* the Prouinciall of the Iesuites, name the man that reconciled *Beza* to their Church ? Yes. He said expressely (not with *Ifs* and *Ands*, as this *Publisher* doth) that the man was the Bishop of *Geneua*. And did hee not name beside, both the man that was sent to catechize the Citizens of *Geneua* in the Romane Faith ; and the man that sent messengers to enquire of this news in *Geneua*, & found it to be true ? Yes. For, for the

one, he nameth himselfe, who among others, was going to *Geneua* to instruct them. And for the other, hee nameth the Lantgraue of *Hessen*, who was a Prince not farre off, and knew the vndoubted truth of this newes. Iesuites and Equiuocators are ashamed of nothing. And yet, I would we might be so much beholding to this *Publisher*, as to publish the *Reconcilers* name, that performed so great a worke for this great man. To this purpose this publike Lier spake in the first publication of his Booke; which not long after was suppressed and kept from the view of the world. I suppose, some of his Superiours more wary then himselfe, being ashamed of such shining lyes, did call in the Booke, till some kinde of qualification might temper those shamelesse and hideous vntruths. And then in the yeere following 1623. hee made a new publication of the same worthy Worke, changing onely the Title-leave, and the Preface to the Reader. And in this second publication, hee is contented to owne his owne abortiue Brat, which in the former hee had without shame fathered vpon the worthy Bishop: and wisheth that himselfe may be taken to haue written those motines; as a precedent or patterne warranting any Protestant in the change of his Religion, though by a Poeticall freedome peculiarly applied to the Bishop. And whereas throughout the whole Booke, hee maketh the Bishop speake what himselfe had forged; hee now giueth his Reader leaue with his full consent and allowance, to suppose all these passages to be *fictiones personarum*, and warranted by the figure *Prosopopeia*, that is, a fiction of the Person. It were some signe of grace, if he had acknowledged the whole *fiction*, as hee doth this part of it. But he goeth on still: and euen in the new altered Preface, or Aduertisement to the Reader, hee accuseth the Bishop of defection from his Religion; and by a figuratiue kinde of *Preterition*, hee spareth peremptorily to
affirme.

affirme, that the Bishop did write and deliuer to others any Reasons or Motiues of his change in Religion. In which speech, this Slanderer would haue his Reader to vnderstand that, which himselfe dareth not speake; that when it shall appeare to be a shamelesse forgery, hee may wipe his mouth with the Whoire in the *Prouerbes*, and say, that hee said it not. But, *foule-mouth*, if thou hast any thing to say, spit out: and labour to giue some satisfaction to the World, to auoid the euidence of *coozening the liuing*, and *slandering the dead*. For know, that the World already is possessed with this opinion, that thou must needes be some ignorant Iesuïte: (for none else can be imagined to be so Bayardly bold.) And if now thou forbear to produce some prooffe, or some probabilitie, or some possibility, how these things might be; wee shall resolue vpon it, that *Persons* his *ghost* is risen from the dead, and hath brought with him *senen. other spirits worse* and more lying then himselfe: and that that is the reason, why such vast and shamelesse Forgeries doe shew themselves in this man. But I leaue this Lyer for this time: and humbly pray the *Worthies* of our Church, that they would take these things into their consideration: and as men that deale with Thornes, doe fence their hands with thicke Gloues; so seeing they doe liue, and must die in the midst of such slanderous Tongues, they would arme themselves against such malice, by an open profession of their Faith, at such times especially as they are ready to leaue the World; lest they may be slandered after their deaths, when they will want libertie to defend themselves. But heere I stay my course. For I perceiue I haue in part digressed already; and yet not so, as that I am gone from the matter in hand. For I was saying, that Equiuocation did serue the Masters of it for this turne among others; that by it they might without scruple of conscience,

defame and belye the *Worthies* of our Church, that so they might gaine the more credit to their owne. Now how they vse to defame our learned men, I haue declared fully by this digression, if the Reader will so esteeme it: and what vse Equiuocation may stand them in this practice, will not be hard for any man to conceiue. For a wonder it might seeme, that men of any religion or conscience, should endure themselves, while they broach such broad-faced lyes. But the Arte of Equiuocation will presently remoue all such scruple or grudge. For, it teacheth how to speake all vntruths, without telling of the least lye: and so the Equiuocator needeth not to haue any scruple in that respect. And this doubt being once remoued, there can be no further let to hinder their proceeding. For, what though the Heretiques complaine of wrong and iniustice done to them in their good name? that skilleth not. For, *in ordine ad Deum*, and *pro bono Societatis*, that is lawfull enough, or rather very meritorious. For the ^a Seculars tell vs, that when a Priest complained to the Iesuities, or some one among them, of *wrong done to Master Bennet by their defamation*, reply was made, *that it was necessary or conuenient hee should be disgraced, because hee was against their Societie*. Where the Author or Authors of that Booke adde further, that the Iesuities hold such *deuillish Principles*, whereby they may at pleasure defame whom they please. And if they take such libertie of Conscience against their own Catholique Brethren; they will out of question make no bones to slander and disgrace an Heretique. This then is one turne among the rest, and it is a speciall one and of great vse for their purpose, that by this Arte of Equiuocating, they can defame and disgrace, and (as we plaine-dealers doe call it) belye whom they will, without any offence or grudge of conscience.

Sixtly, In ordinary dealings and course of life, Equi-
uocation

a Reply to
Persons Libel.
pag. 18.


uocation may serue them, for concealing of any truth, or perswading of any vntruth, if either of them may make for their aduantage. So a *Nauarre* telleth vs, that if wee be asked what wee haue eaten, how much money wee haue, what wee haue heard, &c. In these and all such cases as these, if there be aduantage to be gotten by it, we may by this fine Arte, conceale the truth, or speake an vntruth, so as by *subintellection*, or a mentall reseruatiō, wee make vp the matter. And the *b* Seculars tell vs, that the Iesuites make *Equiuocation* to serue their turnes so frequently in this kinde, as, that their owne *Catholique* Brethren; nay, their fellow-Priests can scarce tell when they speake sincerely, when otherwise. They might haue added, no nor their holy Father the Pope neither. For, Father *Standish* coozened and deluded him also, by Equiuocation, thereby to oppresse the Secular Priests; as *c* they complaine in diuers places of their Bookes. And if this Arte can serue for this turne, when they deale with his Holinesse himselfe; no maruell if they make the same vse of it, whensoever they haue to deale with Heretiques and enemies of their Religion: as Father *Lister* also did, who *d* giuing his Faith, in verbo Sacerdotis, to be true prisoner to the Knight-Marshall, yet did breake that word and that Oath. But the good Father (say his Secular Brethren) had perhaps some mentall euasion, wherewith to rescue his Soule, at least from remorse, though not from the Deuill. As for example, as hee was in that minde hee would be true prisoner, or for any thing the Keeper should know to the contrary, till hee were escaped; or that hee meant not to runne away on his head, but on his feete; or that hee would not breake away so long as the Knight-Marshall or his Deputie stood by and looked on; or that hee would not breake away as a Priest, but as a Iesuite; or that hee would not scape with a minde euer to come againe with his will; or that nulla fides seruanda

a Comment.
in c.Human.
aur.q.3. nu.13.

b Reply to
Persons Libel.
pag.23.

c Reply to
Persons Libel.
cap.3, pag.57.
True Relation
pag.55,56.
Quodl.3. art.4.
pag.66, in the
Margin.
d Answer to
a Letter of a
Iesuited Gentleman, p.104.

Hæreticis; or, how many Ors might I make vpon this point? saith the Author of that Booke. But the point is plaine, and as well proued to be true, of all sorts, as heere it is affirmed of the Iesuites; though I will not denie these Fathers the precedencie in this practice. *Equiuocation* then serueth for many singular turnes, and for vses of great consequence and moment: and therefore it is no maruell that they doe so hugge and embrace it, as a dearling of great worth.



CHAP. V.

Of the Grounds and Arguments, either for or against Equiuocation.



IN setting down the Reasons on either side, I shall not neede to be long; because I haue beene large already in vnfolding the nature and conditions of this Art, in the points hitherto spoken of: and the discouery of such a monstrous deuce is argumēt inough to disproue it. It may then be sufficient for this place, first, to answer the chiefe Arguments, which are brought in defence of it; and then in the second place, to set downe some fewe Reasons, that may refute it.

And first, for their Arguments, they are many in particular; for Father *Persons* findeth 8 or 9 at least, in one piece of a Chapter: & how many then might he haue found, if he had sought all the Chapters of the Bible, in the like maner? But the Wren hath moc birds then, the Egle: and errors doe more vsually abound with their

their rotten proofes, then Truths doe with sound and substantiall Reasons. And it is no maruell. For a false Conclusion hath no direct or good prooffe at all: and Cauils and impertinent flourishes for euery thing, may bee infinite and without number. And so it is in this case. For such proofes, as the 8 or 9 are, which Father Persons findeth in one Chapter, he might haue found 8 or 900 in the compasse of the Bible. But howsoeuer the particular allegations be so many; yet all of them may easily be reduced to some few heads: and so many of them together may be cut off at one blowe.

The Heads then, to which the substance of all that they say, may be reduced, are these three. 1. Examples of holy men. 2. Examples of God himselfe. And 3. Examples of Iesus Christ our blessed Sauour.

And first, for Examples of holy men, they bring in, the Patriarches and Prophets, and other Saints of God. For *Abraham*, say they, did equiuocate, when he said of *Sarah*, that she was his Sister: and *Jacob*, when hee said, *I am thy first-borne Esau*: and *Moses*, when he said to *Pharaoh*, that they would goe three dayes iourney into the *Wildernes*, but meant to go to *Canaan*: and *Samuel*, when he said, he went to offer *Sacrifice*, but principally inteded to annoint *Dauid* to be King of *Israel*: and *Dauid*, when he told *Abimelech*: *The King commanded me a businesse, &c.* and *Jeremie*, when to the question of the Nobles, who demanded of him, What saidst thou to the King, &c. He answered, *I presented my supplication to the King, that he would not cause me to returne to Iouathans house, to die there*: whereas hee talked with him, concerning his yeelding vp to the King of *Babylon*.

For answer to these and the like, I note 2. things, by way of preamble. 1. That the old Hereticks, the *Priscillianists*, who defended the lawfulnessse of *Lying*, as now the *Papists* doe of *Equiuocating*, did alledge these same places and examples, at least many of them, for
proofe

Gen. 20. 2.

Gen. 27. 19.

Exod. 5. 1.

& 8. 27.

1. Sam. 16. 1, 2.

1. Sam. 21. 2.

Ier. 38. 25, &c.

prooffe of their heresie; which our Iesuites doe for confirmation of their opinion. And they had better shew of reason then these men haue; for diuers of those Instances were either direct and culpable vntruthes, or seemed at least to border too neere vpon such obliquity: but as for this newfound *Equiuocation* by mentall reservation, it hath no shew nor semblance of probability, to be gathered from them. 2. That neither S. *Augustin*, who most diligently confuted those Heretikes, nor any other ancient Writer, for answering of these obiections, did euer flee to this Arte of *Equiuocation*; or once say, that those Fathers and holy men did not lye in any of those speeches, for that they spoke the truth by a mentall reservation. Which answer, if it had bin true, had beene most pertinent and easie; as our late, *Equiuocators* doe not only confesse, but bragge of it too. For *Narré* saith, that from his doctrine of *Equiuocation*, there ariseth, or may bee gathered, *nonus modus excusandi à mendacio Patriarchas*, a new way to excuse the Patriarches from lying. Where, when he saith that it is a new way, he acknowledgeth that it was not knowne to S. *Augustin*, or those other Worthies, who in former times did beate downe these Errours of the Heretikes. And when he saith, that this way ariseth out of his doctrine, he intimateth, that if the Fathers had knowne this, they might easily haue answered the *Priscillianists*, by interpreting those Texts after his new way. Now from hence it followeth, that the Ancients did not vnderstand these passages of Scripture, as making any thing for *Equiuocation*. And therefore, when *Equiuocators* alledge S. *Augustin*, and some others of the Fathers, for their interpretation, they abuse both their Readers, and the ancient Fathers.

These things being first noted, I come to giue a more direct answer to the obiections; and it is this; As they affirme, so I deny, that these or any of these sayings alledged,

^a Comm. in C.
Human. aures
9. 3. m. 7.

ledged, were meant, or are to bee vnderstood and construed with any *Equiuocall reservation*.

Yes, say they, that they are. For if they bee not so construed, they are *apparent lyes*, which may not be supposed of those holy men.

Ans. 1. If they be not vnderstood and made true by *mentall reservation*, they are *apparent Lyes*, say they. If this doe not follow, then our *Equiuocators* doe great wrong to those ancient Worthies. And plaine it is, for diuers of them, that they doe so. For when *Abraham* said of *Sarah*, *She is my Sister*; and when *Moses* said to *Pharaoh*, *We must goe three dayes &c.* and when *Samuel* said to the Elders of *Bethleem*, *I am come to sacrifice vnto the Lord --*; and when *Jeremie* said, *I presented my supplication &c.* these speeches were all of them true, in the words as they lye, and according to the common acception and meaning of them. And therefore there is in them no *Iesuiticall Equiuocation*, in which the words are false, till a secret thought doth make them true. And in this sence, and to this purpose, *Abraham* doth interpret his owne meaning, and explaine his words. For when *Abimelech* challenged him for concealing his wife, and asked, *What sawest thou, that thou hast done this thing?* he answered for himselfe, *Because I thought, Surely, the feare of God is not in this place, &c.* and yet indeed *she is my Sister*; *she is the daughter of my Father, but not the daughter of my Mother.* In which answer we may note three things. 1. He sheweth the reason which moued him to conceale her to be his wife; *Because I thought the feare of God, &c.* 2 He defendeth his speech to be true as the words doe sound; and yet indeed *she is my Sister. q.d.* That which I said is very true. And hereby it appeareth, that *Abraham* did not equiuocate; because *Abrahams* words in their vsuall signification, and as they were vttered by him, were true: but the words of an Equiuocator, as

^a Apologie for
Ecclef. Subord.
c. 12. in the end
fol. 202.

^b So S. Aug. in-
terpreteth this
place, lib. con-
tra mendac.
cap. 10.

they are vttered, are false, till an inward *reseruation* do patch them vp, and make a truth of them. And it further hereby appeareth also, that *F. Persons* did not only belye *Abraham*, but Almighty God himselfe, when he saith, that ^a both *Abraham* and *Sarah* said, that shee was not his Wife, but his Sister: and that this was one among diuers sayings and speeches in Scripture allowed by the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, *Abraham* explaineth his words, or rather sheweth how they were true and vnfaigned, and that is, because she ^b was his neere kinswoman on the Fathers side, and such women in the vsuall language of those Countries, were called their *Sisters*. *Abraham* then sheweth that his speech was true, because the thing was so, as his words did sound; and not because he had some secret *reseruation* in his minde, by additiō wherof they became true. And this sheweth againe, that in these words of *Abraham*, there was no *Equiuocation*, such as our new Doctors doe imagine. And *Abraham*s example in interpreting his owne words, may serue vs for a patterne to interpret the rest by. And so; as he said, *Indeed she is my Sister*, as I said: so we may say of them, *Indeed*, and intruth the things were so, as they said. Only in these examples, though all that was said, was true: yet something that was true, was concealed; which we grant to bee lawfull: nor doth it any way helpe the Iesuites, or fauour their imaginary fiction.

Answ. 2. When they say, If the speeches be not vnderstood with *mentall reseruation*, then those men told a *Lye*: I answered, that that may be granted of some of them, without any absurdity, or wrong of those worthy men. For if we be forced to confesse, that *Dauid* did commit murder, why should we bee afrayd to confesse that he told a *Lye*, if he vttered any such words as had not a true meaning, as our *Equiuocators* say that he did? And if we grant it in *Dauid*, what harme is there,

there, to acknowledge it in others of Gods best seruants, if by the Text and their owne speeches, any such thing doe appeare? If then any of these holy men did speake words which were vntrue, wee may without inconuenience grant, that as they did sinne in other things, so they might in this: and therefore herein we must not take example by them, to doe as they haue done before vs. This answer S. *Augustin* maketh to the *Priscillianists*, when they alledged the example of ancient men and women, to prooue that *Lying* was lawfull. For *when we reade of these things in the Scriptures* (saith he) *we must not therefore thinke that wee may doe them, because we know that they did doe them; lest we violate Commandements, while without choice wee follow examples.* Say then, that the words of some of those holy men cannot haue a good meaning or true construction, in themselues considered; it will be no inconuenience, to grant that such good men did therein doe amisse, and made a *Lye*. And (to speake more particularly to the point) so I thinke *Iacob* did, when hee said, *I am thy first-borne Esau*: and *Dauid*, when hee said, *that hee had made a rode against the South of Iudah*, &c. *1. Sam. 27. 10.* And so wee may say of *Rahab*, and the Mid-wiues of *Egypt*, and some others.

Obiect. But S. *Augustin* doth excuse those words of *Iacob*, from being a lye.

Ans. 1. Be it so. Yet S. *Augustin* doth not interpret them to be vnderstood and made true by any *reservation* in the mind. And this doth no way helpe our *Equiuocators* at all.

2. Say that S. *Augustin* doe giue vnto those words a more fauourable construction; yet *Cornelius à Lapide* disliketh that, and preferreth the other opinion, which granteth that *Iacob* did lye, before this of S. *Augustin*. in *Gen. 27. 19.* And for that interpretation, he citeth S. *Chrysostome*, *Lyra*, *Caietan*, *Lippoman*, *Pererius*, and others.

a Hec quando in Scripturis sanctis legimus, non ideo quia facta credimus, etiam facienda credamus, ne violemus precepta, dum passim sectamur exempla. Aug. contra mendac. c. 9. p. 18. A.

b Contra mendac. cap. 10.

Relect. de Se-
creto memb. 3.
q. 3. Concluf. 7.
pag. 321.

3. *Dominicus Soto*, a learned Frier, doth defend or excuse both Saint *Augustine* & *Iacob* in this manner; It may be (*quod puto sentit Augustinus*, Which I thinke was *Augustines* meaning) that those words of *Iacob*, were used in that Countrey, in that signification and meaning that they might be uttered by him, without telling a lye.

But howsoever it be, *Iacob* was so plaine a man, (saith à *Lapide*) that it is not to be supposed that hee did vse equivocation in his speech: nor doth any of former time so vnderstand his words.

2. The second head of Arguments, containeth the example of Almighty God, the God of Truth. But what hath this iust God, this God of Truth done or said, for which hee should be thought to equivocate, that is, to keepe one meaning to himselfe, and to deliuer another to his people, and by a double-sensed proposition to deceive them, whom he professeth to teach? Yes, say these men, he said to *Niniveh*, Yet forty daies and *Niniveh* shall be quertbrowne, *Ion.* 3. 4. And he said to *Ezekias*, Set thine house in order: for thou shalt die and not live. *Is.* 38. 1. And yet neither of these came to passe, according to these words spoken. And therefore they are not true, vnlesse they be helped by some inward reservation, seeing in the sence that the words yeeld, they were not fulfilled.

Ans. These and other such speeches of God, are words of Commination and threatning. Now words of Commination in Scripture, are meant by Almighty God that spoke them, and are vnderstood by men that heare them, with exception of repentance and amendment, or some such conditions in the persons against whom they are vttered, as may moue GOD to reuoke the sentence. For God himselfe hath declared his owne meaning to be so, in such like sentences and speeches. ^a At what instant (saith he) I shall speake concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdome, to pluck

^a *Ier.* 18. 7, 8.

up and to pull downe, and to destroy it : if that Nation, against whom I haue pronounced, turne from their euill, ^f will repent of the euill, that I thought to doe vnto them. And ^b when I shall say to the Righteous, &c. And when I ^b Ezek. 33. 13. say to the Wicked, Thou shalt surely die : if he turne from his sinne, &c. none of his sinnes, that he hath committed, shall be mentioned vnto him. &c. And according to this plaine Rule giuen by God himselfe concerning his own words, we are to vnderstand Gods threatnings, with some such exception. As for example, yet *fortie daies*, and *Nineueh*, &c. that is, vnlesse *Nineueh* repent, and obtaine Gods fauour for their preservation. And, *Thou shalt die*, &c. that is, vnlesse thou by prayer and humiliation obtaine Gods fauour, to lengthen thy life beyond the ordinary course, or such like. And these exceptions are not secret *reseruations*, kept in Gods owne brest, and concealed from the hearers, as the *Iesuites* *reseruations* are ; but they are conceiued and euer haue beene vnderstood by men acquainted with Gods language, to be meant by the very words. And therefore when God had threatned the Iewes, yet the Prophet exhorteth them to repentance, that so they might moue God to stay his iudgements. ^c *Who knoweth* ^c Joel 2. 14. (saith hee) *if hee will returne and repent, and leaue a blessing behinde him ?* And Daniel, when he had told *Nebuchadnezar* of Gods Decree against him, yet hee giueth him counsell ^d to breake off his sinnes by righteousness, and his iniquitie by shewing mercy to the poore, that this might be a meanes to lengthen his tranquillitie. ^d Dan. 4. 27. Yea, and in the very examples alledged to the contrarie, when *Jonas* pronounced, yet *fortie daies*, &c. the men of *Nineueh*, as either hauing had some aduertisement thereof by Scriptures, or by some of Gods people, or conceiuing so much by the common light of reason, they did vnderstand these words of the Prophet as a threatning, that implied an exception of repentance.

And therefore the King with his Nobles proclaimeth
 a Ionah 3.8,9. a Decree, ^a Let Man and Beast be couered with sackcloth, and cry mightily vnto God, &c. For, who can tell if God will turne and repent, and turne away from his fierce anger, that wee perish not? And when God had threatened Ezekiah, Set thine house, &c. yet Ezekiah ^b turned his face to the wall, and prayed to the Lord, &c. Where his prayer for freedome, sheweth that hee vnderstood not Gods threatning to be meant without exception. And thus the people of God haue euer beene wont to vnderstand such like speeches, till our late Doctors of Rome haue made God to be an Equiuocator, that they might alledge him for a patrone of their sinne.

The third head of Arguments, containeth the example of our blessed Sauour; who though hee were the Truth it selfe, and that there was neuer any guile found in his mouth, yet these men will needes draw him in, to be a fauourer and ring-leader of their falshoods and vntruthes. And so did their Predecessors, the Priscillianists doe before them. For they (as ^c Saint Augustine saith of them) for defence of their Doctrine of lying, brought testimonies out of Scriptures, and encouraged their Schollers by the examples of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and Angels, non dubitantes addere etiam ipsum Dominum Christum; making no scruple to adioyne also our Lord Iesus Christ, as a patterne of their lyes. And right so for all the world, doe our Equiuocators deale now-a-dayes. They bring examples of Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Apostles, and blessed Angels, not fearing to draw in God himselfe, and Iesus Christ his blessed Sonne, to be Abettors of their frauds.

But of God wee haue heard what they say already: let vs now heare what they say of Iesus Christ: and how, and when, and wherein hee vsed this Arte of Equiuocation. Yes, say they, he did equiuocate, when
 d Luk. 24. 28. being with two of his Disciples, ^d hee made as though hee

c Contra Mē-
 dac. cap. 2.
 pag. 14. A.

hee would goe further : and when speaking of the day of Iudgement, he said, ^a *But of that day and that houre knoweth no man --, nor the Son, but the Father onely :* and when hee said to his Brethren, ^b *Ego non ascendam,* ^c *I will not goe up to Ierusalem to this Feast,* and yet hee meant to goe vp, and so went ; and diuers other times.

a Mar. 13. 32.

b Ioh. 7. 8.

Persons Mitig.

c 7. num. 29.

pag. 293.

Ans. Neither in these, nor in any other place, was our Lord, the spotlesse Lambe of God, ever found to equivocate, according to the rules of this new Arte.

Not in the first place, *Luke 24. 28.* For first, there our Lord is said to doe something; *hee made as though hee would goe further :* but he is not said there to haue said any thing, in which this supposed reservation might be vnderstood.

Ob. Yes, but deedes also may signifie as well as words.

Ans. Deedes sometimes are equiualent to words, and doe signifie as well as words doe : and that is, when as words, so they doe declare our meaning, *ex instituto*, or by some kinde of compact and agreement among men. And that may be done two wayes. First, expressely, when some words ioyned with the deedes, doe declare that to be the meaning and purpose of him that vseth them. As when *Iudas* kissed his Master : this signified that hee was *Iesus*, whom they came to apprehend, because before hee had giuen them this signe, ^c *Whomsoeuer I shall kisse, that same is hee.* And ^c *Matt. 26. 48.* when *Iesus* gaue a sop to *Iudas*, that signified that hee was the Traitor, because hee had told them before, ^d *Hee it is, to whom I shall giue a sop, when I haue dipped it.* ^d *Ioh. 13. 26.* And so, when an oath is ministred or tendred vnto vs, if wee lay the hand vpon the Booke, and kisse it, this signifieth that wee consent to the taking of the Oath, because that is appointed and required for this purpose. Secondly, deedes may bee equiualent to words,

a *Faſta nihil
huc attinent, niſi
certam & expe-
ctatam ab altera
parte, ſine ſigni-
ficationem ſine
quaſi reſponſionē
continere de-
beant.* Abbat.
Antilog. c. 2.
pag. 26. And
again, *Otiōſe
totum hoc de
ſtrategematis v-
ſurpatur, quia
nulla ibi conſi-
liorum commu-
nicatio, nulla
ſignorum inter-
ceſſio, que men-
tibus noſtris in-
uicem aperiendis
conſtituta ſunt.*
Ibid. pag. 26.
b *Non magis in
hoc factō video
mendaciū ſpecie,
quā in eo quod
ſimulauit ſe pere-
grinum ſeu via-
torem.* Lucas
Brugenſ. in
hunc locum.
c *Magnum diſ-
crimen eſt inter
verba & opera:
verba ex prima
inſtitutione ſigni-
ficandi vim ha-
bent; non item
opera.*

words, when by ſome outward circumſtances wee doe declare, that we intend them as ſignes of our meaning, and doe referre and vſe them to that purpoſe. In this kinde, wee may ſee a man, who is borne deafe and dumbe, to talke and conferre with his neighbours. And in this kinde a *ſhrugge of the ſhoulder*, (iſas *Perſons* ſaith, it be ſo meant and taken in Italie) may be a ſigne, and haue the ſignification of a Negation or deniall. And when a man openeth his mouth, and ſheweth a defect in his tongue, and maketh a gabbling noyſe and vndiſtinct ſound, this is a ſignifying deede, and doth import that that man is dumbe. In either of theſe kindes, deedes and geſtures are equiualent to words, and may containe truth or falſhood in them, as well as words doe. But elſe, deedes and geſtures, if in ſome ſuch manner, *ex inſtituto*, by appointment and agreement among men, a they be not referred and intended for ſignification of our minde, though they may carry ſhew, and men may gather ſome meaning from them, yet they are not equiualent to words; neither is there any lye contained in it, though the ſhew be not answerable to the thing. And ſuch a deede as this, was that of our Sauour, when hee ſhewed by his geſture, a purpoſe of going further: and therefore this needeth no reſeruation to make it true; ſeeing without any reſeruation it hath no falſe or lying ſignification, ſuch as words haue. And thus *Lucas Brugenſis*, a learned Diuine of the Roman Church, doth vnderſtand and interpret this place. His words (that the Reader may iudge of his meaning the better) are theſe, b *ſee no more ſhew of a lye in this fact of Chriſt, then when before he ſeemed to be a ſtranger or a way-faring man.* And he giueth his reaſon, why hee thinketh there is no vntruth in this deed and geſture, c *for there is a great difference betweene words and deedes. For words by their firſt inſtitution haue the power or vſe of ſignifying; but ſo haue not deedes.* And hence

hence he inferreth that deedes, actions, and gestures, though oftentimes they be, yet they are not alwaies signes either of some ensuing action to follow, or of our present purpose and meaning; nor haue they the nature of a lye in them, *etiamsi ad decipiendum aliquando fiunt*, though they be sometimes done, to deceiue the vnderstanding of the beholder, and to make him beleue that which is not true. So that if our Lord did make shew of going further, and intended it not, as Father Persons saith; yet in this learned mans iudgement, there was no lye in it: and consequently there needeth no mentall reseruatiō to saue it from being a lye.

Secondly, and more agreeably to our Sauours mind, wee may answere and say, that our Lord made as if he would goe further: yea, and meant it too, if their intreaties and importunitie had not stayed him. Therefore the Text saith, *They constrained him*; that is, they importuned him to stay; and he, ouercome by their intreatie, stayed with them. The clearer meaning of which words, we may the better conceiue and vnderstand by alike speech, Luke 9. 53. For there it is said, *The Samaritans receiued him not, because his face was as though hee would goe to Ierusalem*; that is, by his behauiour it seemed that hee meant to goe thither: and so hee did meane it indeed. And so in this place, when it is said, that *hee made as though hee would goe further*; the meaning is, that hee tooke his leaue, and bad them farewell, or vsed some other such like behauiour, which made it seeme, that hee meant to goe further. Yea, and so hee meant indeede, sauing that at their request hee was contented to abide with them.

And thus *Barradius*, and *Ribera*, two famous Iesuites, doe interpret this place. Wee may answere saith the one of them, ^a *Dominū voluisse ulterius progredi, si non retineretur à Discipulis, &c.* That our Lord indeed would

a. Barrad. to

4. l. 8. c. 12.

pag. 356. 21

M

haue

a Ribera in
Amos 2. nu. 21.
Pa^g. 344.

b Si enim cum
non tenuissent,
transisset sine
dubio, & isset
longius.

c Mitig. cap. 9.
nu. 58. pa. 386.

d Mitig. cap. 9.
nu. 72. pa. 397.

e Mitig. ca. 9.
nu. 45. pa. 378.

f Mitig. cap. 9.
num. 48.

haue gone further, had hee not beene detained by his Disciples, and that there was no vntruth in this shew. And the other, a *Nihil veritas fingit*, Christ who is the Truth doth not feine any thing. But the common sort might thinke that hee did feine, but it was no fiction or counterfeiting; ^b For if they had not detayned him, he out of doubt had passed by, and had gone on further. Thus not onely the euidence of truth, but the authoritie of Romish Doctors and Iesuites doe vindicate this place from that false glosse that *Persons* putteth vpon it; and doe free our Lord Iesus from that slanderous imputation, which the Iesuite doth lay vpon him, when ^c he saith that Christ in this place did *equiuocate*: and when ^d hee calleth this dealing of his, *The dissimulation and fiction of our Sauour*.

The second place mentioned, and produced for Equiuocation, is that speech of our Sauour, *Mar. 13. Of that day, and that houre, &c.* This proposition (saith ^e *Persons*) had some reseruatiō of mind, for that otherwise it had beene false.

Ans. Not so. Nay this inference of the Iesuite is false and foolish too: for our Sauour, according to his wonted manner elsewhere, speaketh of himselfe, as he was reputed and knowne to be, that is, as he was man. And in that sense, the words haue an vsuall and cleare construction and signification; which is, that as he was man, he knew not of that day. This interpretation (as ^f *Persons* doth acknowledge) is giuen by ancient Fathers in great number. Nor is this a *mentall reseruatiō*, as *Persons* would haue his ignorant Reader to beleue: but an interpretation vsuallly meant and vnderstood by Christians, in these and such like speeches as these. And therefore our Sauour in this sentence did not keepe one *secret sence* to himselfe in his inward minde, and signifie another to his Disciples in the words vttered.

But

But if it be an Equiuocation, such as they fancy, what then shall the reseruati^on be? *Persons*, knowing that no man before the late inuention of this new *Art*, did euer thinke of secret *reseruati^ons*; or mentall imaginati^ons in our Sauours words; calleth euery Exposition that any good Author giueth, by the name of *reseruati^on*, and reckoneth that Author, for a fauourer of his, like the mad man in *Athenaus*, who when any ship came to the Hauē, put it in his Tables as one of his owne. But that which carrieth most shew of a *reser-* L.c.nu.49.
uati^on, is this; *The Sonne doth not know* the day of iudgement, meaning that hee knew it not so, as hee would discouer it vnto them. For this explicati^on is giuen by Saint *Augustine*, and other Fathers, saith *Persons*; and hee addeth, (as triumphing in so plaine a prooffe) that this exposition *expresseth the very same reseruati^on* in *Christs* words, which they talke of in their mixt and equiuocall propositions.

Ans. To this I answere two things: First, That the Exposition giuen by those Fathers, doth not imply any equiuocall reseruati^on. Secondly, That it doth not giue the true sence or meaning of the place.

First, It containeth not any Iesuiticall *reseruati^on*. For those Fathers which giue that interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *not to make you know it*: or rather, *the Sonne knoweth it not*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*; doe fetch and gather this exposition, not from any secret conceit reserued in our Sauours minde, but from the vse and acception and signification of the word, as it is vsed in Scripture. For so, say they, this word, *scio* or *noui*, is often vsed. As when God said to *Abraham*, *Now I know that thou* Gen.22.12.
fearst God: and to the Israelites, *The Lord your God* Deut.13. 3.
proueth you, that hee may know, whether yee loue the Lord, &c. the meaning is, *that hee may make you to know*. And from this vse of the word *scio*, to know,

Rob. Abbot
Antil. cap. 2.
pag. 22, & 23.

frequent, as they say, in Scriptures; they thinke they may by the like reason, keeping the same proportion of speech, interpret the word *Nescit*, *knoweth not the day*; that is, *hee doth not make you to know it*. Concerning which meaning of the Fathers exposition, if the learned Reader desire any further prooffe, he may haue enough to satisfie his minde, in that reuerend and learned Bishop who wrote against *Eudamon-Joannes*. Now this interpretation of the word, being drawne from the vsuall acception of it in Scripture, is nothing at all to the Iesuites purpose, who fancieth a *secret* clause kept in the minde, but no way included in the vse of the word.

Secondly, This interpretation, *The Sonne knoweth not*; that is, *hee doth not reueale or make it knowne to you*, as it maketh nothing for the Iesuites Equiuocation, so it is not greatly to our Sauours meaning. My reasons are two. First, If that were the meaning, then it would follow, that the Father did so know the day of iudgement, as that hee did *reueale* it vnto them. For that which this sentence doth deny of the Sonne, it doth by vertue of the exceptiue particle adioyned, affirme of the Father; *No man*, no nor the Sonne doth know it, but the Father. Where, if wee fill vp the construction, and make the sentence perfect, the whole speech must be this; *No man, nor Angell, neither the Sonne, doth know it, but the Father hee doth know it*. Now in this speech take the word [*know*] in the sense of those Fathers, *hee knoweth*; that is, *hee maketh to know*, and then the sentence thus expounded, in plaine words will be this, *No man, nor the Angels, neither the Sonne, doth make you to know the day of iudgement: but the Father hee doth make you to know it*. But this is not true of the Father; and therefore that is not the true interpretation or meaning of the word.

My second reason is, Our Sauour in these words,

No

No man -- knoweth; meant to shew how secret and vnkowne the day and houre of Gods iudgement was: but take the word in this sence, *hee knoweth not*; that is, *hee reuealeth not, or doth not make you to know*: and then this sentence doth not imply or inferre or signifie any secrecie of that day. For, if thousands knew it, yet it might be said of them all, *They know it not*; that is, *they doe not reueale it, or make you to know it*. And consequently, this interpretation doth crosse our Sauours meaning, and ouerthrow that, for which hee intended it. Now, lay these together, and then there is lesse then nothing in our Sauours speech for the Iesuites purpose: both because the word cannot beare that sence in this place, which onely might seeme to fauour them; and because, that sence, as it was vnderstood by the Fathers, was not meant to include any such *re-servation*. And so I haue done with this second place, which is the one of the places, that Doctor Norrice did defend his Equiuocation by.

Onely, lest some Popish Cauiller, according to their vsuall manner, should raise clamours after mee, that I doe deny and gain-say the exposition of the Fathers: let the Reader remember, that the other interpretation, which I follow, is confessed by Father *Persons* to be giuen by other Fathers in great number. And againe, if any shall quarrell with mee for leauing an exposition of some Fathers, where I haue so good reason for it; let him know, that I can produce diuers of their owne Writers, who doe reiect as great a number, and perhaps vpon lesser reason.

Thirdly, The third testimony is from the words of our Sauour, *Iohn 7. 8.* which Father *Persons* and other Equiuocators recite thus, *Ego non ascendam ad diem festu istum*, *I will not goe vp to Ierusalem to this Feast*; and yet (say they) he meant to goe vp, and so he went. And therefore here he had a secret *reservation*.

Asw. They corrupt the Text two waies, 1 by altering the words. 2 by peruerting the sence.

* Roman. Cor-
rect. Ioh. 7. 8.

1. By altering the words. For the Originall Greeke is, *Εγω ἔτι ἀναβαίνω*, that is, *I doe not yet goe vp*. And their authentick Latin, *Ego non ascendo*, *I doe not goe vp*. And whereas some Copies had corruptly read it, *non ascendam*, *I will not goe*; ^a *Lucas Bragensis*, lest any man might afterward mistake, hath giuen admonition, that according to the *Roman Correction* of their Bible, set forth by the Popes authority, they may not change *ascendo* into *ascendam*. Yea, and their Rhemists reade it in their English Translation, *I goe not vp to this Festiual day*. Which was true in the very Letter, & meant by our Sauour according to the expresse words. For he did not meane then to goe vp, but afterward when time serued. And yet our *Equiuocators*, to gaine some shew from our Sauours words, doe corrupt not onely the Originall and truely authentick Greeke, but their owne Latine Text too. But it is no maruell: for such a false Arte could neuer be vpheld by true dealing.

2. By peruerting the sence. For say the words had beene, *I will not goe vp*, as *Persons* and *Doctor Norice*, and others would faine haue it: yet the circumstances of the Text doe shew, that that could not be meant of the whole time during the feast, or that hee would not go vp at all; because it followeth in the next words by way of reason, *because my time is not yet accomplished*, as the Rhemists translate it; or *because my time is not yet fully come*, as it is more plainly in our Translation. Which words doe plainly shew his meaning to be this, that he would not then goe, when they would haue him: but would goe when he saw his owne time. And this he might both doe and meane, according to the plaine sence of the words spoken. By which it may appeare, that it is want of prooffe, and weakenes of their cause, that made them to drawe in this Text, which is so cleere

cleere against them. And so, it is the very same reason also, that forceth them (*for necessity hath no law*) to produce the many other speeches of our Sauour, which haue as much affinity with Popish *Equiuocation*, as there is agreement betweene Christ and Belial, or betweene Christ and Antichrist: as I could easily shew, if it were conueniēt to stand vpon all their friuolous & idle allegations. But I thinke it not worth the while, either to tire the Reader, or to trouble my selfe with such fond Cauils. Only for a generall answer to them all, let this be remembred; that there is neuer a Text produced by them for this purpose, but that learned expositors, both ancient and moderne, as well of their Church, as of ours, do interpret and expound it in some determinate sense, which they gather or obserue either from the signification of the words, or the vse & application of them in the Scriptures, or from some circumstances or considerations in the Text it selfe. And therefore such Texts, in the iudgement of all such Interpreters, are not to be expounded or vnderstood of any *Popish reseruations*, kept secret in the Speakers minde. For such *reseruatiō* as I shewed before; may be any that themselves will fancie. Insomuch, that the Priests do frame seuen seuerall and distinct reseruatiōs, all alike fit for Father *Listers* Equiuocation, when he deceiued his Keeper; and doe intimate that they might haue framed many more, and all to as good purpose. And no doubt, as they imagined those seuen, they might haue inuented seuentie more, that would haue serued the turne. In all which it is not possible, for the Hearer or Reader of such a speech, to imagine, what the Speakers *reseruatiō* is; it beeing not such as the signification of the words, or any circumstances of the businesse doe yeeld, but as the minde of the *Equiuocator* will fancie within his deceitfull heart. Nor do they in their *Equiuocations* meane, that the Hearer should knowe their

their *reservations*. For their intent is, to reserve one sense in their owne breast, and to imprint another in the Hearers minde. This only short note being observed, it will be easie for euery Christian, that will open his eyes, to see that no place produced by them out of the Bible, doth include their secret and hidden *reservations*. Or if any Equivocator will caull, or can say, that there is any testimony of theirs, which may not receiue satisfaction by this generall Rule, and is in his opinion worth the standing vpon; let him produce it: and I will promise him either a solution of his reason, or a recantation of mine opinion. And thus much shal serue to be said concerning the Grounds and Reasons which Equivocators doe build vpon.

Now I proceede to set downe some few reasons against this new-found Arte, and fond deuice of *Equivocation*. And those for this time shall be these five.

1. Because this late doctrine of *Equivocation* destroyeth the true nature of *Equivocation*, whose name it beareth.

2. Because it maintaineth a practice of lying, vnder a colour of Truth.

3. Because it disturbeth humane society, and hindereth mutuall commerce.

4. Because it impeacheth God of folly, in making his Lawes against Lying.

5. Because it freeth the Deuill from all iust imputation of being a Lier.

Arg. 1. The Iesuiticall doctrine of *Equivocation*, doth destroy the true nature of *Equivocation*, which hitherto hath beene receiued of all men, and now (for ought I know) is not reiected of any. This I prooue thus; *Equivocation*, in the true nature thereof, is, when a word or speech hath moe senses than one. This the word doth import. For *Aequiuocum*, by the very notation of the name, is *vox aque plura significans*, a word indifferently

rently betokening *moe things*. And in some such manner as this, doe Writers of all sortsexplaine and describe *Equivocation*. But in this new-devised *Equivocation*, there is no word, nor no sentence, or saying, that hath *moe significatious or senses* than one. For in their *mentall equivocall Proposition*, which they fancie, neither the words taken by themselves, nor the whole saying and sentence intended by the speaker, haue any *Ambiguity* or doubtfulnes of signification; or any *moe senses* then one; as I haue shewed ^a before, out of the *Equivocators own Rules*. And hence I may inferre, that either their *reserved Proposition*, is not an *Equivocall* and *double-sensed Proposition*, as they call it without reason, and consequently, that they doe not by *Equivocation* speake truth in one sense, and mis-leade the Hearer with another sence: or else, if notwithstanding this, that Proposition bee *Equivocall* and *double-sensed* still, then we must say, that there may bee an *Equivocation*, where there is but one single sense and meaning. And that destroyeth the true nature of *Equivocation*.

^a Cap. I. p. 17.

To this reason, first their confession is, that ^b *verball Equivocation*, which is, When ^a a word or speech signifieth ^b *diners things equally*, ^c indeed is onely true and proper *Equivocation*, and agreeth onely to the Definition of *Equivocation*, deliuered not onely by Philosophers, but Orators also: and that ^d it is properly called *Equivocation*, When ^d a speech or word signifieth *diners things equally*, if we consider the proper nature of *Equivocation*: and, ^e that *mentall Equivocation in rigor is none*.

^b Perf. mitig. cap. 8. num. 8.
^c Perf. ibid. num. 15.

^d Perf. ibid. num 8.
^e ibid. num. 15

2. Their answer is notwithstanding, that their mixt Proposition may be ^f called *Equivocation*, in a more large and ample signification, as *Equivocall* may signifie an *ambibologicall*, doubtfull or *double-sensed Proposition*, in respect of the Speaker and Hearer, whereof the one understandeth the same in one sense, and the other in another. And the cause Why it is so called, is rather by a certaine simili-

^e Perf. mitig. cap 8. num. 10.
pag. 313.

tude, then propriety of speech : to wit, that euen as Equivocation properly by communitie of name in things of different natures, by variety of significations in the selfe-same words or speech, by custome of phrase and composition of sundry sorts, doth make different and doubtfull senses and meanings to the Hearer : so in this case, by mentall reseruatiō of some part of the foresaid mixt Proposition, the like effect of doubtfulness is bred in the Hearers vnderstanding. For more ready vnderstanding of which perplexed speech, I note that there are three things said by this doubling Equiuocator. 1. That it is onely true and proper Equivocation, & such as is comprised in the Definitions giuen both by Philosophers & Orators, when there are diuers senses and significations in the words. 2. That Equivocation as they meane it in this question, hath no such propertie in it, nor is comprised in the Definition, that Philosophers and Orators haue described Equivocation by. 3. That notwithstanding all this, yet it may rightly be called Equivocation, because as true Equivocation breedeth diuers senses to the Hearer, by the Ambiguity that is in the words; so this new-deuised Equivocatiō may breed diuers senses, one in the Hearer, and another in the Speaker, by reason of the secret reseruatiō that the Speaker imagineth in his own mind. And this may seeme not so vnreasonable, because words doe signifie *ad placitum*, and may be changed euery day. And therefore it is no such fault, to frame a new meaning and another signification in this word, then euer any body did thinke of heretofore.

Rep. This answere doth not weaken mine Argument, it confirmeth and strengtheneth it rather. For first, I doe not except so much against their new signification of the word, as against the new explication and description of it. For they say, that they call it *Equivocall*, because it is a *double-sensed* Proposition; and a *double-sensed* Proposition there fore they call it, because

cause by it they signifie one sense to the Hearer, and imagine another to themselves. But this doth vtterly destroy the very essence & entity of true *Equiuocation*. For true *Equiuocation* cannot be conceiued to be without a diuersitie of meanings in the speech: nor was it euer heard of, that a Proposition could be *double-sensed*, which had none but one single meaning: nor is it imaginable that that saying should be ambiguous, which the Hearer can take or construe but one way.

Secondly, Their change and alteration of the word, to another different meaning, as it is by them here v-
 sed, doth conuince them of false and naughty dealing;
 such as we may obserue Thieues to vse, when they haue
 purloyned other mens goods. For Thieues (saith a *Tul-*
lie) when they haue taken away other mens goods, doe
 change the *markes* of them, that it may not be knowne
 whose they are, or to whom they belong. And right
 so doe our Equiuocators deale in this case. For they
 change the *names*, which are true *markes* of things; that
 hereby they may conceile and hide the nature and pro-
 pertie of the things themselves. I grant then, that
 names may change with times; nor is it any fault to
 alter the vse of a word, so there bee no wrong done to
 the thing, by the misse-applying of the word: as like-
 wise it is no fault neither, to change the *markes* of
 goods, when there is no fraud intended by it. But if
 the *markes* of goods be changed, that the propertie of
 them may be conceiled, that is a plaine trick of thie-
 uerie. And so, if names be changed, that the nature of
 the things may be peruerterd or obscured, that is a trick
 of iugling, not inferior to that cousonage of the Thiefe.
 And so it appeareth to be in this case. For this mungrell
 Proposition of theirs, if it should be censured by Philo-
 sophers, Orators, or other learned men, no man but
 would iudge it at the first sight to be a lye: and so hi-
 therto all men haue euer called such speeches. But now

• *Ut reliqui stu-*
res, earum rerum
quas ceperunt,
signa commutant:
sic isti -- nomina,
tanquam rerum
notas, mutauere-
runt, Cic. de
finib. bon. &
mal. l. 5. nu. 74.
 pag. III.

our new Artificers haue found another name for their new Arte: they call it, Equiuocation. And this they doe for a colourable shew, that it may be thought that there is no vntruth, but onely an Ambiguity in the speech: and that they in deceiuing men by *mentall reseruations*, doe nothing but what honest men are wont to doe, when they vtter sentences, that may haue diuers meanings. Thus, while they change the names, they doe also confound the things, and destroy their true nature, which wise men, and *Aristotle* among the rest, haue euer acknowledged to agree vnto them.

a Mitig. cap. 8.
num. 16. pag.
310.

Obiect. Nay, saith Father ^a *Persons*, but if *Aristotle* did not comprize this our reserved Proposition under some of the three sorts of Logical Equiuocation, mentioned by him in his *Elenchs*, then he erred grossely in making an insufficient Diuision, which comprehendeth not all the parts of the thing deuided. For if the said mixt Proposition (saith he) be an Equiuocation, (as Iesuites say it is, in spite of all reason, and against the doctrine of all ages) then must it haue place among some of these three kindes; or else the Diuision should be insufficient.

Rep. A ridiculous conceit: whereto I know no example, that may be paralell; but I will imagine one as neere as I can. Suppose then, a Father deuideth his Lands among his owne Children, and a Conie-catcher there by steppeth in, and layeth claime to a share among them: and when the matter commeth to be debated, in the Court, the Iudge parteth the Lands among the Brethren, to whom onely they belonged, and shutteth out the Conie-catcher for a wrangler, that layeth claime where he hath no right. What if in this case, the Conie-catcher should complaine of the Iudge, for partiall dealing, and reason against him, as *Persons* doth against *Aristotle*, that if this Conie-catcher haue a right, and a share in those Lands, as himselfe saith he hath, then the Iudge erred grossely, that had excluded

ded him? Would not euery Boy kicke such a wrangling foole or knaue shall I call him? out of the Court? And such a ridiculous wrangler, is Father *Persons*, who accuseth *Aristotle* of a *grosse error*, for not rancking among his kinds of Equiuocation, this of the Iesuites, neuer heard of in the world before; and which the wrangler himselfe doth else-where acknowledge not to be true Equiuocation.

Arg. 2. This doctrine of Equiuocation doth maintaine a practice of lying, because hee whom they call an Equiuocator, is in truth a Lye, and that which they call an Equiuocall Proposition, is a lying assertion. I proue it thus. He that speaketh to another that which himselfe knoweth to be false, is a Lye, and a lye it is, whensoever there is ^a *falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi*, a false signification with a mind to deceiue the Hearer. Or, to speake in a Iesuites words, ^b A Lye is *verbum falsum, cum intentione fallendi*, a false speech, with an intention to deceiue. Which description of a Lye, so far as concerneth this purpose, he explaineth thus. A false speech is heere ment, when a ^c man speaketh otherwise, then himselfe thinketh: and it is said to be with intention to deceiue, because ^d *Hee that speaketh otherwise then himselfe thinketh*, doth deceiue another, and intendeth to deceiue him. For he would not so speake, but that thereby he may engender a contrarie opinion in another mans mind: and this is to deceiue. Thus the Iesuite describeth a Lye, and that agreeably to the receiued Doctrine of the Schooles. But this which is said to containe the nature of a Lye, is all of it found in the new-deuised Equiuocall Proposition. For first, that which the Equiuocator vttereth, is false, and so he knoweth it to be: for ^e it may seeme (saith *Persons*) to haue falsitie in it; and sometimes also hath indeed, in respect of the words onely, or vnderstanding of the Hearer. And the case is cleere, that the words vttered by the Equiuocator, containe an

^a Aug. contra mendac. c. 12.

^b Tolet Instr. 1.8.c.54.

^c Non est mendacium, dicere quod non ita est, sed dicere aliter quam homo putat. Tolet. ibid.

^d Qui aliter quam sentit proloquitur, alterum fallit, et fallere intendit. Non etenim sic profert, nisi ut diuersam opinionem in animo alterius generet. Hoc autem est fallere. Tolet. ibid.

^e Pers. mitig. c. 13. num. 2. pag. 484. & cap. 10. num. 22. p. 424.

a Cap. i. pag.
16. num. 6.

vntruth and a falshood : for else they could not serue him for *euasion*. But the words vttered are all that the Equiuocator speaketh : and therefore that which hee speaketh, is *verbum falsum*, a false word or speech. And secondly, that he vttereth this falshood with *minde and purpose to deceiue* the Hearer, in the sence that Tolet here explaineth it, I haue ^a shewed and proued out of their owne writings : nor can it stand with common sence, to conceiue it otherwise. And hence it followeth that the Equiuocator is a plaine lyer.

Ans. Their answer is, that though the words considered by themselues, and as they are vnderstood by the Hearer, be false : yet as they are meant by the Equiuocator, and as they are ioyned with the *reseruation* kept in his minde, they are true. The summe is, they are false of themselues, but they are made true by the imagined *reseruation*.

Re. This is a weak answer, & an impertinent shift; because their *mentall reseruation* hath nothing to doe either with Truth or Lying; as may appeare by this reason. Truth as it is heere meant, and Lying which is the contrary to it, are morall acts contained in the second Table of the Decalogue or Tenne Commandments : and therefore doe include a respect to our Neighbours, nor can they be vnderstood without reference and relation vnto other men : so that lying consisteth in a signification of falshood vnto others, and truth in signifying or vttering of that which is true; and without such signification, either performed by outward signes, or meant and intended to be performed, if occasion should be offered, Lying and Truth morally taken, can haue no place. Vpon this ground, which hath cleare euidence in it, Bannes a learned Schoole-man doth refute their opinion, who thinke that there may be a lye, where there is no *purpose to deceiue*. ^b *I thinke (saith he) that a minde to deceiue, is so necessary*

b *Mihi vsque adeo videtur ille animus fallendi necessarius ad rationem mendacij; quod sine illo mendacium esse non possit. Vt v.g. si Petrus absque aliquo teste proferat propositionem, quā scit esse falsam; ille non mentitur, quamuis dicat falsum in voce. Similiter si Petrus dicat Ioanni; Tu non es Ioānes: certē non menti-*

necessary in a lye, as that without it, a lye cannot exist. This hee declareth thus: *If Peter, no man being within hearing, should utter a speech, which hee knoweth to be false, yet hee should not lye, though hee should speake an vntruth in the words.* In like sort, if Peter should say to Iohn, *Thou art not Iohn*, doubtlesse hee should not lye, though hee spake an vntruth, because hee cannot speake that with purpose to deceiue Iohn himselfe. And hereof hee giueth this reason, *Because a lye is a kinde of fiction or faining, which is in the Will, with reference to another, by which a man intendeth that another man may beleue otherwise than himselfe, who telleth the lye, doth thinke.* And that a lye doth include such respect and reference to another, is plaine (saith hee) because that veracitie, or the vertue of speaking truth, which is opposite to lying, doth consist also in relation to another, because it is a part of iustice. Thus reasoneth this learned Frier. In this discourse of his wee may note two things. First, His Conclusion, which is, that both lying and truth morally taken, which hee calleth *veracitie*, doe consist in a relation and reference to others; so that no words vttered, without respect of signifying somewhat to some other by them, can be either the sinne of lying, or the vertue of true-speaking. Secondly, wee may note his reason for prooffe of this Conclusion; which is, that *veracitie*, or the vertue of speaking truth, is a part of iustice: and iustice hath a respect to some other, to whom it giueth that which is his due. This reason I take to be vnanswerable; and then his Conclusion must needs be vndeniable. It is proued then that truth morally meant, for a vertue or act of speaking truth, which is a part of iustice, and a durie which wee owe to our neighbours; doth include a reference and respect to others, which respect consisteth in signifying or declaring our meaning to them, truely and sincerely. But now in the *mentall reservation*, shut vp in the

tur, quamuis dicat falsum, quia illud non potest dicere animo fallendi ipsius Ioannem. Huius ratio esse potest, quia mendacium est falsio quedā, quæ est in voluntate, propterea quod est ad alterū per quam intendit homo, ut alius credat aliter, quam sentit ille, qui fingit, & mentitur. Quod autem mendacium sit ad alterum, patet. Nam etiā veracitas, quæ est virtus opposita est ad alterum, quum sit pars iustitiæ, ut ait S. Tho. Dominicus. Bannes to. 3. in 2. 2. q. 1. art. 3. Dub. 1. S. Pro decisione. pag. 16.

Equivo-

Equiuocators breast, there is no such reference or relation, nor doth it admit of any intendment, to signifie or declare his meaning to others. Nay, it is therefore suppressed, and broken off from the speech which is vttered in words, that nothing thereby may be signified to the Hearer. It followeth then, that this *reservation* hath no point nor piece of morall truth in it. And therefore, if that part of the Equiuocators proposition, which hee vttereth in words, were a false and lying speech before; it must needs remaine a lye still, for any helpe that this Reservation can yeeld it.

Arg. 3. The Doctrine of Equivocation doth disturbe humane societie, and destroyeth that mutuall commerce that one man should haue with another. I proue it thus. This societie and commerce must needs be disturbed, when men in wisdome may not beleeuue one another, vpon their words or oathes: but if this Doctrine of Equivocation be receiued, men may not beleeuue one another, either vpon their words or oaths. This is proued thus. The Equiuocator professeth to *equivocate*, whensoever hee may lawfully hold his peace; and if it be for any aduantage of weight, vpon his Oath too. Which how farre it may extend, I haue declared in part already, and euery man may easily conceiue by himselfe: but sure in what business soeuer I haue to deale with such a man, I cannot tell, but that he may thinke it lawfull to conceale the truth, and consequently to *equivocate* with mee. And in case his conscience will permit him to *equivocate* with mee, (as in what case it will not permit him, I know not) then am I as sure to be deceiued, and ouerreached by him, if I doe beleeuue him, as if I beleeuued a plaine and downe-right lyer. For, my credence or beleefe can reach no further then to the words vttered; nor can I learne any thing from the Equiuocator, but that which I can gather from his words: but

but all that is false and lying ; as hath beene shewed by their owne Confession. And therefore if I beleue a man, when hee doth *equiuocate*, I am sure to be deceived. I declare this yet further by a familiar example. Say, two Priests haue layed a plot of Inuasion for the King some, and being questioned vpon their oaths concerning the plot, they both deny it. And the one, hee saith, *I neuer meant or intended any such thing*, vnderstanding within himself, *so as I meane to tell you of it*: and the other, hee answereth in the very same words, but hath forgotten to frame a *reseruation* in his minde : the one of these by their Doctrine is a lyer, and the other an Equiuocator. But in respect of being deceived by them, what difference is there betweene them ? Shall I not as soone be deceived by the Equiuocator, as by the Lyer ? Yes certainly, it is no more safe to beleue an Equiuocating Iesuite, then a lying Deuill. And if this be so ; then where men teach and professe the Arte of equiuocation, there in wisdome men may not beleue one another : and consequently, they cannot haue that commerce and societie that men should haue among themselues. I conclude this argument against Equiuocators, in the very same manner, as Saint Augustine did against Lyers, onely putting the name of Equiuocator, where he did the name of Lyer. ^a *Either* (saith hee) *wee must not beleue honest men ; or wee must beleue them*, who wee thinke ought sometimes to tell a lye ; or else, wee must beleue that honest men will not at any time tell a lye. The first of these threë is pernicious, (and ouerthroweth societie.) The second is foolish, (and exposeth a man to the mercy of euery cheating companion.) It remaineth therefore to say, that an honest man will neuer tell a lye. Thus that learned Father: by whose example I may reason against Equiuocators in the very same manner. Either wee must not beleue honest

a Aut non est credendum bonis ; aut credendum est ijs, quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri ; aut non est credendum bonis aliquando mentiri. Horum trium primum perniciosum est, secundum stultum. Restat ergo, ut nunquam mentiantur boni. Augustin. de Mendac. cap. 8.

men pag. 6.f.

men on their words or oathes : or wee must beleue them, who wee thinke may *equiuocate* with vs both in words and in oathes : or else, wee must beleue that an honest man will not *equiuocate*. The first is pernicious, the second is foolish : and therefore wee must resolve vpon the third, which is, that an honest man will not *equiuocate*.

Arg. 4. This Doctrine of Equiuocation defeateth all Lawes made against lying, and doth by consequence impeach God of folly for making any such Lawes. I proue it thus. It is a folly to make such Lawes, as are vnauaileable, and cannot reach to the ends, for which they were made. But if Equiuocation be admitted, Lawes against lying cannot serue for the purpose, to which they are intended. This appeareth by two things. First, Gods Lawes and precepts against lying were made for this purpose, to restraine mens tongues from speaking of falshoods and vntruthes. But by the Arte of Equiuocation a man may speake any and all falshoods that hee will, and yet these precepts against lying shall neuer take hold of him : because by a mentall *reseruation* warranted by this Doctrine, hee may make any falshood to become true. And therefore the Equiuocator, notwithstanding all Lawes of God and men against lying, yet is at his libertie to vtter what vntruthes hee will, without the least transgression of any of those Lawes. Secondly, Lawes against lying doe intend preuention of hurt and deceit to be vsed against our neighbour. But admit once of this new doctrine of Equiuocation, and no deceit toward our neighbour can be preuented by any Lawes against lying. For if this Doctrine be warrantable, then all Lawes against lying must be meant onely against such as doe not keepe a *reseruation* in their mindes, to make true the falshoods that they vtter, in their words.

words. And so, for example, when *Moses* saith,
^a *Yee shall not lye one to another:* and when Saint *Paul* ^a *Leuitic. 19.*
 saith, ^b *Put away lying, and speake truth euery man with* ^{11.}
his neighbour; the meaning of these Precepts must be ^b *Ephes. 4. 25.*
 to this purpose; *Speake no vnttruth, nor utter no falshoods*
to your neighbours, vnlesse yee haue some secret reseruati
kept in your minde, which if it be added; will make them
to become true. For, by the Equiuocators Doctrin, if
 such *reseruati* be kept in the minde, then all their
 words become true: and therefore they are no way
 included within these Precepts against lying. But if
 this interpretation of such Lawes may be admitted,
 and such libertie of speech may be granted, without a-
 ny breach of these Lawes: then these Lawes doe no
 way preuent the least danger of deceit and dammage
 that may come to our Neighbour by vntrue and false
 speeches; because I can deceiue him as much by this
 equiuocall *reseruati*, as by a formall lye: as hath been
 proued already. And from these considerations it fol-
 loweth, that Precepts against lying are vaine, if the
 practice of Equiuocation be lawfull.

Arg. 5. If the Doctrin of Equiuocation be true,
 then neither men nor Devils can be conuincd of ly-
 ing. First, men cannot. For though they speake ne-
 uer so vast and apparent falshoods, yet who can say
 but that they haue some *reseruati* in their minde,
 that may free their words from being lyes? And yet
 all sorts of men, when they heare euident vntruthes
 vttered, doe without controll of any, charge the
 speakers with falshoods and lying. Which shew-
 eth that all men iudge of lying and truth, by the
 words vttered, and not by fancies reserued in the
 minde. As for example, the Secular Priests doe
 charge Father *Persons* with a continuall practice of
 lying, so that ^c they giue him *the Whetstone, and leaue*
^c *D. Ely in his*
Notes vpon
the Apologic.
cap. 9. pag. 311.
D. Bagshaw in
his Answ. to
Persons Apo-
logic, pag. 42.
Reply to a
briefe Apolo-
gie, cap. 2.
it pag. 11.

a Apologic
for Subord.
cap. 12. in the
latter end.

it with him too, as if they thought there were no such a bold and impudent lyer in the World, that could winne it from him. But how did the Priests know, but that *Persons* spake with some *equiuocall* referuati-
ons? And if so, then they broke the rule of charitie,
in censuring him for a lyer, when hee was but an E-
quiuocator. And againe, Father *Persons* chargeth the
Seculars with a *infinite number of vntruthes, lyes, slan-
ders, and open falshoods vttered without scruple of con-
science*; so that the use of Equiuocations was little need-
full for them; because they could take libertie enough
without it. But how doth Father *Persons* know, that
his Secular Brethren did not vse Equiuocation in all
these vntrue speeches: and so made them true by
some *reservation*? Thus all men, when they finde ap-
parent vntruthes vttered, sticke not to charge the
speakers with lying. But if the Doctrine of Equiuo-
cation be true, no man can be conuincd of the least
lye, vnlesse himselfe will confesse it.

Secondly, The Deuill himselfe, if this Doctrine be
true, cannot be conuincd to be a lyer. For who can
say, but when he telleth vs most palpable vntruthes,
yet hee may reserue within himselfe some clause to
helpe all? Nay, if this Doctrine be true, it cannot
be supposed with any reason, that the Deuill euer
would or euer did tell any lye at all. For, whatsoeuer
he hath spoken at any time, be it otherwise neuer so
false and lying; yet it might be made true by a *re-
servation*: and hee neither wanted wit to deuise such
reservations, nor will, by such or any other meanes
to free himselfe from the imputation of lying. First,
hee wanteth not wit. I shall not neede to proue this;
because, as I suppose, it will be confessed, that hee
is as quicke and nimble at such deuices, as the fi-
nest witted Iesuite in the packe. But, if any man
shall

shall question it, I will engage my selfe to proue it. Secondly, hee wanteth not will, by this or any other tricke to saue his credit, and to auoid the imputation of lying. For, hee knoweth that the greatest hinderance to his proceedings, is, because the World esteemeth him for a lyer, and the Father of lyes: and if he could once but gaine to be accounted a true and honest dealer, (as by vsing Equiuocation, he might as well proue himselfe to be no lyer, as any Iesuite can:) then hee might finde more credit in the World. For which cause, ^a the Apostle saith that hee *transformeth himselfe into an Angell of light*. And an ancient Writer ¹⁴ telleth of a Monke, who was a strict and religious liuer, that the Deuill, ^b *purposing by a custome of Visions to winne him to the beliefe of a future illusion* which hee intended for him, *did for a long time, as a messenger of truth, shew him all true Visions*. And when by this meanes hee had gained credit to be beleued, then by another Vision, hee perswaded him to renounce Christ, and to become a Iew. And it is an vsuall obseruation among Christians, that the Deuill will tell some truthes, that hee may gaine afterward the more credit to his lyes. And therefore it can be no doubt, but that the Deuill desireth not to be reputed a lyer; and would gladly put off from him all such imputation, if by any trickes hee could deuise how to effect it. Now lay these two positions together: first, That the Deuill wanteth no wit to deuise *reseruations*; and secondly, That hee wanteth no will, by this or any other such deuice, to auoid the discredit of a lyer: and then it will follow, that in reason wee cannot imagine, that the Deuill euer would or did tell a lye, if by an *equiuocall* reseruation hee could cleare himselfe. And hence againe it may be deduced, that as our Equiuocators doe challenge vs for

a 2 Corin. II.

14.

Quum volens eum consuetudine visionum, ad credulitatem future deceptionis illucere, verissima queque multo tempore, Diabolus, velut veritatis nuncius, reuelasset: ad extremum, &c.
Cassian. Col. lat. 2. cap. 8.

flandering them; because wee call them lyers, when they sweare falshoods by imagined *reservations*: so the Deuill himselfe might challenge G O D (be it spoken with reuerence to his Maiestie) for iniustice and slander, because hee hath branded him with the note of a lyer, and calleth him the Father of lyes. But these consequents are most absurd: and therefore the Doctrine of Equiuocation, from whence they follow, is most false.

Thus, by Gods grace, I haue declared, and I trust, in some measure also cleared the poynts propounded in the beginning. Now, for conclusion, I will onely commend one Caueat to the well-meaning Christian; and that is, to beware of trusting them, whose profession is to *equiuocate*. For such men are both more impious and more dangerous than any other sort of lyers, that I know beside.

First, They are more impious, because among men of other Religions, though there may be vicious persons, that make too common a practice of lying deceits; yet that is the fault of the men, and not of their Doctrine. But in the Church of Rome, their great Doctors dee not onely practise this deceit, but praise it too: and commend it to their Disciples, as a *good Arte*; very fit for *scrupulous consciences*. Which doctrine cannot be conceiued to be without great dishonour to God, and much disgrace to Religion.

Secondly, They are more dangerous then any other sort of Lyers, because they come masked vnder a vizard of truth, & armed with resolution to protest, and sweare, and pawn their soules and saluations, vpon the truth of that which they say, notwithstanding that for so much as they vtter, and for all that you can heare or gather by them, all is most false, which they speake. From the consideration whereof, I inferred before, that
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it was not safe to belecue a Iesuited, or any of his fellowes or schollers; for that a man may as soone be deceived by an Equiuocating Iesuited, as by a lying Deuill. Now I adde, therefore wise Christians must be ware of them; and if wee will not be deceived, wee must not belecue either their words or oathes, in what businessse soeuer wee haue to doe with them. This Caueat, that it may the better appeare how farre it is to be extended; I will, for example sake, set downe some speciall cases of ordinarie vse, in which it will not bee safe to belecue them.

1. First then we may not safely belecue them, when they are disputing, and arguing for their Religion, and deliuering points of their faith. For they tell vs, that Iesus our Lord did equiuocate, when hee preached of Prayer and Sacraments, and of his office of iudging the World, &c. And I trow, Iesuites will be ready to imitate the example of Iesus, whose name they beare. But we need not doubt of their meaning in this case; for they therefore alledge the example of Christ, that they may defend and make good their owne practice. And therefore when I heare a Priest or a Iesuited telling of Popes Pardons, and preaching of S. *Patricks* Purgatorie, &c. and when for these, he telleth me, of the consent of the ancient Church, and alledgeth many Fathers to confirme his Assertion; how can I be sure, that hee doth not *equiuocate* with mee in that case? or what reason haue I to thinke, but that he speaketh against his knowledge, and conscience? or how can I, without a note of rashnes and temeritie, belecue that hee doth not wilfully belye the Fathers, and other Authors to serue his owne turne? and when he hath done all, make vp all with a secret *Reseruation*, that I neuer dreamed on?

Secondly, Wee may not belecue them, when they
giue

giue Answers, or beare witnesse in a Court of Iustice, or before a Magistrate; no, not though they sweare what they say, and take it vpon their soules and saluations. For they professe to *equivocate* in such cases, if either the Iudge be *incompetent*, or if he proceed *incompetently*. And when I heare one of them speake and sweare before any of our Gouvernors or Rulers, either Ecclesiasticall or Ciuill, what can I tell, but hee may thinke either the Iudge, or his proceedings to bee *incompetent*, and *vnjust*? Nay sure, in most cases, in which they haue to doe before our Gouvernors, they are knowne to hold, either the Iudge, or the proceeding, or both, to bee *incompetent*. And therefore I cannot see how wee may safely beleue them, when they make answer, or giue euidence vpon their oath.

Thirdly, Wee may not beleue them, when they tell of great wonders and Miracles, done by men of their Order and profession; and by Saints and Images of their owne making. For they professe to *equivocate*, when it may bee for some good to themselues, and therefore much more when it may proue so great a good to their Order, to their Church, and to their Religion. And therefore, when they tell mee of many great miracles done by their men in the Indies, and by the Ladies of *Laurett* and *Hall*; how can I tell, that they doe not fitten and deuise all that vpon their fingers end. to gaine credite to their profession?

Fourthly, We may not beleue them, when they publish and disperse disgracefull tales and reports against the professors and Doctors of our Church. For the disgracing of these men, may breede great aduantage to their Religion: and beside, it is an Axiom of theirs, *He must bee disgraced, because he is an Enemy to their order*. And therefore, when they tell mee of *Luther*,

ther and Calvin and Beza and Bucer and such others, that they either despaired, or recanted, or renounced their Religion; how may I beleue them, that they doe not Equiuocate? Nay it is certaine, that in the forging of these reports, they did either lye, or *Equiuocate*, or both. And therefore when they now tell vs, that many of our Reuerend Bishops, and learned Preachers and Schollers, are of their opinion, and thinke them to be in the right, but that for the worlds sake, they dissemble their iudgement; how can I giue credit to their words, or to their writings? And when they tell vs, that such a Doctor, vpon his death-bed; and such a Bishop toward his latter end, turned Papist, and renounced in their eare, what he had taught in the Pulpit, and was reconciled to the Church of Rome, by one that came and went inuifibly; shall wee beleue them to speake as they thinke? Nay, wee should rather spit in the Lyers faces, that presume vs to bee so simple, as to beleue an Equiuocator in a case so auailable for his Order, and in a thing so vnlikely and absurde in it selfe; that the narration of such a thing, might call in question the truth of a knowne honest man.

Fiftly, We may not beleue Equiuocators in matters of common life, and ciuill conuersation. For they professe to *equiuocate* in most cases of common practice, and in all cases in which they are not bound to reueile the Truth, if the thing may be for their aduantage. And therefore if one of them should contract to marry a mans daughter amongst vs, how can any of vs tell, that the Equiuocator thinketh himselfe bound to lay open his heart, and to speake the truth in this case; and that therefore in his opinion may not equiuocate and deceiue vs? And if he propose to pay me a summe of money, how can I tell that

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he keepeth not a *reservation* behind, that may disanull his promise aforehand; as that he will pay it, if himselfe shall thinke it necessary, or if he shall haue so much to spare, or if hee haue nothing else to doe with his money? &c. And so, if he vndertake to be my Sollicitor for my Law-businesse, or my Physitian for my body, or my Counsellor in any doubtfull case, &c. how shall I be assured that I may beleue his word, and that he doth not for some secret reason kept to himselfe, think it lawfull to cheate me by a mental *reservation*? Surely, for mine own part, if I may know him that professeth the Art of *Equivocation*, I will trust him no further then I would doe a common and noted Lier, that is no further then I do see him.

(::)

FINIS.

